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PREFACE 
The study of guilt and shame encompassed by this die-
sertation grew out of the author's experience in the pastoral 
ministry. It was prompted by the need to understand the 
motivations and emotions surrounding moral conflict and 
crisis. A minister's role in the community both as counselor 
and as moral guarantor leads many persons to seek his counsel 
and guidance when their guilt can no longer be ignored or 
dealt with by their own resources alone. For this reason, 
a minister who seeks to become deeply involved in the care 
and counsel of his parishioners finds that he must deal 
constantly with problems of guilt and shame. 
The dissertation is a study in ethics. It is, how-
ever, limited to an investigation of the motivations and 
evaluative processes which relate to the moral struggle. 
The dissertation does not develep a positive theory of ethics, 
since it is a study in guilt, although hints for such a 
theory emerge. It relies heavily upon the theoretical work 
of psychotherapists, in part because of the author's need 
to develop skills in the counseling arts, and in part be-
cause of the author's conviction that philosophical ethics 
has not yet fully appropriated insights stemming from the 
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psychiatric disciplines. For these reasons the author de-
cided not to deal directly with the many rich insights on 
the nature of guilt found in literature and theology, such 
as in the perceptive work of existentialist writers. 
Questions such as the following emerged from the 
author's pastoral experience, arld helped to stimulate the 
present study: 
1. Questions are raised by the problem of disguised 
guilt. It is not unusual in counseling to discover that an 
undeclared sense of guilt lurks beneath a person's chronic 
exhaustion, depressed moods, distorted perception of others 
as hostile and vindictive, or even a cynical rejection of 
family or communal standards of conduct. This guilt often 
relates to a clandestine pattern of behavior which on the 
surface has been thoroughly rationalized. The disguised 
guilt indicates that a person has held an internal inquisi-
tion and found himself guilty in spite of his avowed ethical 
commitments. 
What is the source of this inner, hidden judgment? 
Why may it be apparently more perceptive of one's actual 
value situation than one•s conscious deliberations may be? 
It is an often held assumption in ethics that subconscious 
impulses and feelings are irrational, and that clarity of 
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thinking about moral aims leads to coherent order among 
these impulses, and facilitates moral achievement. Can it 
be that subconscious impulses and feelings contain the seeds 
of their own immanent order, or are subject to some type of 
subconscious reasoning or valuing process? 
2. A guilty person feels threatened •. He expects 
punishment, even though his situation may protect him from 
legal or social sanctions. He talks of being unable to sleep 
nights, of a haunting sense of impending disaster,. of pro-
found fears which he cannot explain. 
What is the meaning of this anxiety? Is it always 
a neurotic revival of childhood emotions? What is the mean-
ing of a guilty person's profound sense of alienation from 
God? Thoughts of punishment or rejection by God or neighbor 
appear sometimes to be intellectualizations, reasons found 
for anxiety already present, rather than the primary causes 
of anxiety. What is the source of this anxiety? 
3. Some persons appear to be led into moral dilemmas, 
not by too little, but by too intense guilt'. The uncontrol-
lable drinking of the alcoholic and the compulsive sexual 
preoccupation of the philanderer illustrate this phenomenon. 
These persons tend to be driven by shame and guilt into 
dependence upon the very behavior patterns which produce 
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shame and guilt. Under what circumstances is moral confront-
ation possible without reinforcing cynicism, despair, and 
guilt-driven sin? 
4. The above problem leads to another: Protestant 
Churches have traditionally sought to assure conformity to 
moral law by moralistic-authoritarian means. It is commonly 
. thought that reiteration of certain ethical norms and exhort-
ation to reach those norms, accompanied by subtly veiled 
threats as to the consequences if they arei.UOt'~et will lead 
to internalization of standards. Is this effective moral 
strate-gy'l 
To reinforce the guilt of those who sin compulsively 
may feed a pattern of cynicism and self-rejection which hinders 
their moral quest. For iristance, there is much talk in theo-
logical circles about human pride as the basis of sin. Is 
it then effective strategy to condemn pride? Suppose pride 
roots in a problem, not of too much self-regard, but of too 
little self~regard? Pride is then a neurotic defense; to 
attack it merely heightens the person's desperate attachment 
to it. Similarly, if materialistic status-seeking in our 
culture is motivated by esteem needs, is it not more import-
ant to understand and support the victim of our vertically 
stratified culture, rather than to condemn his materialism? 
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Will the support of a community of love diminish the esteem 
needs and hence allow a greater range of freedom from mater-
ialistic preoccupation? 
5. The capacity to verbalize ethical norms appears 
to be only loosely related to actual moral achievement. It 
is a common assumption of philosophical ethics that clear 
verbalization of an ideal helps pe~sons to define the moral 
goal, and hence aids in the quest of moral excellence. 
While this may point to a worthy objective, it appears to 
run counter to much actual experience. Compulsive behavior, 
as we have indicated, does not bend to verbal clarification. 
Encouraging persons to identify moral excellence with effec-
tive ethical verbalization may not be effective strategy. 
It may even encourage persons to stratify interpersonal re-
lationships in terms of verbal stereotypes, rather than 
developing a sensitive grasp of infinitely variable, real 
situations. Similarly, a person may come to talk one moral 
language and live another. Language may be isolated from 
hidden and disguised motivations, and may even become a tool 
of escape from emotional honesty. 
Another dimension to this dilemma is that many per-
sons do an admirably effective job of creating value and 
developing personal integrity, but aren't able to verbalize 
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the principles used. Does ethical thinking then relate to 
moral valuing? If so, the relationship is surely much more 
complex than is often reflected in ethical theory. 
Is it a function of ethics to study moral motivation, 
and to develop strategies for moral education?. Has ethics 
ever divorced itself fully from the Greek presumption that 
knowledge leads to correct action? 
The above questions indicate the author's initial 
impulse to engage in this stu~y. The dissertation itself 
does not fully deal with these questions. It is limited to 
an investigation of psychiatric and ethical theories which 
may shed some light upon the· .. ;moral struggle. It hopefully 
indicates ways in which future ethical dialogue might take 
cognizance of the realities of human experience in the midst 
of moral conflict. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCT.ION 
The central focus of this study is suggested by 
the question: Is conscience cognitive? The problem to be 
investigated is the extent to which the expe:rience of 
,, 
obligation or "oughting" is coherently rela1;:ed to cognition. 
In the early days of modern philoso~~hy conscience was 
conceived as a special faculty offering int1~itive awareness 
of moral right. Thus Kant identified consc:lence with the 
'l ,, 
ucategorical imperative", or sense of duty.': Conscience is 
not the product of exper:i.encet but an inherited or original 
capacity of the soul, and is related to th~ law of duty. The 
view of Bishop Butler was somewhat similar,:, in that conscience 
was seen as a unique capacity which aftfiords. an intuitive grasp 
of duty: 
There is a principle of reflection:in men, by 
which they distinguish between, apj)rove and 
disapprove of their own actions ••• ~This 
principle in man, by which he appr6ves or 
disapproves his heart, temper, and.actions, 
is conscience • 1 :: 
While Bishop Butler saw this function as reflective, 
and one which exercises critical evaluation of passions and 
1Butler, Sermons i, as quoted in g,ncyclopedia of 
Religion and Ethics, Vol. IV, p. 31. 
1 
2 
purposes in the light of human nature, his view coincides 
with Kant's in that conscience is a unique faculty of moral 
cognition. This somewhat paralleled the assumption in some 
theological circles that conscience is the "voice of God" 
which speaks with authority in the hearts of man. 
It is somewhat more the fashion in recent years to 
regard conscience as of no valid moral authority. Thus 
T.V. Smith examined various grpunds of validation of the 
claims of conscience, and refuted each in its turn.l Freud 
is often given credit for having vanquished once and for 
all any illusions about the rational validity of conscience. 
Thus CraneBrinton says that those who see the individual 
sense of moral responsibility disappearing in the Western 
world usually blame, dm part, "belief in Freudian psychology", 
which is belief "in the irrationality of guilt feelings." 2 
Similarly, Thomas Hill points to Freud as a m~j.or source of 
modern ethical skepticism. Conscience originated in primitive 
totemic'practices, according to Freud, and has never outgrown 
its origins. Hill describes. Freud's view as follows: 
1cf. T.V. Smith, Beyond Conscience (New York: Mcqraw-
Hill Book Co., Inc., 19.34.) 
2
clarence Crane Brinton, A History of Western Morals 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1959),.pp. 379-80. 
\' 
3 
Being rooted in emotional reaction 
against primitive patricide and incest 
and in childhood wishes to re .. enact those 
acts, it could in any case scarcely be ex-
pected to be rat"ional; and further analy-
sis of it reveals·that it is for the most 
part definitely irrati.onal. Conscience is 
a major part of the activity of the super-
ego' which is a turning of the death 
instinct, which originally prompted the1 killing of the father, upon one.' s self. 
I. Thesis and Preliminary Assumptions. 
The thesis which will be d~fended in this study 
is that a further reading in Freudian psychoanalysis and 
later psychiatric theories will reveal conscience to be 
cognitive. Conscience, however, is not a unique cognitive 
capacity, as Kant and Butler conceli;ved it, but is rather a 
complex experience coordinated with the cognitive function 
which is to be found at work in every task demanding intell..:. .. 
ective activity. In this sense, conscience is functionally 
\ 
cognitive, or serves within the personality to stimulate and .·~ '~ 
guide cognitive assessment of one's total situation with re-
ference to obligation and duty. 
1. One preliminary assumption is that obligation is 
a complex experience which includes anticipation of guilt. 
The statement "I will feel guilty if I do this" is ordinarily 
\ 
1 • ' Thomas E. Hill, Contemporary Ethical Theories (New 
York: The MacMillan Company, 1960), p .-, 40_. 
'"" \ \\ \ 
-,- .. ~ 
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accepted as valid evidence that one feels an obligation to 
do otherwise. There is no richer source of insight into the 
phenomenology of guilt than Freud's work. If his view of 
guilt is a major rationa.lization for ethical skepticism, it 
appears that a theory of obligation must be preceded by a 
study of Freudian theory. 
An added dimension is confronted, however, by the 
fact that guilt is closely related to problems of self-
esteem and feelings of inferiority and shame. The state-, 
ment "I would feel ashamed of myself if I did this" is 
accepte4 as valid evidence of a sense •of obligation. Con-
science now appears as anticipation of shame as well as 
guilt. As one turns from Freud to more recent psychiatric 
theory, one notes a shift fram an exclusive concentration 
on.-::gu;Ilt to consideration of self-esteem problems. Thus 
in modern psychoanalysis guilt is seen as issuing in 
selfc-hatred and disgust with('aneself . 1 Moving even further 
afield from Freud; one notes that psychiatrists who emphasize 
the interpersonal and cultural aspects of behavior firid feel-
ings related to self-esteem of much greater imp.ortance than 
1
cf. Otto Feniche1, The Psychoanalytic Theory of 
Neurosis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1945), pp. 
105-ff and 134-ff . .:. 
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gutlt. Any study of obligation must surely take cogni-
zance of the thought of such thinkers as Alfred Adler, 
Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan, who see the insecuri-
ties related to self-evaluation as of central importance to 
mental health. The every-day use of the term "obligation" 
includes references to an evaluation of self, or an assess-
ment of anticipated anxieties an:dself-negation following 
failure or neglect in value-achievement. 
With this in mind, a study of various psychiatric 
theories will be made, with special reference to the pheno-
mena surrounding feelings of guil~ and shame. A recent 
clinical distinction between guilt and shame, made by Gerhart 
Piers and Milton B. Singer, will provide an initial defini-
tion: 
Whereas guilt is generated whenever a 
boundary (set by the Super-ego) is touched 
or transgressed, shame occurs when a goal 
(presented by the Ego-Ideal) is not being 
reached. It thus indicates·a real "short-
coming.u Guilt anxiety aicompanies·trans-
gression; shame, failure. 
This distinction between guilt- and shame-anxiety will be 
followed throughout the dissertation. 
1Gerhart Piers and Milton B. Singer, Shame and Guilt: 
A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study (Springfield: Charaes c. 
Thomas, 1953), p. 11. 
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2. A second preliminary assumption is that conscience 
has some relation to the evaluative: function, and is thus 
in some sense functionally cognitive. The term "evaluative 
function" will be used throughout the dissertation as roughly 
synonymous with "cognitive function", in the:~sens.e ·:ii:t~~which~"l 
the cognitive psychologists use the term. 
The cognitive psychologists point out that cognition 
is present in the simplest perceptual experience. Thus "it 
' 
takes the form of phenomenal organization which is centrally 
interposed between the source of stiwulation and the be-
havioral response."1 Such cognitive factors as organization, 
causal reference, schematization, mapping, anticipation, and 
concentration are all involved even in the simplest percep·~ 
tion. The further conclusion is drawn, that "any experience 
or act of valuing presupposes a cognitive-emotional-motiva-
tional matrix."2 This association of valuing with cognition 
is a promising lead which will be investigated in this study. 
From the standpoint of epistemology, the work of 
Brand Blanshard is important in this connection. He sees 
~artin Scheerer, "Cognitive Theory", in Gardner 
Lindzey, Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), Vol. I. p. 99. 
2Ibid., p. 122. 
-~- -· ----- ·---·---- ------·- -··-
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that the most rudimentary mental event involves judgmental 
factors. uThe simplest form of thought is, by general ad-
mission, judgment; and percept~on in turn is the simplest 
form of this."1 Sensations become perceptions only after a 
major task of construction has taken place. Sensations are 
evaluated with reference to· their intensity, their relations, 
their "affective meaningn or interest to us, and the fre;.. 
quency of their repetition.2 A form of implicit inference 
is present in all .perception, since all perception of objects 
involves not only sensory perception of what is given, but 
' 3 belief in which is not given, but only assumed. · Thus "any 
perception is a starting-point from which others may leap, 
like a knmght in chess, in many different directions; and 
the direction of the leap is determined by interest."4 
Here is evidence that evaluative processes of extreme com-
plexity, including not only the weighing of sensory intensity, 
but the meaning of sensations in terms of interest, and the 
screening of sensations in terms of concentration and atten-
tion, are at work below the level of awareness. Indeed, 
1 ' 
Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought (New York: 
The MacMillan Company, 1939), Vol. I, p. 51. 
2
cf. Icid,;., pp·;~· 66-76. 3cf. Ibid., pp. 80-120. 
(!; Ibid., p. 187. 
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consciousness is "like.· the office of a Tammany politician 
after his election, .with an ante-room full of applicants~ 
and places for very few. ul From the vast welter of sensory 
material which enters experience, only a small part is selected 
for specific self-conscious examination; but this selection 
presupposes a selective factor at work at a subconscious level. 
C.I. Lewis speaks to this association of valuation 
and cognition. The purpose of cognition is to guide action, 
he says, and "action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation."2 
Cognition always includes belief in or assertion of some-
thing which lies outside cognition itself. 3 In this sense, 
the content of cognition has value and meaning for the person 
concerned. It includes symbolic reference to the broad range 
of experience. Lewis concludes that valuation is a form of 
empirical knowledge.4 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate 
the thesis that the experience of obligation coordinates 
coherently with cognition. By "cognition11 is meant not 
intellective activity in the narrow sense of logico~verbal 
1Ibid., p. 193. 
2c.I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation 
(LaSalle: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1946), p. 3. 
3cf. Ibid., p. 27. 4cf. Ibid., p. 365. 
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thought, as the philosopher.typically employs the term. 
Rather, we will be concerned with cognition in the broader 
sense of the selective ordering and structuring of exper-
ience which takes place throughout all intrapsychic activity. 
We will use the' term "evaluative function" for three 
reasons: i. To indicate that cognition at every level in-
volves evalua tbre comparisons, the weighing of the intensity 
and meaning of experiential elements, and the ordering of 
those elements into objects and ideas which facilitate action. 
This means that a central valuational focus is present in all 
cognition; namely the intent of the person cognizing. ii. To 
express the preliminary assumption of this dissertation that 
moral evaluation and cognition involve one and the same func-
tion, and that to. deny cognitive validity to moral evaluation 
is to deny that any truth is possible, in the physical sciences 
or eleewhere. iii:~ To block identification of conscience with 
cognition as immediate awareness of objective moral truth, and· 
to indicate the provisional possibility that conscience may 
relate to the creative and constructive aspects of the knowing 
function. 
3. A third preliminary assumption is that psycho-
therapists may have important things to say to philosophical 
ethics. It may be equally valid to indicate that philosophers 
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have important things to say to psychotherapists. It could 
no doubt be demonstrated that when psychotherapists theorize 
they make extensive philosophical and metaphysical assump-
tions, many of which are common to the Weltanschauung of the 
culture in which they live. Recent research revealing that 
patients tend unconsciously to assimilate the value-assumptions 
of their therapists offers graphic illustratton of this fact. 
Certainly no one would doubt that psychiatric theories could 
be subjected to searching epistemological, ethical, and meta-
physical scrutiny, with value to all concerned. 
This dissertation is limited, however, to a critical 
examination of certain ethical systems following a careful 
look at psychiatric insights and clinical assumptions, 
especially as the latter might bear on problems of guilt, 
shame, obligation, and the evaluative function. In this sense 
it will represent an attempt to enrich ethical thinking with 
the insights of depth psychologists, or at least to set up a 
dialogue between the two fields of disciplined thinking. In 
theology the work of Paul Tillich, Albert Outler, Carroll 
Wise, Paul Johnson, Seward Hiltner, and others indicates that 
fruitful cross-fertilization between such related fields is 
a hopeful possibility. Similarly, recent theorists have 
11 
taken a closer loo~ at the place of values in human life 
following the impact of psychoanalytic thinking. 1 
Philosophers build ethical systems upon certain 
assumptions about human nature, motivation, the relation of 
affective to cognitive aspects of consciousness, and the 
psychological consequences of various ways of.acting. There 
is not always evidence that these have been founded on a 
thoroughly empirical investigation 6£ the:cireature "man", 
however. This dissertation is based upon the. assumption 
that the true subject of ethics is man, his valuing, his 
wants and interests, his hidden motivations and apparent 
goals. The subject of ethics is man, and psychotherapists 
may be assumed to be intimately acquainted with this subject. 
Count&ess hours of skilled listening to the most intimate 
concerns of men must offer a rich vein of data. 
II. Previous Relevant Research. 
A search was made of American Dissertations Accepted 
by American Universities2, from the year 1946 to the present. 
1
cf. Alex Inkeles and Daniel J. Levinson,. "National 
Character: the Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural 
Systems", in Gardner Lindzey, Handbook of Social Psychology ••• , 
Vol~· II, pp. 986-ff. 
2Arnold H. Trotier and Marrian Harman, eds. (New York: 
The H.W. Wilson Co.), beginning with the year 1945, and of Dis-
sertation Abstracts (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc.) 
12 
Two dissertations appeared to bear directly upon the sub-
ject under consideration, and were carefullj::/read: 
1. Thomas A. Wassmer wrote a ~h.D. dissertation at 
Fordham University in 1954, on the subject of "A Phenomeno-
logical Study of the Guilt Experience in the Light of Modern 
Ethics and Value Theory". The author is a Roman Catholic 
priest, and writes within the c·ontext of Thomistic theology. 
He investigates the ethical thought of the logical positi-
vists, A.C. Garnett, A.E. Taylor, A.K. Rogers, and G.E. Moore. 
Wassmer finds that the following qualities charac-
terize guilt, some of which clearly feflect the Roman Catho-
lic perspective from which he write·s: i. Self-condemnation; 
ii. Indelibility or indestructibility, in that guilt is a 
macula, an irreversible injury to the soul; iii. Recognition 
of sanction, or punishment; iv. Recognition of defilement, 
of pollution and desecration. 
Some investigation of Freudian thought is made, 
characterizing Freud's view of guilt as self-directed aggres-
sion related to the death-instinct, and as disproportionately 
severe in relation to man's real misdeeds. No study of other 
psychiatric thought was included. 
2. Otis A. Maxfield wrote a Ph.D. dissertation at 
Boston University in 1954 which closely parallels some of the 
I 
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thinking of the present study, under the title of "The Psycho-
logical Nature of Conscience in Freudian Theory". His pur-
pose is to examine the psychological nature of conscience in 
Freudian theory, and to evaluate it in the light of certain 
neo-Freudians and non-Freudians. Erich Fromm and Karen 
Horney are studied as neo-Freudians, and Gordon Allport, 
0. Hobart Mowrer, and Rollo May as non-Freudians. 
The author makes an excellent study of the differ-
ences·between nimmature and mature" consciience. The follow-
ing characteristics are indicated for immature conscience: 
i. It rests upon a basic authoritarian orientation, Freud's 
voice of internalized authority; ii. It is repressive and 
negative, prohibiting expression .of'"~sexual and aggressive 
needs; iii. It is charact:erizedby a disproportionate sense 
of guilt; iv. The unconscious elements achieve precedence 
over conscious elements; v. It gives unlimited power to an 
idealized image of perfection, thus neglecting the real self; 
vi. It is characterized by a "tyranny of'the shoulds" 
(Horney), in complete disregard for feasibility; vii. It 
maintains a pseudo-ideal, and hence is compulsive and coer-
cive; viii. It lacks an integrative capacity, functioning 
in terms of opportunistic goals. 
He characterizes the "mature", or "creative con-
science" as follows: i. It is an agent of expression, not 
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repression; it reflects one's own adequate self-image and 
values; ii. It shifts from obedience tro individual re-
sponsibility; iii. It is characterized by growth; iv. It 
increases tension as long-range goals frustrate innnediate 
· satisfactions; v. It relates tradition to present exper-
ience; vi. It enables the person to organize behavior 
around a central, self-chosen goal; vii. It includes 
religious elements; viii. It is a function of the total 
self, rather than a·single faculty; ix. It arises out of 
self-recognition which creat;es a sense of oughtness; x. It 
is characterized by individuality; one is not ruled by un-
conscious impulses arid desires, but by conscious, self-
chosen goals. 
While the views expressed here are very similar to 
the thesis of thts study that conscience is functionally 
rational, these differences between the two studies may be 
noted$ i. The Maxfield study does not include a critical 
examination of theoretical ethics; ii. The phenomenology 
of guilt, shame, and anxiety do not come in for the inten-
sive scrutiny which this study will give them; iii. The 
Freudian ethical perspective is identified with super-ego 
guilt, whereas this study will point to hidden assumptions of 
Freud which would support a view of the rational conscience; 
15 
iv. The author equates unconscious phenomena with irrational 
and irresponsible drives, and identifies conscience with con-
scious, voluntary goals only. This study will conclude that 
conscience is creatively coordinated with unconscious pro-
cesses, which are not necessarily irrational, but are, in 
fact, immanently rational. The identification of morality 
with conscious, voluntary choices only is too narrow in per-
spective, and does in fact falsify the organismic scope of 
judgmental and evaluative processes. 
III. The Plan of This Study. 
The study will center first upon an investigation 
of various psychiatric theories, tracing through their work 
strains of thought which promise to illuminate the nature of 
guilt, shame, and the evaluative function. Second, three 
contemporary ethical theories will be examined and evaluated 
as to whether their conceptions of obligation adequately 
account for. the'''phenomenological data from psychiatry. 
Chapter II will include a detailed study of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, first with reference to guilt, and then in 
terms of the evaluative function. Freud's own work will 
occupy the center of attention, but the contemporary psycho-
analyst Heinz Hartmann will receive some consideration. 
Hartmann is sometimes given credit for leading Freudian 
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psychoanalysis toward a more creative conception of guilt 
and valuation. The. chapter will begin with an examination 
of guilt in Civilization and its Discontents. Then the 
"structural hypothesisn of Freud will be scrutinized to 
discover the relationship of the super-ego to the other 
psychic functions. Finally, certain implications of Freud's 
work on the intellective functioning of the ego, or uncon• 
scious dream-work, and the meaning of wit, will be used to 
demonstrate that Freud assumed a close functional relation-
ship between guilt and the evaluative function. 
Chapter·;:III will be devoted to an examination of 
three psychiatric theories which have come more directly 
under the influence of social and cultural studies of recent 
years. Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, ·and Harry Stack Sullivan 
appear to be the most creative theoretical innovators among 
this group, who may be called generally ttinterpersonal" or 
"social" psychiatrists. In this chapter the anxieties 
~caompanying self-esteem problems, which correlate generally 
with the Piers definition of shame, will be examined. Certain 
conceptions .which shed some light upon unconscious evaluative 
processes will be investigated to discover their relationship 
to shame-anxiety. 
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Chapter•Iv will offer a comparative summary of the 
psychiatric theories as they seem to suggest a coherent view 
of the nature of obligation. The functional relationship 
between evaluation and guilt- and shame-anxieties will be:.: · 
defended. 
Chapter V will comprise a study of the ethical views 
of H.A. Prichard, C.L. Stevenson, and Brand Blanshard, who 
represent three divergent concept'!i.:ons of the nature of obliga-
tion. The first two are chosen because they represent two 
leading fields of thought which challenge the thesis of the 
dissertation. Ethics is essentially noncognitive in the views 
of these two thinkers. Brand Blanshard has made a significant 
and recent statement which reflects the major issues in con-
temporary ethical dialogue. 
Chapter VI will offer a critique of the three ethical 
theories based upon the view of obligation developed in Chapter 
IV. The cogency of the psychological interpretation of obli-
gation in relating to contemporary ethical discussions will 
thus be tested. 
Chapter VII will contain the major findings of the 
dissertation. 
CHAPTER II 
GUILT AND THE EVALUATIVE FUNCTION IN FREUDIAN THOUGHT 
The purpose tlo which this chapter is directed is 
that of tracing the concept of guilt through the Freudian 
writings, to discover what Freud affirmed about the evalua-
tive function, and to see what relationships he observed 
between guilt and evaluation. Some consideration wili also 
be given to the contemporary psychoanalyst Heinz Hartmann. 
Civilization and its Discontents will be examined 
first, followed by a study of the "structural hypothesis". 
which leads into consideration of the Super-ego and the 
Oedipal relationship. As guilt emerges in Freud's thought 
as a form of anxiety, it becomes necessary to study the ego-
defenses which he saw as prima facie evidence of subconscious 
anxiety. 
Freud's p!Loneering work upon subconscious:!evaluative 
processes is revealed especially in the Interpretation of 
Dreams and in Wit and its Relation. to the Unconscious. These 
works will be used to explore the nature of "primary process" 
thinking. 
The central thesis of this chapter is that Freud 
affirms conscience to be irrational, but assumes its ration-
ality. 
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I. Guilt in Civilization and~Its Discontents. 
Probably Freud's most comprehensive .statement of the 
meaning and place of guilt in human experience is found in 
Civilization and its Discontents. This work, written at 
the apex of Freud's career, has been described as "the 
most distinctive statement in the .philosophy of existence 
and civilization which has been produced in the present 
century."1 Whether or not such enthusiasm is justi-
fied, the work is valuable for our punposes, since guilt is 
therein discussed from the dual perspective of its role in 
individual experience and in culture. In addition, we find 
iri this discussion the fruit of Fre.ud' s unique genius, the 
capacity to observe and to analyze experiential phenomena 
with unusual decisiveness and to interpret this complex 
data by means of a fabric of imaginative theory. 
A. Freud defines the purpose of human life in terms 
of the pleasure-principle. The most basic characterization 
of men is that they "seek happiness, they want to become 
happy and to remain so."2 This means the elimination of 
1Benjaminc N. Nelson (ed.), Freud and the 20th Century 
(New York: Meridian Books, 1947), Pref. 
2 Sigmund Freud, _c..:;:i:.;;;v-=i:..;;;l;;.;;;i;;,;;;;z;.;;;a;;;.;;t;;.;;i;;..;o;;.;;n;;;;......;a;.;.;n"'"d;;;;._,;i;;;;..t.:;;..s;;;_D;;;..,;;;;;i.:;;..s..;;;.c..;;;.o.;;.;n;.;;;t..;;e..;;;.n;;..;t;.;;;;..s • 
Translated by Joan Riviere (London: The Hogarth Press, 1929), 
p. 27. 
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pain and discomfort and the experiena~ng of pleasure. Freud 
the biologist is bette speaking; the pleasure which relates 
to instinctual gratification, especially·following some 
deprivation, is the primal goal of human activity. 
The purpose of culture is to assure human survival 
through cooperative work, and human pleasure through sex-
related activities. 
The life of human beings in common ••• had a twofold 
foundation, i.e. the compulsion to work, created 
by external necess~ty, and the power of love, caus-
ing the male to,iWish to keep his sexual object, 
the female, near him, and the female to keep near 
her that part of herself which has become detached 
from her, her child. Eros and1Ananke were the parents of human culture, too. 
As seen above, culture enables men to live by protecting 
them from the harsher aspects of nature, and gives them a 
reason for living by assuring the close proximity of love 
objects. Fortunately, the work men do also discharges many 
of their libidinal impulses, and spares them the discomfort 
f "f" d . d 2 o ungrat~ ~e erot~c nee s •. 
B. There· is an unfortunate irony inherent in human 
culture, however. Culture is necessary to assure libidinal 
fulfillment, but at the same time it is the great source 
1Ibid.' p. 68. 2Ibid., p. 34. 
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of pepression and deprivation. Cooperative living is an 
absolute necessity, but.the order it entails tends to make 
it the enemy of its own inherent purpose. Thus: 
It is impossible to ignore the extent to which 
civilization is built up on renunciation of 
instinctual gratifications, the-degree to which 
the existence of civilization presupposes the 
non-gratification (suppression·, repression or 
something else 7) of powerful instinctual urgen-
cies. This :t cultural privation' dominates the 
whole field of social relations between human 
beings; we know already that it is the cause of 
the antagonism against which all civilization 
has to fight.l · · . 
As culture evolves, direct sexual expression suffers 
the most severe restrictions. Society acts toward sexual 
relations as an entrenched power gt61lrp might act toward 
the population which it exploits. It absolutely forbids 
the use of sex as a source of enjoyment, and barely 
tolerates it as the only means to multiply the human race. 
This cultUllal enmity toward se~ takes its toll, Freud con-
eludes. The sexual life of civilized man is nseriously 
disabled", and sometimes gives the impression of being "in 
process of becoming atrophied, just as organs like our teeth 
cm:.d our ha:ti: seem to be. n 2 
1 . Ibid.,p.63. 
2
ef. Fromm's comment on this as revealing Freud's 
own sexual inadequacy, in Erich Fromm, Sigmund Freud's Mission 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 29-ff. 
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Fredd explains this phenomenon by referring to the 
law of psychic energy. Culture requires mental energy for 
its own purpose, arid hence is jealous of its being expended 
in sexual pursuits. The higher mental operations, such as 
scientific, artistic, and ideological activities, play an 
important part in civilized life, and depend for their 
energy upon the sublimated sexual drive.l 
A basic weakness in Freud's cultural analysis reveals 
itself at this point. On the basis of his theoretical for-
mulation, it would be impossible to explain the evolution 
of these "higher types of mental activity." The goal of 
human life is libidinal gratification. Culture evolves to 
assure survi-val and erotic fulfillment. ·scientific and 
artistic pursuits certainly do not secure the latter goal, 
since they are in jealO.us competition for the psychic energ-
ies involved. While a case might be made for the utility 
of scientific pursuits as assuring survival by wre~t11ilg? 
the initiative away from nature, a. similar case cannot be 
made for aesthetic pursuits, which have little survival 
value. 2 Such pursuits might become a substitute for sexual 
1Freud, Civilization.~ •. , p. 63. 
2 Of. Ralph Linton, The Study of Ma~ _(New York: D. 
Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1936) for a discussion of 
elaboration as a threat to survival, especially pp. 87-90. 
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expression for the fortunate few who can sublimate their 
energies in this way,l but the aesthetic interests of this 
/ 
elite come at the cost of depriving the vast majority of 
libidinal gratification. Of course, on the basis of the 
pleasure-principle we cannot understand how beauty can be-
come a substitute for sexuality. What value can its indul-
gence offer which can take the place of ~? This is the 
·classic dilemma of hedonism. Its defense leads one to 
defend pleasure on a qualitative basis, but this puts 
pleasure under a standard of judgment which::. is more than 
pleasure. 
Freud can only conc~ude that for some reason which 
he never elaborates (except for passing blows at Christianity, 
which he seems to blame for this and many other ills), cul-
ture has evolved into an unfortunate dilemma of staggering 
magnitude. 
, 
An elite few enjoy their sublimated "higher 
mental operations" only through the serious deprivation of 
the masses, and this through a· j:eaiousnsurveillance of their 
sexual life~ Who this ~iite might be Freud never elaborates; 
he usually hypostatizes nculturen and blames it as a collect-
ive entity. Certainly one aspect of Freud's therapeutic aim 
1e£. Freud, Civilization .•• , p. 39. 
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is the championing of the individual-'s instinctual needs 
against "culturett, which inhibits them and diverts them 
to purposes foreign to the individual's true.interests. 
0. Now, the result. of the above impasse between a 
hypothetical 'lite and the deprived masses is precisely 
what one might expect. Culture is eternally threatened 
with imminent revolt. 
Civilized society is perpetually menaced with 
disintegration through tlie primary hostility 
of men tow~rds one another .••• Culture has to 
call up every pos~ible reinforcement in order 
to erect barrier-s against the aggressive in-
stincts of men. and hold their.manifestations1in check by reactJ.:on-formations 1n men's minds. 
The primary task of culture, then, is to deal with 
aggression. Its survival depends on:it. What is the 
source of this aggression? Freud carries two mutually 
incompatibletheories along at the same time, in what 
amounts to an internal contradiction. 
1. The Death Instinct: In Beyond the Pleasure;. 
Principle Freud had concluded that in addition to the 
life instinct, eros or libido, which he had formerly 
thought to comprise the whole of the instinctual energies, 
he must affirm the .universality of the death instinct. He 
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apparently arrived at this conclusion for two reasons, one 
biological and the other psychological. He felt that in 
addition to the instinct to preserve biological life there 
must be an opposing one which-aims at the return to the 
antecedent inorganic state. This he had to affirm,_ since 
it was his conviction that every biological need or goal 
had its psychic components, and in pne important sense the 
goal of biological life is death and dissolution. More 
important, however, Freud affirmed the death wish in order 
to explain.the clinicalobservation that sexuality is 
closely related to sadism, the need. to destroy the beloved, 
and masochism, the need to destroy oneself. Sexual im-
pulses often seem J:o convert into aggressive aims. If the 
life-impulse, or libido, is essentially sexual, then the 
aggressive impulses which relate to sex would lead one log:i:-
cally to .affirm the death-impulse, since the life impulse 
is here bent on destruction of life. 
What-ever its genesis, the concept of the death wish 
led Freud to regard aggression as · instinctual. Thus: 
In all that follows I take up the standpoint that 
the tendency to aggression-is an innate, indepen-
dent, instinctual disposition in man, and I come 
back now to the-statement that it constitutes the 
most powerful obstacle to culture.l 
1Ibid.' p. 102. 
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This instinct of aggression is the derivative 
and main representative of the death instinct 
we have found alongside of Eros, sharing his 
rule over the earth. And now, it seems to me, 
the meaning of the evolution of culture is no 
longer a riddle to me. It must present to us 
the struggle between Eros and Death, between 
the instincts of life and the instincts of 
destruction, as it works itself out in the 
human species .1. 
Freud agrees with Hobbes: Homo Homini Lupus. Man 
is to man a wolf. This eternal struggle of the individual 
with culture is for Freud a manifestation of the eternal 
struggle of man with himself. He needs to die and destr9y 
as basicallyas he needs to live and love. This is the 
irremediable curse of his existence. 
2. Aggression as Reactive: The second view of 
aggression, which Freud holds in indiscriminating tension 
with the first, is that aggression results when libido needs 
are thwarted •. Aggression is a .reaction against all depri-
vat.iori. which is not self-imposed. This view is the one 
expressed on page 21 above. Civilization presupposes non-
gratification of many of our instinctual energies, and this 
cultural deprivation results in antagonism. Certainly this 
viewpoint would render more coherent Freud's analysis of 
culture.as hostility-producing. It is this viewpoint, too, 
1Ibid.' p. 103. 
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which Freud relates most closely to guilt, as we shall see 
below. When the infant was first deprcived of gratifications 
by the adult environment, aggressive impulses resulted; it 
is this reactive aggression which causes the ambivalence 
related to the Oedipal situation, and results ultimately 
in the self-directed hostilities of the guilt situation. 1 
Now, the choice of one of these theories of aggress-
ion over the others holds the most far-reaching implications 
for ethics. If aggression is a part of the congenital 
structure of the human personality, then a certain despair-
ing pessimism enters our ethics, and we are led to build a 
repressive and authoritarian system to guard man from him-
self. If, on the other hand, aggression is a natural re-
action to deprmvation, we are led in the direction of a 
realistic optimism, and the building of a life•fulfilling 
climate wherein men are enabled and encouraged to seek the 
goals of their congenital tendencies. 
At this point, however, it is important to relate 
this discussion to Freud's theories of guilt. 
D. Whether aggression is a congenital inheritance 
or a reaction to deprivation, culture has to deal with it. 
1 . 
.Th.!s!·, pp.' 114-ff. 
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If people were allowed to express it openly the civilization 
would degenerate, and men could no longer live to love. 
Civilization employs an ingenious means to control aggress-
ion. 
The aggressiveness is introjected,. 'internalized'; 
in fact, it is sent back where it came from, i.e. 
directed against the ego. It is there taken over 
by a part of-the ego that distinguishes itself from 
the rest as a superego, and now, in the form of 
'conscience', exercises the same propensity to harsh 
aggressiveness against the ego that the ego would 
have liked to enjoy against others. The tension 
between the strict super-ego and the subordinate 
ego we call the sense of guilt; it manifests itself 
as the need for punishment. Civilization therefore 
obtains the mastery over the dangerous love of 
aggression in individuals by enfeebling and disarm-
ing it and setting up an institution within their 
minds to keep watch over it, li~e a garrison in a 
conquered city.l 
Now, the process of introjecting aggressive tenden-
cies, and the development of ttconscienceu or a sense of 
guilt has two phases: 
1. There is no natural sense of good and evil; in 
fact, evil is most often that which would give the ego 
pleasure. We forego these pleasures because we fear the 
loss of love. Man is absolutely dependent on others, so the 
dread of losing love is a primal source of anxiety. Con-
science in early stages, then, is social anxiety. 
1Ibid.' p. 105. 
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Fear of loss of love is also fear of the aggressive-
ness of authority, since love is a protection against this 
aggressiveness. Very early in life, we learn to give up 
instinctual gratifications, to identify with authority, 
and ~ence to avert the threat of aggression. At this level, 
of development renunciation diminishes threat. 
2. Freud noted clinically, however, that in the 
guilt situations found in aduilit life dep~ivation does not 
diminish self-aggression. Those who are the most righteous 
in their instinctual renunciations are usually the most 
guilt-ridden. Similarly, when things go well with a man, 
conscience is lenient, but "when some calamity falls, . he 
holds an inquisition within, discovers his sin, heightens 
the standards ofhis conscience, imposes abstinences on him-
self and punishes himself with penances. ul Adverse circum-
sta.nce:;:is apparently a substitute di6r parental punishment, 
or so it appears to the clinician who observes the guilty 
person's reactions. 
Now the situation is reversed; renunciation does not 
decrease guilt, but rather increases it. Freud describes 
this situation as that of a nstrict super-ego11 ; the person-
1 Ibid., p. 110. 
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ality ~s attacking itself with aggression apparently gener-
ated from within. To explain this, Freud once again has 
recourse to two different theo117ies.i which he holds simul-
taneously. 
a). When the infant was first restrained from grati-
fying its instinctual needs, severe aggressive impulses were 
generated by this thwarting. This aggression could·~·not be 
exercised against the parents, its true object, for fear of 
a loss of love and reciprocal aggression. The ·result is 
that the aggression is forced back upon itself, and becomes 
a part of the_ personality, the super-ego. The super-ego 
attacks the ego, not because it deserves attack, but be-
cause it identifies with the parental figure, sides with it, 
and assumes its role. It is in its role as authority-surra-
gate that the ego is attacked. These passages illustrate 
this: 
When authority prevented the child from enjoying 
the first but most important gratifications of 
all, aggressive impulses of considerable intensity 
must have been evoked in it •••. By the process of 
identification--it absorbs into itself the invul-
nerable authority, which then becomes the super-
ego and comes- into possession of all the agg~ssive­
ness which the child would gladly have exercised 
against it.l 
1Ibid.' p. 115. 
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The effect of instinctual renunciation an~con­
science thenooperated as follows: every impulse 
of aggression which we•,1omit to gratify is taken 
over by the super-ego and- goes-· t,o ,heighten its 
aggressiveness (against the ego.) l 
Here we see that Freud's theory of aggression as 
reaction is employed to explain guilt. The sequence would 
be as follows: 
(1) Authority prevents instinctual gratifications, 
giving rise to aggressive impulses in the infant. 
(2) These aggressive impulses cannot be vented on 
authority for fear of loss of love and reciprocal aggress-
ion. 
(3) The infant identifies with authority, and in 
the role of authority-figure curbs its own gratifications. 
(The nature of this identification is not explained at 
this point.) 
(4) The aggressive impulses are directed against 
the ego, but in its role as authority-surrogate. 
b). Freud's second theory sees guilt as originating 
in the Oedipus complex'· which means that it "was acquired 
when the father was killed by the association of the bro-
thers.n2 This Oedipal situation presupposes an inhelt!'ent or 
1 Ibid., p. 114. 2Ibid. , p. 118. 
.. . :,-, 
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primal will to destroy the father, source of ultimate 
authority and aggression from without, and to marry the 
mother, source of ultimate love. The prospect of killing 
the father, boweve.r, sets up remorse, which must root some-
where in the instinctoid structure of the personality: 
This remorse was the result of the very earliest 
primal ambivalence of .feelings towards the father: 
the sons.bated him, but they loved him too; after 
their bate against him. bad been satisfied by their 
aggre-ssive acts, ·their love came to expression in 
their remorse about the deed, set up the super-ego 
by identification with the father, gave it the 
father's power to punish as he would have done the 
aggression they had performed, and created the 
restrictions which should prevent a repetition of 
the deed~l ~· . , . · . 
At this poirit •• ~we can· last clearly perceive 
the part played ··by love in the origin of conscience 
and the fatal inevitableness of the sense of guilt. 
It is not really a decisive matter whether one has 
killed one's father or abstained from the deed; 
one must feel guilty in either case, for guilt 
is the expression of the conflict of ambivalence, 
the eternal struggle between Eros and the destruc-
tive or' death instinct.2 
Here the doctrine of aggression as instinctive has 
returned. In this case, the. guilt sequence is as follows: 
(1) The death instinct drives one·to plot aggression 
against the father, ultimate source of external aggression. 
1Ibid. ' p. 120. 2Ibid., p. 121 
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(2) The love instinct causes remorse at the thought, 
identification with the hated father, and the turning of 
aggression against oneself forthreatening the ihove object. 
(3) Guilt remains as the eternal inner conflict 
between Eros and the death instinct, the mark of our tragic 
human fate. 
E. It remains to point to two other aspects of guilt 
which Freud describes in his major social ana~ysis. We have 
seen that guilt relates to aggression, whieh Freud says 
~'civilization" turns back upon the individual in order to 
protect the social fabric. That aggression may relate 
either to instinctual deprivation or to the primal death 
wish. It becomes guilt as the individual identifies with 
the authority figure, introjects the role of authority, and 
directs the aggression against himself as authority-surrogate.· 
Now it is important to lif~ up two other aspects: 
Guilt is a type of anxiety, and is largely unconscd:ous. 
At bbttbm the sense of guilt is nothing but a top-
ographical variety of anxiety, and~ •• in its later 
phases it coincides completely with the dread of 
the super-ego •. ~.Somewhere or other there is always 
anxiety hidden behindall symptoms •••• Consequently 
~t is very likely that the sense of guilt produced 
by culture is not perceived as such and remains 
to a great extent unconscious, or comes to express-
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ion as a sort of uneasiness or discontent for 
which other motivations are sought.l 
Here we see the nucleus of two insights which have 
become virtual axioms in counseling psychology: (1). Guilt 
is a species of anxiety. (2). We may suffer the effects 
of guilt without being consc~ously guilty, or even recog-
nizing that guilt is in any way related to our anxiety. Both 
of these findings hold deep significance· for ethics. If 
guilt is a form of anxiety,. why does a person who. feels 
guilty suffer from a self-initiated fear? What is the signi-
ficance of this? If guilt is mainly u~conscious) yet may be 
clearly seen by the skilled psychotherapist to affect the 
entire life style of the.person, what does this say about 
conscience? May it be a more universal phenomenon than we 
would believe from merely verbal testimony? Does careful 
clinical analysis point to a universal base of values in 
terms of which persons may suffer guilt-anxiety? Even though 
guilt may be disguised and preconscious, might it not in 
many instances indicate that a person has made a judgment 
of his moral situation, which may be truer to reality than 
he can bring himself to admit verbally? · 
lrbid., p. 126~ 
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These issues will be explored in succeeding chap-
ters. Here it is important for us to look at the so-called 
"structural hypothesis", which will allow a closer scrutiny 
of the terms "super-ego", "anxiety", "identification", and 
"Oedipus complex", all of which have been associated with 
guilt in the discussion above. 
II. The Structural Hypothesis. 
To assist him in his clinical work among neurotics, 
Freud made three attempts to construct a model of the psychic 
h . 1 mec an~sms. The first of these was an analogy only, and 
was abandoned. In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud com-
pared the mind to an optical instrtnnent, with different 
functional parts reacting to sensory stimuli, producing con-
sciousness, storing and reproducing memories, and other 
functions. Psychic energy flowed among these, energizing 
them as required, something as a nerve impulse is energized. 
The second model was the famous division of mental 
functions in relation to consciousness. He distinguished 
three mental systems, Ucs. (unconscious), Pes. (preconscious), 
and Cs. (conscious). Preconscious mental contents are those 
1cf. Charles Brenner, An 
choanalysis (Garden City, N.Y.·t· 
1955), pp. 34-37. 
l 
Elementary Textbook of Psy-
Doubleday Anchor Books, 
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which can be recalled by an effort of attention, and are 
forgotten when attention is withdrawn. Unconscious mental 
contents and processes are actively barred from conscious-
ness by some force within the mind itself, and cannot be re-
called at will. This theory is sometimes spoken of as the 
"topographic hypothesis.n 
The third model of the mind was fully formulated and 
described by Freud as The Ego and the Id, in 1923. This 
"structural hypothesisn was proposed to distinguish three 
groups of mental processes, which were functionally related 
to each other, but at the same time in some way functionally 
autonomous. Certain mental processes appeared to Freud to 
function together as a unity, sometimes in cooperation with 
others, and sometimes in opposition to them. He distinguished 
three such functional categories, and called them the id, the 
ego, and the super-ego. These must be explicated in some 
detail, for they allow us to understand the precise nature 
of Freud's impact on ethical attitudes today, and will pro-
vide the framework for our critique of his ethical posture. 
A. The Id. 
The id may be defined as the psychic representations 
or counterpart of somatic drives; those most primitive 
psychic functionings which are in direct contact with the 
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inherited biological functions of the human body. Freud 
summarized it as follows: 
You must not expect me to tell you much that is 
new about the id, except its name4 It is the 
obscure inaccessible part of our personality; 
the little we know about it we have learnt from 
the study of dream-work and the formation of 
neurotic symptoms, and most of that is of a 
negative character, and can.only be described as 
being all that the ego is not. We can come nearer 
to the id with images, and call it a chaos, a 
cauldron of seething excitement. We suppose that 
it is somewhere in direct contact with somatic 
processes, and takes over from them instinctual 
needs and gives them mental expression •••• These 
instincts fill it with energy, but it has no 
organization and no unified will, only an impul-
sion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctual 
needs, in accordance'with the pleasure-principle. 
The laws of logic--above all, the law of contra-
diction--do not hold for processes in the id. 
Contradictory impulses exist side by side without 
neutralizing each other or drawing apart; at most 
they combine in compromise formations under the 
overpowering economic pressures towards discharg-
ing their energy.~ •• In the id there is nothing 
corresponding to the idea of time, no recognition 
of the passage of time, and ••• no alteration of 
mental processes by the passage of time .••• Natur-
ally, the id knows no values, no good and evil, 
no morality •••• Instinctual cathexes seeking dis-
charge,--Ihat, in our view, is all that the id 
contains. 
The above statement speaks for itself, but it re-
mains for us to explicate two central ideas, first the "plea-
1 Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; 
as quoted in Nandor Fodor and FranrG~ynor (eds.), Freud: 
Dictionary of Psychoanalysis (New York: Philosophical Lib-
rary, 1950), p. 90. 
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sure-principle", and then the prelogical means of id function-
ing, which Freud calls elsewhere· the ~•primary process. nl 
1. The pleasure-principle is the principle operative 
in all id functions. When the tension level of the organism 
is raised, that tension is discharged immediately, if poss~ 
ible. Tension is uncomfortable--release is pleasurable. 
The one goal of the primitive organism is escape from the 
uncomfortable tensions of somatic need. 
2. The p;imary process has come to have a dual mean-
ing in contemporary psychoanalysis. 2 It may refer to~.,what 
is called nprimat:y process thinJ.sing", which is the type of 
thinking characteristic of the infant or one whose ego is 
immature, or a person who has regressed under emotional 
strain. This is prelogical, picture or image thinking, using 
symbols and analogies. We shall discuss this in fuller de-
tail later. 
This development of the term apparently grew from 
Freud's original usage, building on his dream work. As it 
relates to the id, the term "primary process" referred to the 
manner in which the id may affect pleasurable release in the 
1af., for instance, Freud, An Outline of Psychoanaly-
sis. Translated by James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., Inc., 1949), p. 108. 
2Brenner, Elementary Textbook ••• , p. 49. 
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absence of the desired object~ It hallucinates the desired 
object, and wishes for it. A wish is the ideational repre-
sentation of a somatic impulse. 1 This process enables the 
primitive organism to "known what it is seeking, to initiate 
activity toward it, and to recognize it when it is found. 
Before-the development of the capacity to postpone instinct-
jlve needs, it may serve temporarily to allay discomfort. 
That. is, the hallucination itself may suffice until tension 
reaches a certain level and seeking activity is made urgent. 
B. The Ego. 
A full discussion of the ego would involve us in 
virtually the entire Freudian system. Here we are content 
to characterize it generally, and to point to distinctive 
concepts which relate to its functioning. It will be dis-
cussed later, as we discuss the evaluative function generally, 
and in our critical comments below. We point to these quot-
ations as typical: 
We .•• recognize in man a psychical organization 
which is interpolated between his sensory stimuli 
and perception of his bodily needs on the one hand, 
and his motor activity on the other; and which 
mediates between them with a certain purpose. We 
call this organization his "I" (Ego). 2 
lcf. Hall and Lindzey, Art. (1954), 147-ff. 
2Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis. Translated by 
Nancy Proctor-Gregg (N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1950), 
l>~ 33. 
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The Ego was developed out of the corticaL'.layer 
of the id, which being adapted for the reception 
and exclusion of stimuli, is in direct contact 
with the external world. Its psychological 
function consists in raising the processes in the 
id to a ~igher dynamic level (perhaps by trans-
forming freely mobile into bound energy, such as 
corresponds to the preconscious condition); its 
constructive function consists in interposing, 
between. the. de~nd made by an instinct and the 
action that satisfies it, an• intellective activ-
ity which, after considering the present state of 
things and weighing up earlier experiences, en-
deavo~s by means of experimental actions to calcu-
late the consequences of. the proposed line of con-
duct.l 
The ego, then, is the organized, executive aspect of 
the mind. It is a part of the id; it seeks to forward the 
pleasurable e~ergy releases of the id; it utilizes the energy 
of the id; and it is never. fully independent of the id. It 
seeks to fulfill id-requirements by mediating between these 
"truly private" psychic needs and exte:tnal reality, and as 
we shall see later, between these needs and super-ego demands. 
1. Secondary process;. Originally, this term, as 
contrasted to the "primary process", referred to the binding 
and mobilization of psychic energy'· or the process by which 
freely mobile energy., as it is often called in psychoanaly~. 
sis, is converted into "bound" energy. The tendency of the 
id, in fact its only capacity, taken in the abstract, is to 
lFreud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, as quoted in 
Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary .•• , p. 64. 
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discharge the "cathexis" or energy quantum as it arises. 
This immediate gratification may, of course, prove danger-
ous to the organism; survival depends upon the capacity to 
delay discharge untii a suitable object comes along. 
The ego, according to· Freud, utilizes and diverts id 
energy (libido) for the purpose of control. All libido is 
"narcissistic" at first, or is withdrawn by the ego from the 
primitive instinct-system, and is invested in, or "cathects" 
external Hobj.ects" only after much evaluation. The id is 
so .controlled as the ego utiliz_es this energy against it, 
or "reality testing" is made possible. Given time and energy, 
the ego formulates a plan to satisfy a need, and tests it by 
action to see if it will work. It tests the "wishes" or hall-
ucinatory images suggested by the primary process, to see 
whether in fact an object exists in nature which can fulfill 
the wish, and whether this is the most propitious time and 
place to do so. In contemporary psychoanalysis, when this 
skill is adequate, the person is said to have a "good sense 
of reality."l One aspect of this is the capacity to know pre-
cisely where "self" and "not self" shade into one another, or 
to have "firm ego boundaries." 
1cf. Ibid., pp. 54-ff. 
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It is important to note that virtually every func-
tional aspect of the person's existence is conceived by Freud 
to be an ego function. The id is the psychic counterpart 
for the somatic system, which in one sense is the instrument 
of the ego, or the resisting and facilitating medium for its 
organizing activities. Thus motor control, sensory percept-
ion, memory, affects, and creative thought are all ego funct-
ions, and are all employed to test reality in order to gauge 
its pleasure-affording possibilities. 1 
We note especially that all affects, or the entire 
emotional life is an ego function. Their dynamic f<lree comes 
from the n;i;.d, but their qualitative form registers on the 
ego. The term ulibido", then, or the basic id-energy, .. must 
be regarded as a high abstraction. Freud continued to speak 
of it in sexual terms, even after affirming its extra-sexual 
nature. Certainly if all emotions are ego functions, the 
associations of tender love or violent lust which surround 
the term "libido" have to be abandoned. Similarly, if we 
follow Freud's later theory and affirm the ndeath wish", then 
the aggressive emotions he read into it must be carefully 
abstracted. Another implication of this is that anxiety 
1
cf. Ibid., pp. 59, 63-81. 
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becomes an emotion which is intimately related to the creat-
ive, synthesizing thought functions. This will be developed 
below as a central criticism of Freud's moral position. One 
wonders, too, how much meaning is sti;Ll retained in the "plea-
sure principlett as a primary process or id function. Dis-
charge of an energy quantum is said t.o give pleasure, but 
this pleasure is an affect, and cannot even be recognized as 
such or evaluated for its quality and intensity apart from 
the organizing thought functions of the ego. Any reference 
to the "pleasure principlen which is used to make Freud a 
hedonist must certainly be modified by this qualification. 
When Freud. says, "The power of the id expresses the true-,pur-
pose of the individual organism's life,nl we must read it to 
mean not that pleasure is the goal of living, but that dis-
charge of energy is the goal of living. Freud continues 
throughout his writings to read more affect into the id tban 
he is consistently ailowed to do. 
2. Ego defenses: Reality never affords the organism 
sufficient opportunities for·energy discharge. For this 
reason, the ego is constantly in the position of being beset 
by more id energy than it knows how to handle. It cannot 
1Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, as quoted in 
Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary .•• , p. 91. 
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neutralize it all. It has to defend itself, at the cost of 
energies which might have been used in more productive causes. 
Freud discussed several means of defense which the 
ego employs, and Anna Freud systematized these in her classic 
work, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. It is important 
for us to discuss these here, first because they permeate 
every school of psychotherapy, and second because they re-
late to anxiety, a~d guilt is a form of anxiety. In addition, 
they enable us touobserve the complex range of evaluative 
ego functions which occur below the le~el of awareness and 
conscious control. Freud thought of these defensive devices 
as pathological. The ego ideally tests, judges, and evalu-
ates reality in order to meet the id wishes; when it is on 
the defensive, however, it distorts reality. 
Before discussing individual defensive devices, it 
is important to see how they relate to anxiety. The ego is 
not defending itself against a threat from the outside world, 
but against anxiety arising from the threat of id-impulses. 
According to Brenner,1 Freud developed two theories of anxiety. 
His original theory was that it was a "damming up and inade-
l,cf. Brenner, Elementary Textbook ••• , pp. 76-87. 
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quate discharge of libido. ul Whenever libido accumulated, 
because external.circumstances or personal inhibitions pre-
vented its discharge, this quantum of energy became trans~ 
formed into anxiety. Freud's second theory of anxiety 
appeared in his monograph entitled The Problem of Anxiety, 
in 1926. Here he proposed that anxiety be conceived as re-
lated to traumatic situations, or situations in which nthe 
psyche is overwhelmed by an· influx of stimuli which is too 
great for it either to master or to discharge.n2 For the 
infant, whose ego is not sufficiently developed to hold the 
drive-related wishes in abeyance, anxiety is a constant 
threat, since these wishes may at any time overwhelm the 
infant psyche with a flood of stimuli. _ While traumatic 
situations may arise from the environment (such as the birth 
experience, for instance), the real problem is the pressing 
demand of the id. Now, there is a second part to this theory 
which is important to us. The child learns to anticipate a 
traumatic situation, and to react to it with what Freud 
called "signal anxiety." The ego produces this anxiety in 
order to mobilize its forces to defend against an overwhelm-
1Ibid., p. 76. 2Ibid., p. 78. 
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ing flood of uncontrollable stimuli from the id. We will 
see below some of the implications of this theory for ethics. 
If guilt is a type of signal anxiety, which functions to 
warn the person of a situation which is evaluated as_ threat-
ening, and threatening precisely because it may(<OVerwhelm 
the judgmental capacity, then: ,guilt is cognitive through and 
through. This hints at the possibility of developing an 
ethic of the rational conscience. 
A second preliminary consideration of some interest 
is this: Ego defenses function below the level of awareness. 
A person is rarely conscious either of_having adjudged his 
situation as threatening, or of choosing a defensive de-
vice to guard against the resulting anxiety. In fact, the 
anxiety itself may be·· felt only if the defense is in serious 
danger of collapse. This means, then, that highly complex 
evaluations are made continually without conscious control, 
but which are nevertheless cognitive in nature, in the sense 
that they include a direct acquaintance with the hidden data 
of one's psyche, and a weighing of the strength of opposing 
inner forces. They include a complex evaluation of the in-
terpersonal situation, too, since it is in terms of the 
expectations of others that the threatened controls are 
e_xercised. This line of reasoning will continue to be the 
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major theme of this dissertation, and will lead us to affirm 
that the presence of signal anxiety in the form of guilt 
and shame indicates that the person is aware at an organ-
ismic level of a threat situation which is moral in nature. 
We need here only briefly to mention and define the 
various demense mechanisms. The significance of" these for 
ethics will become more apparent later, especially after 
the discussion of Sullivan • s thought. The fa·ct. that the pre-s-
~ence of anxiety, . including guilt-anxiety, may be revealed 
only by the presence of these defensive reactions, holds 
interesting implications for an ethic of conscience. 
a) Repression: ·Repression.:is the most general means 
of defense; in fact, some writers use it as a synonym for all 
of .the defense mechanisms, or point out .that all defense pre-
supposes repression. Repression is an ego activity which 
bars from consciousness an unwanted id impulse, or a memory, 
emotion, or desire relating to it. It is important to see 
this as a dynamic act of the ego, or an "anticathexis", and 
that the repressed material often retains a cathexis of drive 
energy. Another distinction will become important to us, too: 
repression involves not only a barring from consciousness, 
hut a barring. from the ego, as well. Fraud wrote that undue 
repression diminishes the ego, reduces its strength and 
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effectiveness, and may even violate its integrity. He con-
tinued, however, -to speak of repression as a forced for-
getting only, as though resistance to awareness were the 
decisive feature of repression. White shows that repression 
entails the attempted isolation of the unwanted material 
from evaluation of any kind, conscious or uncons~ious, and 
reveals the way in which this isolation leads to u.~~~$.~.t~c 
ionn, or the exaggerated significance which comes to be 
placed on the isolated material. 1 This is an important 
distinction for us. Since most evaluation takes place be-
low the threshold of awareness, the repression which is most 
significant is that which bars material from ego considera-
tion as a whole. 
b) Reaction Formation and Projection: Hall and 
Lindzey discuss these together,2 because in the former the 
object of a repressed feeling remains the same while the 
affective state changes, and in the lat·ter the affective 
state remains constant but the object of the feeling is 
shifted. 
. 
1Robert Winthrop White, The Abnormal Personality_ 
(New York: Ronald Press Co., 1949), pp. 217-ff. 
2~. Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psy-
chology (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 
1954), I, pp. 163-ff. 
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In reaction formation one of a pair of ambivalent 
attitudes, such as love-hate, is repressed, while the other 
is overemphasized. Thus love may appear to be replaced by 
hate--ttl love you11 becomes "I hate youtt, or if, more· ·ttjzpit!-
ally, hatred is the anxiety-producing feeling, it may be 
repressed and love be expressed. Whenever an attitude 
seems to be unrealistic and excessive, the therapist may 
suspect that it is a defense against its opposite. Brenner 
points out. that identificaticm, which we saw plays an im-
portant role in the introjection o£ guilt, may be related 
to reaction formation. Thus when a two•year-old is told 
to nlove baby", when he really hates baby, he 'iloves baby" 
in a special way., "He acts as though he himself were the 
mother and imitates her in his actions and attitude toward 
baby. In other words, he unconsciously identifies with 
mother. nL As we· discuss the· super-ego, we may note that 
· Freud could be right--that moral standards which are intro-
jected on the basis of identification with an autho~ity 
figure may be in some sense pathological when carried over 
intm adult life. They may be noted for their rigid and 
brittle quality; they are not correlated dynamically to the 
adult situation. 
1Ibid.' p. 97. 
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Now, where reaction formation fails, projection ~y 
be a second-layer defense. The unwanted impulse or wish 
may be attributed to someone else, or even to a physical 
object. The person seeks to 11disown" it, by distorting 
reality in such a way that ·he perceives its presence in 
others in an exaggerated manner. Extensive projection is 
regarded as a serious matter in psychotherapy precisely 
for this reason: to the extent that he projects the person 
loses the capacity to test reality adeqUately, and thus to 
correct his condition. 
c) Isolation: Freud defined a mechanism which he 
called "isolation of affect,nl or the separation of an 
anxiety-laden situation from the emotions which might be 
expected to accompany it. The situation may be: recalled, 
but the emotion is repressed. This may relate:::t:Cil.::ehe 11un-
rearr feelings which anxiety-laden persons often mention. 
They suffer from a generalized dissociation of events from 
the fine shadings of emotion which normally accompany them. 
Another kind of isolation Freud discussed in The 
Problem of Anxiety. 2 This is isolation of a thought from 
l,:ef. Ibid., p. 98. 
2ef. Ibid. , p. 99; also Fodor and Gaynor, Diction/"!~. 
ary ••• , p. 102. 
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the associational connections within the mind. An anxiety-
laden thought is isolated from the depth evaluative pro-
cesses, because of the possibility that an attempt to inte-
grate it into those processes may flood the personality 
with panic. White defines neur.osis in these terms, and in 
doing so throws the evaluative process into sharp focus. 
Thus he says: 
The nuclear neurotic process takes its start when 
serious threat is present· and when conditions are 
just right to freeze some of the defenses.":. Be~ 
cause they are staving off anxiety these defenses 
cannot be relaxed, but they prevent reapprais!l 
of the threat and new action in regard to it. 
Normally, fallowing an anxiety-laden experience, one 
may find some way to renew contact with the threat under 
controlled conditions, reappraise its character, and take 
new action to cope with it. All of this involves new learn-
ing. If anxiety is too high, however,i.it may block or dis-
tort the learning process by repressing the functions which 
relate to adaptation. This isolation of a situation from 
the evaluative processes does not pacify the anxiety, how-
ever; in fact, "incubation" may set in, or the isolation it:-
self may cause the person to distort its significance, to 
experi.ence ~ anxiety, and to build new layers of defense 
·lwhite, Abnormal Personality ••• , p. 234. 
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against it. Neurotic breakdown comes when these successive 
layers of defense begin to crack. Therapy involves the 
building of a relationship which will allow the person to 
reevaluate, tinder more favorable conditions, the emotional 
situations he could not handle in childhood. While iso-
lation may begin in adulthood, neuroses typically spring 
from deeply buried childhood situa~ions. 
d) Denial and Undoing: In the mechanism of denial, 
an external situation which gives rise to anxiety is dis-
torted 'in character, or its anxiety-creating aspects are 
denied. Perception is distorted by selective attention to 
the more benign aspects of the situation; or the person 
reacts to a fantasy which he formulates to take the place of 
the reality situation. In formulating this fantasy he dis-
torts the real situation only to the extent of falsifying 
the significance of its specifically anxiety;..earrying de-
tails. 
Undoing involves a similar process, except that here 
the person engages in compulsive or obsessional activities 
to remake the situation which arouses anxiety. In this case 
a person feels that his wishes, such as sexual or hostile 
ones, for instance, have caused ha~ or damaged a relation-
ship to others, or perhaps even caused measurable harm to 
'" 
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another person. The situation undergoes a distortion simi-
lar to that o.f denial--one "reads into" it the harm he 
imagines he has caused. Hence his repeated efforts to 
rectify the situation are always just out of focus, and 
appear to be irrational to one looking on. They are out 
of focus precisely because they are directed toward one's 
distorted perceptual formulation of the actual situation. 
The significance of these mechanisms in~·building a 
self-system will become apparent when we discuss Sullivan's 
work. 
e) Self-aggression: The uturning against oneself" 
which was seen as a vital aspect of guilt-related behavior1 
is in essence a defense mechanism. As Brenner shows, it 
relates closely to identification, introjection, and incor-
poration, all terms which refer to a shifting of roles in 
fantasr. 2 A person wha wishes to aggress against another 
may identify with the object, and direct the aggression 
against himself in the fantasied role of the object. Accord-
ing to Freud, as we will see in the discussion of the super-
ego, guilt always involves self~aggression, following identi-
1 f:f. p ~ 2 8 above • 
2Brenner, Elementary Textbook ••• , p. 103~ff. 
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fication with an authority-figure. 
C. 'The Super-Ego. 
In the light of this discussion of ego defenses, we. 
can now view Freud's theory of the super-ego as it relates 
. to the id and the ego. Apparently the term "conscience", 
and indeed the entire area of morality, was subsumed under 
the super-ego in Freud's writings. The contemporary psycho-
analyst, Edward Bergler, refers to an early Freudian theory 
of the ego ideal, which he says was submerged in the later 
theory of the super-ego.l Our own study has failed to turn 
up any such theory of the ego-ideal. Fodor and Gaynor in X 
their Dictionary of Freudian Terms list the term "Ego Ideal", 
but refer the reader to "Super-ego"; but none of the refer-
ences under the latter heading make further mention of the 
ego idea1.2 Apparently Freud used the term "egq-ideal" in 
The Ego and the Id, but-abandoned it in later writings. 3 
For Bergler, the term "Ego Ideal" does not have the 
connotations it has come to have in recent psychotherapy. 
For him it is the "internalized educator". In order to 
1Edmund Bergl.er, The Battle of the Conscience (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Washington Institute of Medicine, 1948), p. 7. 
2 .• Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary .•• , pp. 68 and 179-81. 
3cf. Freud, The Ego and the Id. Translated by Joan 
Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, 1927), pp. 68-88. 
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retain childlike megalomania and exaggerated narcissism, the 
child introjects the educator, or authority-;igure, and hence 
takes to himself the fancied omnipotence of this ·external 
power.l The ego ideal-is "an unconscious glorified pic-
ture" of oneself. It ret:ains elements of megalomania, in-
trojected parental demands, projected aggressiveness, and 
narcissism. This is far different from the ego ideal as a 
creative construct, an immanent organismic conception of 
one's potential, which undergoes evaluative revision as 
self-insight increases and situations change, wEmch concept-
ion remains foreign to Freud's thought. We will discuss it 
later in the sections on the work of the interpersonal psy-
chiatrists. In Bergler's theory, and in orthodox psycho-
analysis generally, "ego idealu is virtually .Synonymous with 
the Freudian super-ego. Bergler adds ·to Freud's super-ego 
only the concept.of the "Daimonion", which is the death wish 
as it functions in a guilt situation to attack the ego maso-
chistically. In so far as Bergler is representative, it 
appears that orthodox psychoanalysis remains today precisely 'f 
where Freud left it, and the analysis of Freud's super-ego is 
sufficient for an understanding of guilt in contemporary pay-
choanalysis. 
1 Bergler, The Battle of Conscience ••• , pp. 2-3. 
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1. The Oedipus Complex: It was noted above that in 
Freud 1 s theory the super.:. ego and.· the Oedipus complex are 
closely related. Freud makes the statement:. "The super-
ego is in fact the heir to the Oedipus complex and only 
arises after that complex has been disposed of."1 It is 
well known that Freud believed the period of life from about 
two to six years, the~:;so-called Oedipal. ,phase, to be cru~~·~-~.~-
cial for personality development. He noted clinically that 
neurotic patients revealed fantasies of incest with the 
parent of the opposite sex and jealousy and rage toward the 
parent of the same sex, stemming from this period of early 
development. 
· Brenner shows that these early concepts of Freud 
have been broadened somewhat in contemporary psychoanalysis 
to include the entire range of ambivalent feelings toward 
the love objects within the child's family. Inverse, or 
negative Oedipal wlshes~;ha:we been noted, which include 
~fantasies of incest with the parent of the same sex and 
murderous wishes toward the parent of the opposite sex."2 
Hence, the Oedipus complex involved ambivalent attitudes of 
lFreud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, as quoted in 
Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary ••• , p. 181. 
2Brenner, Elementary Textbook ••• , p. 118. 
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love and hate toward both parents, and even toward siblings. 
This development in psychoanalysis would seem to open the,.: 
door to the broader interpretations of Horney, wherein the 
sexual fantasies are seen as symbolic of the broad range of 
love, and the murderous fantasies as expressions of the jeal-
ousies which accompany rivalry. 
It is apparent that the intense feelings of love and 
hate, possession and jealousy, which accompany the child's 
early experiences within the family, will be hard to live 
with. The hostile feelings will conflict with the child's 
own need to love and be loved, and to depend upon the parent. 
Expression of these hostile feelings, the child soon learns, 
leads to retaliation and possible loss of love. Freud was 
convinced that castration is a major fear for boys, and the 
primary motivation for abandoning the Oedipus situation. 1 
To love the mother and hate the father is to risk the father's 
' ' ' 
wrath, and he might retaliate by emasculating his son, or 
removing his penis: Freud felt that for the girl penis envy, 
or the jealous feelings of inferiority which she feels at 
realization of her lack of a penis, lead her into the Oedipal 
situation, and the will to take her mother's place with her 
~f. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanaly-
sis, as quoted in Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary ••• , p. 131. 
58 
father. He apparently felt that girls abandon the'Oedipal 
situation only late in life, and that "the formation. of the 
super-ego must suffer in these circumstances."1 Freud 
apparently questioned the strength of a woman's conscience. 
This would not be surprising in the light of his general 
attitude toward the inferior qualities of women. Contem-
porary psychoanalysis more typically points to fear of 
genital injury and penetration by the father, which leads 
the girl to abandon the strong feelings associated with the 
Oedipal situation. 
2. Identification: The super-ego is formed as the 
Oedipal situation is abandoned, and inherits its primitive 
strength and its ~pecific content. The key word for Freud 
was "anti-cathexis", as Freud saw it. Delay in discharge, 
then, to allow evaluation, is effected at the cost of energy; 
the ego-process is one aspect of a thoroughly dynamic system. 
Secondary process opposes primary process in never-ending 
tension. 
Freud would explain repression and ego resistance as 
he confronted them in therapy in terms of this energy system. 
The ego bars from consciousness, or allows only in disguised 
l!bid.' p. 131. 
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·form, the instinctive energy-quantum which demands release. 
The primary purpose here is to.allow more propitious dis-
charge later, but a related purpose may be to bar completely 
all' instinctual impulses which absolutely endanger the per-
son, such as incest and sibling·destruction, for instance. 
One aspect of this process Freud called "neutraliza-
tion of drive energy. nl Drive energy which would ordinarily 
discharge immediately becomes available for the purpose of 
the ego. Its original character as sexual energy, or aggres-
sive energy, is altered radically. In contemporary psycho-
analysis this is spoken of as "desexualization." Neurosis 
o~ p~ychosis always involves regression, and the "deneutral-
ization" of this energy. In this sense, the capacity to 
bind energy, or the "tension-binding" capacity, is.required 
·for all evaluative processes. This process"actua~llyo··:results~: 
according to Freud, in the diminishing or the weakening of. 
the id. Drive energy is lost with the development of the ego. 
3. The Reality Principle: To the extent that the 
secondary process is successful, and the ego "cathects" suffi-
cient id energy to operate adequately, the reality principle 
comes into effect, or "reality identification." Thus: 
1cf. Brenner, Elementary Textbook ••• , pp. 58-ff. 
·----- -----
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The super-ego arises .... from an identification• 
with the father regarded as a model. Every 
such identificatzon is in the nature of a 
desexualization or even a ·sublimation.1 
The child abandons and represses the incestuo.us,'artd 
murde~ous wishes toward his parents, in part by identify-
ing with them, or internalizing them. The internalized 
images of the moral and prohibitive aspects of his parents 
becomes the,~child' s defense against his sexual and aggressive 
impu:J_ses. 
It is important to understand the riature of this 
identification. Freud thought of it as a primitive func-
tion:, characteristic of the early stages of ego development. 
It is pathological in adult ·life, and signals a maldevelop-
ment. The ttas if" personalities, or those who change their 
personalities like a chameleon to conform to the character 
of those with whom they happen to identify, illustrate this 
abnormality. To identify with a loved object is to become' 
lik¢ him, or to internalize an unresolved or unevaluated 
I 
itOa,ge of the other person. In this sense, the introjected 
image remains inna real sense foreign to the personality, an 
unassimilated body of material which inflbences.the rest of 
1Freud-, The Ego and the Id ••• , p. 80. 
,w .. 
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the personality, but is cut off from the evcrliuative processes 
of reality testing. 
The essence of the super-ego remains the Oedipal 
situation. Conscience is always out of touch with reality 
in Freud's theory. It rules the ego from a foreign base. 
It ref·lects an obsolete situation which for the most part 
is no longer relevant. For this reason guilt is always some-
what irrational. It creates anxieties which are out of all 
proportion to th~ actual offense, and which have very little 
to do with one's present situation. Remnants of childish 
omnipotence cling to it; we punish ourselves for thought as 
well as deed, in a childish way which confuses the two. 
The introjected parental image never undergoes modification 
or reevaluation; it has been- internalized by a primitive 
process very similar to that which operates in mob psychology. 
Freud's work on the stibrational identifications with autho-
rity images which result in mob action illustrates very 
clearly that he conceived conscience to be a pre-rational 
process. The major thrust of our criticism of Freud's work 
will be directed.at this aspect of his thought. 
4. Id and Super-ego: The subrationality of conscience 
as Freud views it is further illustrated by his comparison 
of the id to the super-ego. Freud means to affirm that the 
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super-ego is as primitive in function as the id. 
In spite of their fundamental difference, the id 
and the superego have one thing in common: they 
both represent the influences of the past (the id 
the influence of heredity, the superego essenti-
ally the influence of what is taken over from 
other people), whereas the ego is principally 
determined by the individual's own experience, 
that is to say, by accidental and current events. 1 
We should note that the parental images which are 
intlrojected to form the child's super-ego are the superiifegos 
of the parents. The super-ego of the parent, in turn, was 
introjected from that of the grandparent. This would mean, 
then, that the super ... ego as a body of moral demands is a 
racial inheritance, as the id~impulses constitute a biolo-
gical inheritance, .wlfdo~e take seriously Freud's statements 
that the id-impulses define the purpose of living, and if 
. . 
we note that his therapeutic goal with neurotics was to aid 
in their ·il.iberation from the strictures of tha":super ... ~go'i, . .:::-:ohen 
the object of life is to be sufficiently free of one part of 
the nonrational given to allow indulgence of the other part. 
The rational processes of the ego are defensive and construe-
tive tools to gain this end. Looked at from this perspective, 
morality appears to have been something of an evolutionary 
~reud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, as quoted by 
Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary ••• , p. 181. 
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blunder, similar to the heavy armor of the dinosaur. We 
would be able to fuifill the libidinal purpose of life far 
more happily without it. 
This is even more apparent if we consider the vio· 
lent charge of emotion whichecontinues to accompany this 
racial baggage, transmitted from generation to generation 
via the Oedipal situation. Freud often said that the super-
ego had its roots in the id. 1 He meant by this that the 
aggressive energies which are self-directed in the guilt 
experience derive from the primitive death wish, or from 
the deprivation-hostilities aroused as one parent becomes 
a rival for the love of the other parent, whichever of these 
two Freudian view-points we consider normative. The object-
cathexes, or the libidinal energies driving the incestuous 
wishes of the child, are diverted following the brealidown 
of the Oedipal situation. They search for new objects, but 
finding none they.return to the ego, becoming narcissistic 
energies, and driving the identification process of the 
super-ego. The aggress·ive energies become self-directed 
with this same introjection, and are now poised to attack 
the ego in the name of the introjected parental image. The 
1cf. Brenner, Elementary Textbook ••• , pp. 130..;31. 
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greater the severity of the child's original hatred of his 
parents or siblings, the greater the self-aggression of his 
later conscience~ except in the case of the psychopath. 
To Freud, and to contemporary psychoanalysis, if 
Bergler is representative,,guilt is always associated with 
the sadistic-masochistic phenomena. Freud noted the exagg-
erated need for expiation and self-punishment which c}J.ar-
acterize neurotic persons, and in his analysis of criminal 
character as well. The "fate-neurosis", or the proneness 
of some persons to accidents and calamities is explained 
by him in terms of the super-ego. The violence of the self-
directed aggression is out of·all proportion to any actual 
offense. It is in no sense a reasonable correlate to pre-
sent experience, but is rather the hatred which the child 
would have vented on .the parental rivals during the Oedipal 
situation. 
Both in content and in affect, then, the super-ego 
is irrational. It has a profound effect upon the ego, ob-
serving, criticizing, and prohibiting its aims, but the ego 
has no effect upon it. It is completely isolated from the 
· evaluative or thought func·tibns of the mature personality, 
and unaffected by the learning processes of experience. In 
content. it is a part of the primitive history of the race, 
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and in affect it is the violent emotion surrounding-sexual 
conquest and hatred of the rival. 
III~· The Evaluative Function. 
One strong trend in recent psychoanalysis has been 
an increasing emphasis upon the evaluative functions. This 
is often spoken ~f in the literature as a trend toward ego 
theory, or ego psychology. Perception and cognition have 
been central to the studies of academic psychologists, but 
foreign to p~ychoanalytic thinking. ·Freud thought of the 
ego as subordinate to the id, arid characteristically in a 
defensive role in relation to the -id. 
Hall and Lindzey describe the recent trend, and give 
us some of the important names in this development: 
The direction is away from studies of the defensive 
functions of the ego to studies of the synthetic 
(Nunberg, 1931), integrative (French, 1952), organ-
izing (Hartmann, 1950), maste~ing (Hendrick, 1943), 
and multiple (Waelder, 1936) functions of the ego. 1 
Included in this movement is the trend toward think-
ing of the ego as functionally autonomous, and conceiving 
its function as a constructive, adjustive, rational one rather 
1Edwin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, "Psychoanalytic 
Theory and its Application to the Social Sciences," in 
Lindzey, Handbook of Social Psychology ••. , p. 158. 
66 
than primarily a defensive one. For Fre~d defense always in 
some sense distorts the real situation, or relates to an 
obsolete one, and therefore is less than rational. It is 
interesting to note that Freud!. could not have made this 
judgment without assuming a working criterion of rationality, 
effective at least in his own thinking. 
Else Frenkel-Brunswik states that it was Hartmanil.fs 
work which first established the re;lative independence of 
perception, learning, and thinking from the instinctual 
processes. 1 Hattma.nn called upon psychoanalysts to recog-
nize the tt secondary autonomy" of ego functions. The ego, 
having developed functions such as objectivation, anticipa-
tion, thought, and action, has "achieved a more or less 
reliable synthesis, or integration, or organization, of its 
own functions and of the whole of psychic personality."2 
Ego interests and achievements may exert an "appeal" or 
"attraction" to its genetic or id determinants. To the ex-
tent that the personality is relatively free of ego-id con-
fE.lse Frenk.e-1-:Srimswik, "Psychodynamics and Cognition,n 
in Robert Lindner (ed.)~ Explications in Psychoanalysis (New 
York: Julian Press, Inc., 1953). 
2Heinz Hartmann, "Mutual Influence in Development of 
Ego and Id,11 in Anna Fre'lil>d and others, The Psvchoanalvtic 
Study of the Child (New York: International Press, Inc., 
1952~ ;C.iYI:(., ~ p. ::25. 
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flicts, or sexual and aggressive thre~ts to personal autonomy, 
the ego functions with a great deal of independenc~. 
It is beyond the scope of this .dissertation to trace 
this development further. It i~ informative to see, though, 
that Hartmann excludes consideration of super-ego functions 
from his discussion. 1 In the Freud Anniversary Lecture 
Series at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute in 1960, 
however, Hartmann applies some of this same reasoning to 
moral functions. He reaffirms Freud's position that "onto-
genetically early tendencies survive in the superego" in 
varying proportions, and that nregressive trends force in-
dividual morality on the way of sexualization, back to the 
object relations of the oedipal ph~se, out of which they 
originated," as in masochism, for instance.2 However, 
.. 
morality may relate to social reality; one task of therapy 
is to discover the. relative "autonomyn of m?rality, or the 
estent to which it relates dependably to the social scene; 
rather than to inner pressures. 
Hartmann ag~ees cthat ;:there:: is ,;;a:.:-Ll<bng ;de:velpp~tz;::·of.; 
moral values, or .a 1 'transvaluation" which takes place in the 
lcf. Ibid., p. 26. 
2Heinz Hartmann, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values 
(New Yo:r:rk: International Universities Press, 1960), p. 29. 
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individual. On the long road from internalization of parental 
demands following the Oedipal breakdown, to the moral codes 
of the adult, a new process becomes decisive. What is this 
process? "That is a process of generalizatiop., of formal-
ization, and of integration of moral values."1 This, he says, 
is not a super-ego function, but an ego function. Every 
system of moral values contains elements which correspond 
to the pressures from the super-ego, and other elements 
which "are in constant interaction with the social structure 
and cultural values in which ~1le2:individual lives. n2 The 
adaptive and int:egrative· functions of the ego work to main-
tain a balanced and dynamic effectiveness of moral valuation. 
Superego restrictions still play a part, but they are corre-
lated to ego functions. 
In addition to moral pretenses, then, there may be 
moral motivations which are independent or autonomous funct-
tons:-dn the personality. Moral aims may be an integral part 
of oneself, a way of "being at one with oneself" in moral 
action. "One comes to realize that self-knowledge includes 
not only the recognition of one's own person as a valuating 
agent, but also of imperatives as one's own."3 In addition 
to the instinctual drives and their aims.in the id, and the 
libid.' p. 30. 2Ibid., p. 31. 3Ibid., p. 41. 
· . ....:..; 
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aims and·funct.ions of the ego, Hartmann is ready to admit 
. I . ·, 
that there may be moral imperatives, or acts of moral valu-
ation o~ ill'lperial character which are "dynamically relevant, 
often d~cisive, aspects of personality. nl If. these codes 
I . 
become ~ixed ends, they may be adjudged to be super-ego 
functions, but if they. are correlated with our critical 
faculti~s, they are dynamically significant in our person-
alities~ While we have no means to judge a moral value "truett 
or "false", Harttm~nn says, there may be said to be an "authen-
' 
tic" quality in moral values, in so far as they express the 
integrated dynamics of the moral personality. Integration 
involves a continuing scrutinu,, or value testing, which 
Hartmann says must be a function of the ego.2 
I 
So far as this writer can discover, Hartmann's re-
cent work is the lone chink in the a:rmor of contemporary psy-
choanalysis. Aside from this, psychoanalysts have followed 
Freud's lead in excluding the super-ego from an interactive 
relationship with the evaluative ego,. and in denying that 
there i~ any moral content to the personality apart·from the 
super-ego. Money-Kyrle differentiates a conscience of love 
from a conscience of Oedipal fears, but reaffirms Freud 1 s 
. libid. , p. 41. 2Ibid., p. 51 • 
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stand that all true guilt is conflict with an introjected 
parental figure. 1 Conscience remains, then, in contemporary 
psychoanalysis a genetically-determined structure which 
diverts.the ego, but ·over wl:lich the ego has· only a defen-
sive control. Guilt is in no sense a correlate of the 
creative processes of reality-te:sting. Unless we can find 
away to answer the psychoanalysts at this point,.we are 
barred from developing an ethic of the rational conscience. 
We shall, therefore, attempt in this section to show 
that evaluative functions play a larger role in Freud's theory 
than he was willing t.o admit,. and that· on his own terms he 
should have seen guilt as a functional correlate to reality-
testing. These conclusions will be developed even more 
fully in the critical comments which conclude this chapter. 
A. The Ego as Evaluative~ 
The basal function of the ego is that of evaluation. 
This becomes fully apparent in. the terms which Freud uses 
to describe the function of the ego in the personality: 
The ego is an organization; it is dependent on the 
free intercommunication of, and the possibility of 
reciprocal interplay between,. all its constituent 
lR.E. Money-Kyrle, ·"Psycho-analysis and Ethics'', in 
Melanie Klein, New Directions in Psycho-analysis (London: 
Tavistock Publications, 1955), p. 432. 
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elements; its desexualized energy still gives 
evidence of its origin in its striving for union 
and unification, and this compulsion to synthesis 
increases in direct proportion to the strength 
which the ego attains.l 
The ego, then, is an norganization" characterized 
by "free intercommunicationn among its elements, and by a 
"striving for union. n It is' -a ucompulsion to synthesis." 
In other places he speaks of the ego as· fulfilling its task 
of self-preservation by "avoiding excessive stimuli '(through 
flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adapt-
ation), and, finally, by learning to bring about appropriate 
modifications in the external world to its own advantage."2 
The words "adaptation" and "appropriate" indicate the essent-
ially cognitive nature of the functions which Freud is des-
cribing. 
The ego•id relations reveal the same cognitive nature 
of the ego functions. The ego weighs the external situation 
to discover the most favorable and appropriate occasions for 
the expression of id-impulses. Here very clearly the id-
~reud, The Problem of Anxiety, as quoted in Fodor 
and Gaynor, Dictionary •• •, p. 62. 
2Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, as quoted in 
Fodor and Gaynor, Dictionary .•• , p. 63. 
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impulses are an instrumentality for the well-being of the 
entire organism, and their suppression or expression is 
correlated to extremely complex evaluative judgments as to 
the nature of the environment and the strength of the in-
stinctual drives. Thus, Freud says that the ego's "con-
structive function consists in interposing, between the 
demands made by an instinct and the action that satisfies 
it, an intellective activity."1 How does this intellective 
activity work? It "considers the present state of things 
and weighing up earlier experiences, endeavors by means of 
experimental actions to calculate the consequences of the 
proposed line of conduct."2 Is it too much to suggest here 
that the ego as described is the seat of morality, rather 
than the super-ego? So far as morality is utilitarian in 
nature this would certainly be true. Even this concession on 
Freud's part would allow him to affirm a morality with more 
adaptive flexibility than the compulsively rigid super-ego. 
We note in this connection that signal anxiety is 
closely correlated with this "intellective" function. 3 Anx-
iety signals the presence of a situation which demands cogni-
-tive attention; but it can do so only if cognition has already 
1Ibid 64.· _., p. 
2 . . 
n:.bid.' p. 64. 
3cf. Freud, Ari. Outline·of Psychoanalysis, as quoted 
in Fodor and Gayn~, Dictionary ••• , p. 63. 
73 
done sufficient work to recognize a.~:possib1e.·threat when it 
sees one. It is our contention that guilt-anxiety relates 
closely to the reality-testing or evaiuative ego· functions; 
in this sense conscience is functionally rational. 
Freud was never wiliing to speak of the ego-functions 
as rational. He assumed the rationalist definition of 
rationality, in which reason is confined to conscious delib-
erations of an unimpassioned sort. Freud wanted to show 
that these evaluative processes are mainly unconscious, and 
that they are thoroughly dynamic. Thought involves the en-
tire energy-system of the organism, and is intimately related 
to conation, or the aims and strivings of the total person. 
We can point this out most clearly as we discuss Freud's 
work in dreams and.wit. 
B. Dreams as Evaluative. 
Freud himself felt that his most important work was 
The Interpretation of Dreams. He commented in· the foreward 
to Brill's translation of this work that the most valuable 
of all his discoveries were' contained here. 1 His major 
insight in this work was that the manifest content of dreams 
disguises the latent content. This manifest content is a 
1Freud, The Interpret~tion of Dr.eams. ·Translated 
by A.A. Brill (New York: The Modern Library, 1938), p. 1. 
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psychic fiction which seeks to.bar the latent content from 
entering awareness and disturbing sleep. The latent content 
is composed of unfulfilled wishes which the self has re-
pressed because of their immoral or shameful meaning. This 
transformation of latent to manifest content indicates that 
a great deal of unconscious mental work has been going on. 
Freud called this dream work. It is on the nature of this 
unconscious psychic functioning that we dwell here. 
Freud warns us that the interpretation of dreams con· 
fronts us with an "entirely novel·<:t:ask11 ' . since uthe dream-
content appears to us as a translation of the dream-thoughts 
into another mode of expres.sion, whose symbols and laws of 
composition we must learn by comparing the original with the 
translation. nl The dream confronts us with the task of· 
t~anslating into the ordinary language of logical syntax 
the dream-symbols·, which have- been rearranged along the order 
of another type of logic. Dream work does not proceed along 
the lines of secondary,process thinking, but of primary pro-
cess thinking.2 This means that visual symbols rather than 
verbal symbols become the primary mode of expression. The 
usual time relationships, before and after,- past, present, 
1Freud, Interpretation of Dreams ••• , p. 319. 
2 - --Cf. p. 38 above. 
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and future, are ignored. Opposites coexist beside each other, 
and negatives may represent positives. Freud s~,s that the 
dream:~s use of abnormality, of contradiction, and of re-
presentation through the opposite, has "cost it the dignity 
.of a psychic product", and has caused us to assume the deter-
minants in dream-~ortilation are "collapse of mental activity, 
cessation of criticism, morality, and logic.nl Such is not 
the case, however--an intellective activity is revealed at 
work in dreams. (It is instructive to note that in the 
statement above Freud slipped, and spoke of morality as 
though::it::were related to iogfc .) Freud· describes some char-
acteristic methods employed in dream construction: 
1. Condensation: Freud conn:nents that a dream which 
can be writ.ten in half a page requires "siR, eight, twelve 
times as much space" to analyze. 2 The elements, or dream-
thoughts with which the formative function works, are put 
together in an order wherein "those elements that receive the 
strongest and completest support stand out in relie£."3 Freud 
likens this to election by scrutin du liste. This means that 
1Freud, Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious. 
Translated by A.A. Brill (New York: The Modern Library, 1938) , 
p. 687 ~ 
2Freud, Interpretation of Dreams ••• , p. 320. 
3 . Ibid., p. 324. 
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some function has considered a complex welter of repressed 
wishes, or dream thoughts, has evaluated them according to 
an immanent purpose, and has;~.condensed, reshaped, and ordered 
them, discarding some, and working the remainder into a 
dramatic scene. 
The construction of composite persons is a character-
istic method of condensation. Several persons may be por-
trayed by one person, or one person may become a collective 
image with contradictory features. Words may undergo the 
same transposing process, being. reco~ined into bizarre 
formations~ as a child will do in play. Words are treated 
as obje~ and arranged-·in artificial syntaxes. 
What are the marks of this process? "We perceive, 
as peculiarities of the condensing process, a selection of 
those elements which occur several times over in the dream-
content, the formation of new unities, and ••• the production 
of common means."l Here we see at work the evaluative func-
tion as we have defined it in the first chapter of this dis-
sertation. We note (1) the employment of value-charged sym• 
bols, visual or verbal,. (2) the evaluation of those symbols 
according to their meanings (psychic value) for the self, 
1 Ibid., p. 330. 
,' . 
... ~;. ~ . ' "} 
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and (3) the creative arrangement of those symbols into new 
constructs which allow the pP~trayal of meanings in their 
dynamic or dramatic context. Freud concentrates only on 
the defens·d.Ve- aspect o-f this process, as we shall see later. 
If he had stressed also the positive aspect of this func-
tion, and correlated it with guilt-anxiety in one dynamic 
system, he would have formed the theoretical frame-work for 
an ethic of the rational conscience. 
2. Displacement: One defensive device is to distort 
the dream thoughts by rearranging, or displacing psychic 
xntensity. Here we find in Freud's work a concept of the 
greatest significance to ethical theory. He says that in 
the normal process of life, when we note that a particular 
emphasis is given to an idea in our consciousness, "we are 
wont to regard this as proof that a peculiar psychic value 
(a certain degree of interest) attaches to the victorious 
i_~ea. nl We note that psychic intensity here re-qeals the 
measure of psychic value given to a symbol or an idea. By 
psychic value Freud clearly intends the meaning or signifi-
cance of an idea to the person. An idea which is evaluated 
as broadly significant is invested with·a great deal of 
1Ibid. ' p. 337. 
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psychic intensity, which attracts continuing or repeated 
attention and a top priority rating in intrapsychic dis-
course. It is this psychic intensity which is displaced or 
transferred in the dream, if it is of such strength as to 
threaten the ego. Thus a person may dream of an event which 
in waking life would arouse horror. The dream is complete 
in detail, but the horror is not felt. 
The preconscious thought processes, then, are at 
work in dreams and in waking life, as· signing relative value 
to symbolic content, whether sensory or-intrapsychic. In.,. 
terest follows significance, according to Freud, and this 
significance is defined by evaluative functionings. What 
is the implied criterion of evaluation here? The self:; ~,i .: •• ; 
its survival and fulfillment, is the implied core which de-
fines the. scale of values. Perh~ps this is what Freud means 
when he says: "Dreams are absolutely egoistic."1 Whether 
this type of egoism is compatible with altruism and community 
we will discuss in another chaJ?ter. 
3. Regard for Representability: By this third method 
Freud means the exchange of verbal symbols for pictorial ones 
in the dream work. "Displacement usually occurs in such a 
1 ·. 
Ibid., P· 349. 
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way tbit a colourless and abstract expression of the dream-
thought is exchanged for one that is pictorial and concrete.nl 
He does not look upon this as a means to express the inex-
pressible, but as a defensiv~ device to escape censorship. 
For this reason he calls it a displacement. 
Freud describes this work as very similar to the 
creative activity of theJ::poet. There is a "distributive and-
selective influencen at work. 2 Visual images here function 
as concepts; hence cutting a cake with a knife can- substitute 
for ug~tting to the bottom of things." Freud likens this 
process to that employed in t~e pun, in proverbs, and in 
myths and legends. It is important to see here that when a 
visual image is substituted for an abstract concept, the 
evalua~ive complexity of the concept is not lost. Rather, 
the opposite may be the case; at least this is our intent 
when we accompany a concept with gestures and facial express-
ions in conversation. 
Freud inherits the rationalistic tendency to depre-
' 
ciate the worth of the visual symbol as an expressive device, 
at least as compared with the verbal concept in a logical 
syntax~ For this reason defense rather than expressionis 
1 . Ibid., p. 361. 2 Ibid., p. 362. 
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the only. function he will allow the visual image to play in 
dreams. Such pictorial representation is regarded as a 
regression from secondary-process thinking. It never occurred 
to Freud that perhaps the visual image is used.in dreams be-
cause it is a far superior medium than the word to portray 
a complex situation to the in~er psyche. We might ponder 
whether the visual image of a dramatic situation is not a 
more basic and far superior means of expression than the 
abstract concept. It is certainl~iwore plastic, and can 
express much finer nuances and shades of meaning. Even more 
important, its elements are portrayed with their dynamic in-
terrelationships still intact.· 
Perhaps in interpersonal relationships the artistic-
dramatic form of expression is alone adequate to portray the 
complexities of varying situations. If we accept this view, 
then logical syntax and verbal concepts are a specialized 
tool to perform certain highly differentiated tasks, especi-
ally those relating to the liia.nipulation.of physical objects 
and communication in the context of object-relations. Words 
are supportive, and play a secondary role. The more basic 
and more extensive means of intra- and interpersonal communi-
cation is that of aesthetics--the unifying of content into 
artistic-dramatic portrayals, which are largely preverbal. 
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4. Secondary Elaboration: Here we see the other 
side of Freud coming to thefore--a·suspicion of secondary, 
or logico-verbal processes, and a probing for the truer sit-
uation in the preverbal milieu. Whenever he sees a dream 
which is faultlessly logical and correct, Freud·says, he 
suspects a secon.d-level elaboration, which may be internally 
consistent, but which probably falsifies the entire intent 
of the original dream-thought. In a sense, the dream has 
already been interpreted before we awaken. The whole dream 
may be discredited, as a last-ditch defense against too 
.frank a portrayal of one's hidden wishes. Thus we say, 
"After all, it's only a dream," and this robs it of its 
cognitive authority. 
Freud suspects that all logical relationships among 
the elements of a dream are a defensive cover-up. In inter-
preting a dream, then, the analyst must first break it into 
its simple elements, the individual symbols which it con-
tains, and then rearrange them into a new coherence which 
more adequately portrays the latent situation. Only the 
material content, not the formal arrangement of a dream is 
of interest to the analyst. 
C. Wit as Evaluative. 
Before discussing the implications of Freud's dream 
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analysis and developing the critical trend we hinted above, 
it might be well to integrate his work on wit. In the for-
mation of wit, Freud sees at work the same process of conden-
sation and displacement of psychic accent. The purpose of 
wit, however, is not solely ego-defense, as is the case with 
the dream. Wit has two purposes, which reduce finally to 
one,.the·gaining <llf.pleasure. The pleasure gained is 6£ two 
types, however--gratification of id-impulses and the plea-
sure of the intellectiv.e activity itself. This makes a 
large chink in Freud's biological determinism, as well as 
in his hedonism. In wit we can see pleasure being taken 
in the evaluative frmctions themselves--ego needs may moti-
vate activity as well as id needs. Contemporary psycho-
analysts have scarcely begrm to assimilate the implications 
of this. 
1. Tendency Wit: Freud classifies obscene wit and 
cynical wit under the general title of tendency wit. The 
purpose of such wit is to gratify id-impulses, whether sexual 
(eros), or hostile (thanatos). "It makes possible the gratifi-
cation of a craving (lewd or hostile) despite a hindrance 
which stands in the way; it eludes the hindrance, and so de-
rives pleasure from a source that has been inaccessible. rrl 
1Freud, Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious ••• , 
p. 696. 
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What is the nature of this hindrance? A high degree of cul-
ture and education which decreases our tolerance of unveiled 
sexual matters or hostile expression. 
Cynical wit is of the type which reproaches "our 
system of morality for knowing. only how to make claims 
upon us without reimbursing us. rtl Thus cynical wit at.tacks 
the moral precepts surrounding the fa'IIUi;ly, since "no demand 
is more personal than that made upon sexual freedom, and 
nowhere has civilization attempted to exert a more string-
ent suppression than·in the realm of sexuality.n2 
We note here that the intent of wit is to outwit the 
censor. Who is the censor? The self-conception, or ego-
ideal. Freud everywhere assumes this, but nowhere mentions 
it. This is seen especially in Freud's statement that wit 
was used in one instance as a weapon of disguised aggression 
because 11a man of culture could not defend himself in the 
same manner as a common, ill-bred person would have done and 
as his inner feelings must have prompted him to do.u3 What 
is the censor's weapon? Guilt-anxiety. We seek to avoid 
the anxiety wl1ich would accompany an ttout of charac1;:er" acti-
vity by expressing sexual or hostile wishes in character. 
lrbid., p. 703. 2 . Ibid., p. 704. 3Ibid., p. 699. 
.. 
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Here guilt-anxiety is seen as accompanying an intrapersonal 
threat to the ego-ideal. This ego-ideal is so intimately 
involved with the evaluative processes that it requires a 
device of unusual creative ingenuity to trespass upon it 
without paying the price of guilt-anxiety. Wit is such an 
ingenious device. In using it, a person who might have been 
condemned for his crudity is admired for his brilliant re-
partee, or at least may admire hims~lf. 
When Freud is talking about wit, he integrates guilt-
anxiety, the evaluative function, and ego-ideal into one 
dynamic or functional system, which is precisely the thesis 
which this paper defends. Freud even allows himself to speak . 
of this as related to morality, as we saw in the quotations 
immediately above. 
2. Harmless Wit! Freud calls wit harmless if its 
pleasure is gained from the evaluative functioning itself. 
He accounts for this by the concept of neconomy of psychic 
expenditure."l 
-
In witticisms we direct the psychic focus up-
on the sound instead of the sense of the word, giving it a 
meaning it does not have in its ordinary relations to reality. 
This relieves us from some psychic work, he says, since we 
1Ibid. ' p. 713. . 
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usually assign meanings to words at the cost of a great deal 
of exertion to discover their relations to reality. Thus, 
he says: 
It is quite obvious that it is easier and more 
convenient to turn away from a definite trend of 
thought than to stick to it; it is easier to mix 
up different things than to distinguish them; 
and it is particularly easier to travel over 
modes of reasoning unsanctioned by logic; finally 
in connecting words or thoughts it is especially 
easy to overlook the fait that such connections 
should result in sense. 
Wit gives us pleasure, then, because it saves us a 
lot of work. One wonders whether Freud did not hint at a 
much more satisfactory explanation when he says "Aristotle 
recognized in the joy of rediscovery the basis of artistic 
pleasure. rt2 Here the pleasure we receive from wit is the 
delight we take in a work of.!!!.!· The "economy" admired 
here is the capacity to portray highly complex relationships 
in the simplest of forms. The pleasure one takes in the har-
mony and poetic economy of an art-form is not in the work 
it saves us, but in recognition of a Gestalt. There is re-
lief in a cognitive task portrayed as completed. Delight is 
taken in art and wit because the creator ·has portrayed a com-
plex situation so simply that we grasp its aesthetic form, 
1 . Ibid., p. 717. 2Ibid., p. 714. 
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and this conveys the meaning or essence of the situation. 
Relief from effort does not provide the pleasure, but makes 
possdble, or allows the pleasure. The' ordinary citizen can 
"see at a glance" the essence expressed and take delight in 
it, whereas the same nmoment of truthn portrayed in ab-
stract concepts might have required a logician co appreciate 
it. The sudden apprehension of a meaning seems to afford 
us pleasure, whether we understand all of its implications 
or not. 
Fraud says: ttThe most conspicuous factor in the jest 
is the gratification it affords by making possible that which 
reason forbids."1 We would point out that it is reason, or 
creative evaluation in its functional sense, rather than 
its formal sense as ·a system of conventional logic, which 
affords the pleasure of a witticism. In wit we circumvent 
the logico-verbal strictures on re~son to enjoy an artistic 
Gestalt created by reason as evaluative function, or else we 
take delight in a facile or ingenious display of this evalua-
tive function itself. 
Here we see in Freud hints of Maslow's later insights. 
Cognition itself is a source of high value in human life. 
1Ibid.' p. 720. 
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The universal need for cognitive completion offers real 
pleasure when fulfilled. On the rtegative side, we may dis-
cover that failure to achieve a unified life style of artis-
tic excellence or cognitive worth may be a major source of 
guilt-and shame-anxiety among mature persons. The restless-
ness and even despair which follow a poor vocational choice 
would be a case in point. 
D. Some Implications of the Above Discussion. 
There are implications in Freud's work on dreams and 
.wit which may prove to be of the highest significance for 
. . 
theoretical ethics, and perhaps for epistemology generally. 
We are indebted to Philip Ri;e.ff for pointing up some of 
these issues.l 
1. According to Freud, creative imagination is the 
typical functional mode of preconscious evaluation. Freud 
likened dream work to the work of a poet or an artist. In 
fact, the only difference between a dream and a work of art 
is that a work of art is a system of shareable meanings, where-
as the dream resists.comi:nunicationwith others. The purpose 
of the artist is to communicate, the dreamer to distort and 
conceal for defensive purposes. Dreams are distortions, then, 
1cf. Philip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist 
(New York: Viking Press, 1959). 
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or forgeries. Both art and dreams are creative product-
ions, an:d in that sense fict.ions~:for Freud. 
Aside from this difference in communicative intent, 
dreams and works of art are similar. What is the distinct-
ive aspect of both art on the one hand, and dreams and wit 
on the other? 
The dream, even. though ••• not designed to be under-
stood, has a purposiveness and complexity which 
indicate a degree of immanent meaning not con-
tained in the nonsense word or accidental number; 
the work of art carries such immanent meaning to 
an even higher degree; although in no case is the 
aesthetic production completely meaningful with-
out the capstone of interpretation.l 
There is coherence with an immanent meaning involved 
in all preconscious evaluation, as in all art. Behind the 
contradictory elements of the dream Freud always sought to 
find the immanent meaning which had been distorted or dis-
guised. It is interesting to contrast two types of reason-
ing, and Freud's uses of them: i. First, Freud was always 
suspicious of intellective, or consistent logico-verbal 
reasoning in his patients. He saw. in the famous case of 
Dora, for instance, the manner in which brilliant logic oould 
be employed by a patient to distort the real nature of a sit-
uation. As Rieff puts 'it, Freud "by-passed the patient 1 s 
1 . . Ibid., p. 124. 
insights into her environment as part of the misleading 
obvious; he suspected her reasonableness as an ideological· 
instrtnnent of her neurosis.nl Logical reasoning may take 
the form of "intellectual oppositionn to the deeper coher-
ence which is the truth of one's real situation, as a brill-
iant lawyer might use logic to confirm a lie. ii. Second, 
Freud sought to discover in dreams and in free association 
hints as to·the deeper and more coherent self-evaluations 
which the patients' logic might be distorting. Freud always 
assumed the fullest possible coherence among all psychic · 
events. Here is reason behind reason, and Freud believed 
the patient to be fully rational--that in some sense tQe 
patient already knew his true condition, and could disguise 
it to avoid anxiety, or communicate it when, through dream-
ing or free associations, the defensive restrictions were 
relaxed. iii. Third, in therapy Freud felt it important 
to interpret for the patient in logico-verbal structure what 
the patient already knew at the deeper organismic levels. 
This is what Freud means when he says the dream is nonly a 
substitute for a rational process of thoughtn; it must always 
be "interpreted--that is to say, translated into a rational 
1Ibid.' p. 82. 
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process."1 Here he equates reason with logico-verbal dis-
course, exclusive of the deeper evaluative processes. The 
logical reasoning which he suspected in others he made the 
tool of therapy when used by himself. It was not logic 
which Freud opposed so much as premature logic, and defen-
sive logic. Logic used as a device to avoid awareness of 
those hi-dden streams of evaluation Freud opposed; but logic 
used to clarify and enhance awareness of the deeper currents 
he espoused. Dora's skilled ratiocinations were a clear 
case of preemption of the logical ideal, or the premature 
ordering of psychic clues into conventional logico-verbal 
syntax, in such a way as to hide ra ther:-~·than to reveal the 
coherent truth of her preconscious evaluations. Freud the 
artist had to reconstruc-t. the deeper ·truth which Dora the 
artist already knew--then Freud the logician had to communi-
cate that deeper truth which Dora the logician had disguised 
from herself. 
2. The meaning of any mental process is defined in 
terms of "the intention which it serves and its place in a 
mental sequence."2 Thus, we interpret a psychic event as 
1In Ibid., p. 126. 
2Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 
as quoted in Ibid., p. 127. 
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we would interpret a statement in a dramatic production--
its meaning includes not only the logical relations among 
its terms, but the intent of the statement within the dyna-
mic development of the drama. For Freud, even an act of 
forgetting or a mistake in speaking is the final term iin a 
series, or in a pattern of emotional antagonism and develop-
ment. We must grasp the nature of this dramatic struggle 
before we can understand the true meaning of the psychic 
act. 
Freud sometimes carried this principle out to an 
apparent absurdity. He always assumed the maximum purpos-
iveness in every mental act. He presumed that everything 
mental can be explained in terms of the utility which moti-
vates it. He allowed no room for accident, fallibility, 
or, as Rieff says, for "default of motive" in mental acts. 
His famous interpretation of numbers chosen by chance, and 
the way in which any ·such random choice could be analyzed 
into hidden motives, is an illustration of this. Freud was 
a thorough-going determinist in this sense. He assumed, not 
a physical dete~minism, but a psychic determinism of dynamic 
teleological interaction, which excluded all chance in the 
realm of the mental. 
Whether or not we push it to the extreme which Freud 
92 
did, his conviction that we do not have the meaning of a 
communication until we have its intent and motivational 
context has become a working· principle in psychotherapy 
today, and is of high importance to ethics. Rieff expresses 
it in this way: 
Thought is notoriously richer, more various~ less 
distinct than words--especially those mental ex-
periences most highly prized by psychoanalysis, 
the recollection1of dreams and of the events of early childhood. · · 
As Freud saw, any verbal statement however consistent 
logically, may convey a complexity of meaning which a purely 
logical analysis will miss. (1) Its manifest meaning may 
contradict its intentional meaning. ni respect youu may 
actually convey the meaning ni despise you, but am afraid 
to admit it!' ni do not feel guiltytt may be a verbal screen 
to disguise the presence of guilt. (2) Every verbal communi-
cation represents a decision, and bears the marks of the 
process leading tg decision. What we do communicate remains 
dynamically related to··.;·what we decided. not to communicate. 
This will be made more clear as ·wer'd.iscuss point 3 below. 
(3) Every v~rbal communication is accompanied by shadings 
of tone, by facial expressions, body posture, and gestures 
1 Ibid., p. 77. 
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which convey a wealth: of meaning far more complex than ver-
bal ana~ysis would reveal. These expressive media may en-
hance and amplify the verbal meaning, or may distort or 
even contradict it, as we saw above. At any rate, the 
central point is clear--we do not have the meaning of any 
communication, whether it is interpersonal or intrapersonal, 
unless we understand its motivational intent. Conation is 
inseparable from cognition. 
Related to this is Freud's insight that affective 
intensity varies with psychic value. Interest, as revealed 
by·. the recurring appearance of a psychic theme in a dream or 
in unstructured conversation, or in the place of eminence 
given a symbol in a psychic construct, follows the signifi~ 
cance for the person which such a theme or symbol holds. 
Feeling always has its reasons. To Freud, bizarre or un-
usual psychic intensity attached to an idea indicates an 
intrapsychic realm of value within which this feeling-idea 
relationship has coherent mearting. The attachment of feeling 
to a proposition is never a purely a~bitrary matter, then, 
as the emotivists would contend in their ethical theories. 
It relates to a complex evaluative process, and is presumed 
to be coherent within a system of value-judgments, however 
difficult it may be to dis.cover the nature of that system. 
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At any rate, the meaning of a feeling, as well as the mean-
ing of an idea, is its functional significance within a 
self-system. 
3. Thought is thoroughly dynamic, and abstraction 
of an idea from this dynamic context distorts its full mean-
ing. As Rieff says, Freud employs a "dramaturgic" inter-
pretation of all psychic events. Every idea comes to the 
surface of consciousness bearing the marks of its creation. 
It was shaped in the crucible o£ climax and crisis, of antag-
god..smll and tension. 
Primary process thinking holds opposites in dynamic 
tension, in the same way in which primitive languages use 
the same word for opposites, such as weak-strong, young-old, 
Every word, then, and every idea, has a dual emotional 
valence. It communicates not only itself, but the fact that 
its complementary other has been suppressed. What is on 
the surface both reveals and disguises the total developmen-
tal process. Every denial masks an affirmation, which has 
either disappointed the expectation of its truth, or if true 
is adjudged to be better left unsaid. 
Thus, Freud knew that "sexual distaste, like other 
forms of rejection, may be a dishonest emotion, a defensive 
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tactic of conscience against desire."1 What Freud apparently 
did not realize is that the opposite may also be true--that 
sexual preoccupation and expression may cover deep feelings 
of sexual inadequacy. Boastful statements of sexual exploits 
would convey to the trained the:rapist sexilal weakness, rather 
than sexual strength. 
Now, we may react to the manifest logico-verbal con-
tent of a statement, or to its hidden motivation as revealed 
in its feeling-tone. While it may be true of logic or mathe-
matics that the manifest content of the symbols is decisive, 
in morality we cannot even begin to underst.and what is com-
municated unless we also understand the deeper motivational 
nuances conveyed. This would be true of all interpersonal 
relationships. Whether or not conation and cogni.tion always 
go together, they certainly do here. ·When we convey an idea, 
we always communicate ourselves, in a positive or negative 
sense-~.in what the idea reveais .about us or conceals a bout 
us. Any idea, however Universal its manifest or conventional 
meaning, must have been worked into the fabric of inner mean-
ings which makes up our psychic life, before it can be com-
municated to others. 
1Ibid., p. 80. 
96 
IV. Critical Comments. 
These critical comments will express our conviction 
that the genius of Freud pointed to the major elements in 
an adequate theory of the rational conscience, but that his 
own failure to understand what he had done led psychoanaly-
sis along an unfortunate path. 
A. First, Fre.ud·did not co~relate guilt with the 
evaluative processes; even though 'so many aspects of his 
thought assumed such a correlation. The Freudian system 
leads logically to the~ affirmation that guilt is a functional 
correlate to evaiuation, yet it defines guilt as a nonrational 
given. Freud affirmed a one-way correlation between guilt 
and evaluation •. Guilt is a primitive given which distorts 
evaluation. We wish to affirm that guilt presupposes evalua-
tion, varies with subtle changes iri evaluative activities, 
and stimulates evaluation. The rigid super-ego and the re-
sulting ego-defense are a special class of the same activities, 
only now operating under specific handicaps, just as limping 
is a type of walking. There are several facets to this 
critical comment: 
1. Identification presupposes evaluation. We saw 
above that the super-ego is formed as the Oedipal situation 
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is abandoned.! The process involved is identification, or 
the introjection of the parental super-ego. An internalized 
image.of the prohib.itive .. aspects of the parental character 
functions in the child's personality both as a model and as 
a restrictive factor. Brenner pointed out that reaction 
formation.is involved, or the suppression of one pole of 
an ambivalent attitude, and the intensification of the pale 
which closely approximates the parental attitude. The child, 
then, rrloves babyn as if he were the· mother, imitating the 
love-related behavior of the mother. Similarly, he slaps 
his hands to punish himself for a transgression precisely 
as the parents might have done if they had been present. 
~his involves, th~n, a shifting of roles; the child 
reacts with self-directed hostility in his role as authority-
surrogate. Freud thought of this process as a nonrational, 
intuitive grasping, almost akin to a digestive assimilation. 
Contemporary psychoanalysts often associate it with the child's 
oral wish to bite and ingest the parent, as in breast-feed-
ing. We would point out that even intuitive activity in-
volves complex evaluative formulations, on Freud's own terms. 
It would include the formation of fantasies, or symbolic sub-
1 (ef.P·1 above. 
' .. 
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stitutes for the significant objects. These would be cor-
related to perceptual memories of past parental behavior, 
as they in turn are correlated to memories of one's own 
reactions to that behavior. These would lead to the con-
struction of role-conceptions, which however intuitively 
they may be grasped are yet highly complex cognitive con-
structs. Only after this process is relatively complete 
is the child in a position to shift roles, first in fantasy 
and then in behavior. The child-hates-baby role is per-
ceived to be dangerous; the capacity to play a child-loves-
baby role ,is actuated by imitation of the parent-loves-baby·· 
role, with its appropriate attitudes and action-patterns. 
We _would point out that the parent-loves-baby role is itself 
a cognitive construct of the child, more or less accurate, 
depending upon his perceptual and imaginative capacity. 
Freud himself pointed out that it is the parent as the child 
sees him who is imitated. 
We see that identification involves several dimen-
sions of evaluation: (1) The judgment that it is expedient 
to change roles presupposes the child's very realistic analy-
sis of his sttuation. His shifting of roles indicates that 
he has decided under the circumstances to change his ways 
by the best means available. Here is the point: At the 
time he shifts roles it is a very reasonable thing to do; 
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only the carrying of this new role beyond its applicable 
limits, into late adolescence, for instance, is unreason-
able. Even that, paradoxically, must have its reasons. 
(2) Defining and adopting a parental role requires the 
complex assessment of typical parental attitudes and re-
actions under specific situations. We assume that this 
parental image ordinarily undergoes continuing experiential 
variation and enrichment. If, however, the parent is too 
intensely feared by the child, or does not _communicate 
adequately, either because of indifference, ahsenaec; !'or; 
·emotional disturbance, then growth in evaluation becomes 
impossible. The child must employ the best parental image 
he can formulate under the circumstances. His imaginative 
formulation of the parental image continues, but without 
the corrective influence of perceptual reorientation. The 
distorted parental image which the child develops under con-
ditions of poor communication does not indicate a disto~tion 
of his imaginative capacity, but the continuation of that 
capacity without adequate perceptual reference. (3) The 
parental reactions must be adjudged to be more fitting or 
at least more expedient than the child's own, in certain 
circumstances. This judgment presupposes a call!eful weigh-
ing of the<•on).y experiential alternatives the child has, 
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his own typical reactions and his parents' typical re• 
actions. Other possible alternatives will be integrated 
into this evaluative hierarchy as the child's experience 
broadens and his imaginative capacity grows. 
2. Guilt is an ego-function. Freud saw guilt as 
a form of anxiety; but anxiety is an affect, and all affects 
are ego-functions, at least in their qualitative form, and 
the essential characteristic of the ego is evaluation. 
Freud sometimes speaks of "id anxiety", but the meaning 
of this was s±Ioply that the flood of stimuli which threatens 
to overwhelm the psyche origina:l!es;dn the id. The felt 
anxiety caused by these threatening stimuli has its locus 
in the ego. 
As we saw, Freud correlated emotions to ego-functions • 
. Every emotion, including anxiety, has its reasons. If Freud 
perceived an emocion to be exaggerated and unrealistic, he 
sought a cbberent system in the psyche which would explain 
this exaggeration. Freud assumed that all emotion is reason-
able; we need only discover the motivational system within 
which it is a fitting expression. In fact, a major goal of 
Freud's motivational analyses was the discovery of the mean-
ing of feelings which h~s patients expressed. Freud was never 
content until he could.di.scover "Why do you feel this way?" 
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Also, Freud often made the statement that k!ilt is the.major 
factor in all neuroses. Therapy was mainly the discovery 
of good and sufffeient reasons for this guilt, or explicat-
ion and communication to the~·patient of the motivational 
system within which guilt of this type and intensity has 
coherent meaning. In therapy Freud assumed that guilt is 
a functional correlate of evaluation. 
It is important to see, too, that signal anxiety is 
produced by the ego because of its judgment of internal 
threat. Such a judgment would involve: (1) Recognition 
that internal stimuli are reaching a point of intensity 
which may force a certain activity. This involves experien-
tial factors, or memories of past situations of a similar 
nature. It would also involve imaginative.fantasy-building, 
or the anticipatory extension of a perceived trend in im-
pulse intensity, as one might extend the curve on a graph. 
(2) Recognition that activity which may be forced is threat-
ening to the personality. It may be seen to endaAger inter-
personal relationships, and this involves a careful analysis 
and understan~ing of those relationships. It may threaten 
the coherent organization of the personality, which Adler 
calls the "life stylen; but recognition of this involves 
judgments of extreme complexity. Freud bears testimony to 
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this in his work on tendency wit, as we saw above. A per-
son disguises the crude intent of his communication because 
it does not fit his ego-image of himself as a cultured per-
son. {3) The formulation of defensive devices which will 
be adequate to the task at hand. This will involve imagina-
tive fantasy-building, either in dreaming or day-drea~ing, 
or the inner portrayal of dramatic scenes which will allow 
the careful assessment of alternative possibilities. It 
may involve tentative experimental actions, guided in pro-
cess by clues to the reactions of others and the rise and 
fall of inner anxiety. 
It is easy to see here that signal anxiety is pro-
duced by the anticipatory evaluations of the ego, fluctuates 
in intensity with the adjudged immediacy and extent of the 
threat, stimulates the evaluative processes, and guides 
evaluation as defensive activities are formulated. Guilt 
is signal anxiety, as Freud defined it. This means, then, 
that guilt is a dynamic correlate to evaluation. 
3. Ego-defenses presuppose evaluation. This was 
demonstrated above, when we saw that identification and re-
action formation involve cognitive assessment of one's total 
situatd.on and its meaning. Introjection of the parental role 
is in no sense an arbitrary or fortuitous move--Freud saw it 
103 
as the only reasonable alternative the child has available 
to replace the violent involvements surrounding the Oedipal 
situation. Now we should direct attention to two other ego-
defenses which are closely related to guilt: self-aggression 
and repression. 
a) Self-aggression; "Turning against oneself" is 
an e·go-defense, as Brenner showed.l We should point out 
first that all aggression is an affect, and hence an ego-
function. Aggression defined as thanatos, or the Death Wish, 
is not widely accepted in current psychoanalysis. We saw 
above that if Freud is consistent iL.n a.ssigning all affect 
to the ego, then libido reduces to the need to discharge 
energy. 2 In the same way,; thanatos would reduce to the need 
to discharge energy; any further qualification would involve 
reading into it qualitative distinctions which presuppose 
complex evaluations. Freud's second theory, that hostility 
is reactive, is widely supported today, especially by re-
searches in social psychology •. ·Studies by Miller and others 
of the frustration-aggression hypothesis reveal this. 3 
1 . 0.£. Brenner, Elementary Textbook ••• , p. 103. 
2 Cf :p. 42 above. 
3e£. Theodore M. Newcomb and Eugene Hartley (eds.),· 
Readings in Social Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and 
Co., 1947). 
... 
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Aggression seen as a congenital inheritance reduces to the 
universal capacity to react aggressively to the frustration 
of one's self-expression--or, we may add, to potential 
fnustration as anticipated by the hostile gestures of others. 
Aggression i~ a response to need frustration, then, rather 
than: a need. 
It is important to see that exercise of that capa-
city involves evaluative activity. Sibling and parental 
jealousies presuppose complex judgments as to the realities 
of one's family situation. It is for this reason alone that 
abnormalities in early family relationships can take their 
toll on later adjustment, as Freud well knew. The child 
knows far more about the reality of his interpersonal sit-
uation than he can say. It is a truism in family counseling 
that a child's emotional disturbance may reflect parental 
attitudes of which the parents themselves are not aware. 
The child uknows" organismically that he;.lis involved in a 
family situation within which defensive hostility is a fit-
ting expression, even though only a trained counseltll:o:;.may_.-
be able to understand consciously the interpersonal factors 
which warrant the child's aggression. Now, if conditions 
are such that these early family hostilities cannot undergo 
developmental reconstruction; a sadistic-masochistic regress-
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ion may occur in later life. The adult may react to his 
associates as though he were trying compulsively to relive 
and resolve the early family sc~ne, and his reactions will 
appear unrealistic. In the setting wherein they were 
originally developed, however, they were fully realistic, 
and demonstrated evaluative adequacy which only a trained 
counseliw:·. might be able fully to appreciate. It is in the 
light of its primal intent that we should judge a function, 
not in the darkness of a pathological distortion of it. 
Now, how do these hostilities come to be directed 
_against the self, as in the typical guilt situation? As 
we saw above, Freud explained all self-directed hostility 
as an identification, or introjection of the role of the 
disciplinarian. We noted in the first critical comment 
above that even such a shift of roles presupposes complex 
evaluative activities, since a role is a cognitive construct, 
. ) 
and choice of one over the other must involve a judgment of 
their relative value•standing. 
We might advance here a possible alternative theory. 
If hostility is a reaction to frustration, might not self-
hostility be a reaction to myself as thwarting agent? Freud's 
earlier theory of guilt as fear of loss .of love might relate 
here. I evaluate my situation as one wherein I may cause 
~ .. ' . 
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loss of the loved objects' support and approval. My hosti-
lity is then a reaction to_ my .m:m. role as possible agent of 
deprivation, rather than an introjection of the parental 
role. In the same way, we may be angry with ourselves be-
cause of our inadequacy to handle a specific situation. 
Thus we say: nWhat a fool I am" after making .a mistake 
which might have been avoided by more careful attention to 
the cognitive requirements of our task. The judgment might 
be justified, and the self-hostility accompanying it nothing 
but fitting. Here the chain of events leading to guilt 
would be: Self-perception of my cognitive inadequacy--
self-directed hostility toward myself as thwarting agent--
guilt-anxiety a reaction both to self-hostility and to fear 
of my inadequacy (shame-anxiety, as we will see later.) 
b) Repression: We saw above, in discussing ego-
defenses, that the ego. is defending itself against anxiety, 
and the source of this anxiety is one's own id-impulses. 
That is, anticipatory fantasy gives rise to signal anxiety, 
as one perceives himself becoming enticed by objects Which 
if taken will involve him in a situation of threat, in which 
the full flood of panic might be released upon him. Repress-
ion is a defensive device whereby the forbidden impulse is 
not allowed entry into the network of evaluative associations. 
-. ' 
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One might speculate that it is denied this involvement 
because its psychic value, or the intensity of interest 
which it commands is so great that if one allowed it to 
enter the realm of anticipatory fantasy it would divert 
behavior into forbidden .channels. "I don't dare to think 
about that too muchn would be the verbal counterpart. 
Now, what is the nature of the repressed material? 
Why does it threaten? Freud revealed in his discussion of 
dreams that guilt-related material is most likely to be 
repressed. His theory of guilt ~estricts this material to 
the residual remains of the Oedipal situation. It has 
undergone little change since age six, and hence is a 
nonrational given which continually threatens to elude 
the censor and regress the person's interpersonal behavior 
to that which is appropriate to a six-year-old. When r.~eud 
disnusses wit, however, he very clearly assumes that a 
self-system or ego-ideal is involved in guilt. This ego-
ideal is related to one's contemporary situation, including 
the expectations of others and the self-conceived role one 
plays among them. Hence, one allows himself to feel hostil-
ity, and to express hostility, only in a manner which befits 
one of his position. Material which cannot be worked into 
this schema is repressed, or disowned by some other defensive 
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means--failure to do so· results in. ;guilt-anxiety. This 
clearly shows that guilt-anxiety is anxiety arising from 
a threatened disruption of one's self-conception, or style 
of life. The self-hostility arising in conjunction with 
it would relate to dissatisfaction with one's cognitive or 
adjustive incapacity. 
Freud's interpretation of art shows even more clearly 
that repression and guilt relate to the evaluative processes. 
Art is confessional for Freud. It is a "secondary mode of 
confession, or psychic unburdening. nl All intellective 
activity which is not rigidly restricted by logico-ma.the-
matical requirements is dynamically correlated with guilt. 
That is, wherever::a person is allowed to think imaginatively, 
whether in dreams, wit, or art, his constructs reveal an 
intimate and sensitive correlation with his own self-evalu-
ations, and these evaluations in turn are closely correlated 
to his contemporary situation. We begin to see that when-
ever a person feels free tosexpress himself, or reveal him-
self--whether in free associations, dreams, wit, or art--he 
appears as a self-evaluating creature of marked moral sensi-
tivity. He ·is revealed as one who is constantly weighing 
~ieff, Freud: The Mind ••• , p. 132. 
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his attitudes and actions in the light o.f his own potential 
and-the expectations of othe~s, is evaluating himself, and 
struggling within himself, with guilt-anxiety to guide him 
on the left and the cognitive requirements of his ideal 
self on the right. 
B. Second, Freud.disto!ljts the functional signific-
ance of the preconscious evaluative processes, or "primary 
process" thinking. 'Her:\thiilks of it as a wholly defensive 
function, which distorts and falsifies reality. 
1. One reason for this is that "reality" to Ft1eud 
is no more than id impulses seeking gratification, and 
challenged in their ·quest by the vagaries of environment 
and the restrictions of the super-ego. ·.Evaluative processes 
must be seen, then, as means to outwit either the unpre-
dictable environment or the cunning censor. The ego has 
one motive only--to fnmd a way for id-~gratification. Some-
times that quest leads directly into action, but at other 
times it ~ust take the tortuous route of defensive diplomacy. 
Creativity, whether in art or dreaming, is always defensive. 
It distorts the reality of id-needs· in order to pacify the 
reality of super-ego anxieties. 
Freud's basic principle that the meaning of any men-
tal act must be discovered in its motivational intent may 
... , ,·,. 
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stand. The difficulty here is his genetic reductionism. 
He finds that the vast richness of all symbolism is motivated 
by_very few instinctual needs: sex, death, parental relat~ 
ions. Only in his discussion of wit does he see that one 
may be motivated to find pleasure in the evaluative pro-
cess itself, and its creative fruits. Freud portrayed the 
dramatic struggle which ensues with marked intensity at the 
deeper levels of the human spirit, but failed to see that 
the artistic expression and witnessing of this drama may 
itself be a motive. The way· in which youth are drawn like 
moths to the place of dramatic intensity should convince 
us of this. A popular balladeer, a rock-and-roll artist; 
a modern playwright who can express the climax and crisis, 
the tragedy and comedy of youth's love-related dilemmas, 
will find a ready audience. Such fantasy has a pull pre-
cisely because it expresses reality--the reality of our 
deeper struggles. Here fantasy is expressive, and we are 
motivated to enjoy and to express the essences portrayed in 
drama. 
2. Second, Freud was ambivalent toward the role of 
fantasy in life. The core function of the primary process 
is to create psychic representatives of the objects which 
could gratify id-impulses. A wish is the psychic counterpart 
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of a somatic need, and this·includes a hallucination, or a· 
symbol of the object longed for. It is this primal fantasy 
which sustains seeking activity in the absence of the object, 
of£ers psychic clues as to where it may be found, and allows 
recognition of the object when it is discovered. The in~ 
tent of fantasy here is clearly positive, or constructive. 
It is a necessary correlate to coping activities. Its 
function is to aid in accomplishment of a task, and this 
task is permeated with cognitive requirements. It may not 
be too much to suggest that such a fantasy is a cognitive 
construct, and will be influel?-ced by perceptual memories, 
which in turn are correlate-d to gratification-memor.ies. It 
would seem that all anticipa.tory activity would require the 
imaginative creation of fantasy-symbols which are psychic 
coordinates to perceptual objects. 
Now, when we reach the level of dreams, wit, and art, 
Freud has forgottent:this functional intent of symbolism. To 
the_ work of the imagination at its complex lev~ls Freud 
applies the terms "distortionn, "projection", "displacementn, 
"condensation", to show that the illlCigination distorts reality 
and conceals its true content. Might not the ultimate pur-
pose of this complex fantasy be similar to that of the simpler 
wish-fantasies, however? Ruth Berkeley hints at this when 
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she describes the work of Theodor Reik on the defining of 
sex roles: 
Reik confirms for me that fantasy is the bridge--
betwee~ personalities of such opposite qualities 
as the masculine and the feminine--which permits 
passage from :a condition of aloneness to sharing-
in-love. He describes the daydream of a young 
man as anticipatory fantasies of the woman's 
surrender and images of how she will behave •••• It 
is less the image of the desired body than the 
words and gestures, the behavior of the loved 
woman, which these excited fantasies call up.l 
The function of such fantasy is to prepare for 
potential future activity. It is constructive in its in-
tent. This is important, too~ it correlates with the past 
experience and present situation of the daydreamer. The 
sexual fantasies of a girl in her early teens may not in-
elude intercourse, which is beyond her experience and out-
side the realm of her realistic hopes. The imaginative self-
portrayal of interpersonal situations, then, is a means to 
effective interpersonal functioning, and is dynamically 
interrelated with it. It is evaluative through and through. 
By means of it a person is able to turn a situation over and 
over in his mind, weigh its significant elements and .discover 
1Ruth Pirkle Berkeley,·"Good Gifts. to Share: A Con-
tribution to the Understanding of Masculinity and Femininity', 
in Robert Lindner (ed.), Explorations in Psychoanalysis (New 
York: Julian Press, Inc., 1953), p. 16. 
: .. ()":~ 
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its hidden facets, and thus spare himself the cognitive con-
fusion of unexpected situations. Here fantasy has, in addi-
tion to the expressive function, a coping, or reality test-
ing function. 
CHAPTER III 
SHAME AND THE EVALUATIVE FUNCTION IN CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 
This chapter will be given to the study of the woxk 
of Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan, 
. . 
three psychotherapists who have been variously described as 
"social" or "interpersonal11 psychiatrists. Freud's conceptual 
model is ordinarily the person in troubled isolation; these 
thinkers study persons as they struggle with the demands made 
upon them by others and a:s their character is shaped by cul-
tural influences. 
In this context guilt ceases to be a primary subject 
of inquiry, and various problems with "inferiority feelings" 
or anxieties surrounding the threat of humiliation in the 
sight of other persons, or loss of personal integrity in a 
repressive environment, come into prominence. These anxieties 
are seen to be closely related to Piers's definition of shame. 
The thesis defended in this chapter is that shame-
anxiety is systemically coordinated with a self-system which 
is defined and maintained by means of subconscious evaluative 
processes, with an immanent standard of self-perfection or 
.self-realization which is also defined in part by depth 
evaluation, and with an inherent need for productive inter-. 
personal relationships. 
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I. Alfred Adler. 
A. Shame-Anxiety and Inferiority Feelings. 
The term "inferiority feelings" occurs again and 
a.gain in Adler's writings. The question arises whether 
inferiority feelings can be equated with shame-anxiety. 
Gerhart Piers says that Franz Alexander was the first 
psychoanalyst who differentiated clearly between guilt-
and shame-anxiety, and he called the latter "inferiority 
feelings."1 If this equation can be drawn, then there 
is reason to believe that Adler's influence in psychology 
is a. primary source of insight into shame-anxiety. The 
defenses against shame which Alexander says we employ; 
that is, increased hostile aggression, depreciative 
competitio~, and fantasies of superiority, strongly suggest 
Adler's influence. 2 Since Freud-confuses guilt and shame, 
. ' 
and equates shame with sexual aversion arising from re-
pressive toilet training, Adler is surely one of the 
early pioneers in studying the phenomena associated with 
shame-anxiety. 
1Gerhart Piers and Milton B. Singer, Shame and 
· Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study (Springfield: 
Charles C. Thomas, 1953), p. 8. 
2Ibid., p. 8 •. 
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This is true, that is, provided that Adler's 
term ninferiority feelingsn is analogous to nshame-
anxiety". To determine this it is important to recall 
th~ definition of shame-anxiety with which we began in 
the Introduction, as Piers defines it. 
1. Gerhart Piers accepts an essentially Freud-
ian view of guilt. Guilt is generated by the Super-Ego, 
or the punitive parent image. Its source of dread is fear 
of castration, and its law of operation the primitive La~ 
of Talion. Guilt arises out of a conflict between Ego 
and Super-Ego. Shame, on the other .. hand, arises from a 
conflict betwe~n Ego and Ego-Ideal. This real difference 
is described thus: 
Whereas guilt is generated whenever a boundary 
(set by the Super-Ego) is touched or transgressed, 
shame occurs when a goal (presented by the Ego-
Ideal) is not being reached. It thus indicates a 
real 'shortcoming'. Guilt anxiety accompanies 
transgression; shame, failure.l 
This Ego-Ideal relates in part to the social role 
which a person assumes in relation to his peer group and 
sibling group. In addition, it reflects an "unconscious 
and conscious awareness of the Ego's potentialities."2 The 
fear behind shame is not fear of hatred and mutilation, as 
1 . Ibid., p. 11. 2Ibid., p. 15. 
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in guilt, but fear of contempt, which on a deeper level 
of the unconscious "spells fear of abandonment, the death 
of emotional starvation."1 The parent who uses htnnilia-
tion as an educative device, and who often walks away 
in disgust from this tiny creature who is beneath.his 
notice, is setting the stage for later anxiety. This illu-
strates, too, that the early fear of loss of love, or 
separation anxiety, which Freud saw related to guilt, is 
also related here. The intensity of the adult fears·of 
ostracism or social expulsion reflects the same relation-
ship. 
Now, a sense of inferiority is a concomitant to 
shame ... anxiety. Sibling rivalry in the early family, which 
involves comparison and fear of inadequacy, and parental 
expectations and capacities which illuminate the child's 
weakness and incompetence, provide a fertile field for the 
development of anxiety. All fears of inadequacy develop in 
a field of comparative evaluation, both between self and per-
sonal potentia~, and between self and interpersonal expecta-
tions. Piers shows this decisively in his study of patholo• 
gical male exhibitionism, and of envy and jealousy.2 
llbid., p. 16. 2 . . . Of. Ib~d., pp. 21, 22. 
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Turning to Adler, we see that his interest in 
"inferiority feelings" is the springboard of his entire 
psychology. The way in which a sense of weakness and 
inferiority acts as a motive force in life is the theme 
of his writing. Some biographers have said this interest 
roots in Adler's own childhood illness, a bad case of 
rickets which slowed his physical development and made him 
a poor second to his elder brother in all childhood activi-
ties. We see here the basis for the two types of inferio-
rity feelings he later described: those stemming from 
organ weakness, and those resulting from relationships 
within the family constellation. 1 
Darwin's theory was also a stimulus to Adler's 
thought. His early theories of compensation and organ in-
feriority were aided by Darwin's evolutionary doctrine. 
Homo Sapiens is a weak species physically, and compensates 
for this organ inferiority by developing mental abilities 
and social life. Inferiority has thus acted on man "as a 
stimulus to the discovery of a better way and a finer 
1cf. Ira Progoff, The Death and Rebirth of Psycho-
logy (New York: The Julian Press, Inc., 1956), p. 76. 
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technique in adapting himself to nature."1 In his later 
thought, Adler largely abandoned this evolutionary argu-
ment. An extrinsic comparison between man and his immane~t 
potential ds the primary source of inferiority feelings. 
Homo Sapiens as he means to be, rather than Homo Sapiens 
the weak species, is the immanent standard of comparison 
to which inferiority feelings relate. 
With this as background, what relationship can 
be discovered between Piers' "shame anxietyf1) and Adler's 
~mnd!etmD:i:li.yy;:£eelings0'? Several factors indicate that they 
are roughly analogous: 
a) Adler describes inferiority feelings as ttemo-
tional states of mind which we know as anxiety, sorrow, 
despair, shame., shyness, embarrassment, and disgust.n2 
Their relief at the time of goal-satisfaction is accompanied 
by a nfeeling of rest, of value, of happiness.n3 We will 
see later that Adler does not develop a carefully defined· 
1 . . Alfred Adler, Understanding Human Nature (Garden 
City: Garden City Publishing Co., 1927), p. 29. 
2Alfred Adler in Heinz L. and Rowena R. Ansbacher 
(ed.), The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1956), p. 117. Note~ All future refer-
ences to Ansbacher's work will refer to the Adler text unless 
specified otherwise. 
3~.' p. 116. 
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co~ception of anxiety--but the complex of emotions which he 
describes as inferiority ·feelings points to shame-anxiety. 
b) Second, Adler says·tbat in a child, especially 
one who is burdened with some constitutional weakness, "a 
. . . 
self-evaluation develops whichproduces the feelings of 
inferiority."1. Inferiority feelings, like shame-anxiety, 
root in self-evaluation. 
c) While this self-evaluation is in part relative 1 
to a competitive social field, such as sibling rivalry, it 
relates in essence to a "fictional. final goaln, or ,.ideal of 
self. The sense of inferiority is a "craving for signi£i-
cance.~•!2 · Adle:t:'s early term, nmasculine protest11 , or the 
striving to be strong and powerful, must be seen as. an 
innocent need to fulfill one's· sex-role, or ideal self in 
relationship to the socially-biologically determined ideal 
of manhood. ln place of Freud's backward-looking hedonism, 
we see here a telE!ological finalism. The nguiding self-
ideal" initiates feelings of inferiority, stimulates com-
pensatory activity, and works to mitigate those inferiority 
feelings. We see that comparative evaluations such as sib-
ling rivalry are really on~"Ya dramatization for the child, 
1 Ibid., p. 116. 2 Ibid., p. 67. 
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or an occasion for the deeper need to fulfill and perfect 
self. 
d) Now, these inferiority feelings function as 
Freud's "signal anxietyndoes (cf. above, p. 46) to stimu-
late action. Persons "cannot endure" these feelings for 
long, and are thus stimulated to "movement and action."1 
Adler often speaks as though the goal of life is produced 
by the feelings of inferiority. More consistently, however, 
he sees a dialectical relationship between the two. An 
immanent s.elf-ideal or implicit goal of self-perfection is 
the universal motivational need. Exposed by situations 
Wherein a person's relative worth is in question, this imma-
nent goal creates anxiety and this anxiety in turn motivates 
the person to formulate specific steps which may be achieved 
on the long road toward self-fulfillment. Shame-anxiety is 
here seen as a negative component to the positive thrust of 
self-fulfillment, a result of its non-achievement, and a 
stimulus to its achievement. It is a "quasi-need", or a 
"tension system affected by a purpose" as Lewin would say. 2 
***** 
In this discussion we have seen that the term "shame 
anxiety" as Piers defines it is similar to the Adlerian term 
1Ibid.' p. 173. 2Ibid., p. 115. 
". ·""· 
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"inferiority feelings". Both represent anxiety which is 
correlated with the immanent goal of the ideal self; com-
parative self-evaluation in a social field is usually the 
occasion which triggers this fear of failing one's ideal 
self; avoidance of this anxiety as it signals its painful 
proximity is a major stimulant to coping activity. Adler 
does not correlate the fear of abandonment with this. It 
is important here to show the implications for personality 
theory in the phenomenon of shame~anxiety. Adler's work 
points decisively to some of these implications. 1 
2. Shame-anxiety implies the functional unity of 
the personality. Ansbacher shows that Adler's earliest 
concept of compensation presupposes the unit'yof the com-
pensating personality. 2 When an inferior organ threatens 
the survival and functioning of an organism, compensation 
takes place which strengthens the in"ferior organ, com-
pensates through another organ or through the "psycholo-
gical superstructure", or overcompensates in one of the 
areas. Adler shows that this phenomenon means an "equilib-
1The term "shame-anxiety" may be preferable to 
"inferiority feelings", in that "feelingstt connotes arbitrary 
and unpredictable affective states, whereas "anxiety" connotes 
a specific reaction of predictable order. 
2Ansbacher in Ibid., p. 30. 
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rium" must be "assumed to govern the economy of the individ-
ual organ or the whole organism."1 It is the disturbance 
of this equilibrium which causes compensatory growth or 
activity. Ansbacher suggests that compensation is similar 
to the idea of "homeostasis" which Walter B. Cannon pre-
sented twenty-five years later. 2 
Ansbacher shows that this term suggests a closed 
system of function, but that Adler later developed an open 
system, with his emphasisFp.pon the striving for self-perfec-
tion. The maintenance of internal stability must be placed 
beside the need to grow into new excellence; at times these 
may be in opposition to one another. Neurosis may often 
represent a situation in which the desperate need to main-
tain homeostasis frustrates the need to grow toward self-
perfection. Many of the case studies in Fromm's works, and 
much of Jung's analysis highlight this possible conflict 
between the need foruorder:'~arid the need for growth. Whether 
guilt-anxiety relates to the need for internal order, and 
shame-anxiety the need for upward advance, we will have to 
explore later. 
1Ibid. ' . p. 25. 
2Ibid., p. 23. 
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At any rate, the point is clear that shame-anxiety 
presupposes the unity of the personality. This is seen 
even more clearly when "inferiority feelings" replace Adler's 
early biographical preoccupation with inferior organs. A 
subjective attitude relating to self-evaluation is here at 
work. An inferior physical capacity may be only a symbol of 
one's dread of lost self-esteem, or in unhappy competition 
with one's peers it may be thought to be the cause of one's 
humiliation. The point is that the total self, not the 
offending organ, is threatened. Compensation for a weak 
organ presupposes that its weakness has been imterpreted 
as a threat to the total self~ That threat is the occasion 
for shame-anxiety, or inferiority feelings. 
In his early .theory, Adler felt that the aggression 
drive is the major compensatory force. This was later re-
placed by "masculine protest"_ and finally by ttstriving for 
perfection" as the unifying dynamic principle. 1 Freud re-
cognized' :that even the early aggression drive threatened to 
subordinate theprimary drives to a unified personality force. 
·-
He at first·rejected·it·for this reason. When Freud later 
accepted the theory, it took the form of the death instinct, 
or the need for dissolving of the organism, rather than the 
1 
ef. Ibid., p. 34. 
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enhancement of the self, as Adler meant it to express. 
After Freud accepted this- aggression drive, Adler a~andoned 
it, and saw aggressive behavior as an abnormal dis~ortion 
of the need for overcoming, or self-perfeet~on. 
It is interesting to note ·that Adler's study of 
organ inferiority,compensation,and inferiority feelings led 
him immediately to conc~pttons which Freud could see re-
instated the tmified self in psychology. Shame-anxiety 
cannot be understqdd.apart from some such conception. Per-
haps Freud's analytical bent and his antipathy toward §elf-
conceptions explains his failure even to distinguish shame-
anxiety. Aside from one or two isolated references, we 
find no discussion of inferiority feelings in Freud!s works. 
Some of the references, however, contained flashes of real 
insight. Freud saw that guilt caused a lessening of self-
esteem. Self-aggression had an effect upon one's sense of 
worth. This would mean, then, that guilt-anxiety increases 
shame-anxiety. This relationship will be discussed in a 
later section. Here it is enough to see that shame-anxiety 
presupposes the unity of the self. 
3. Shame-anxiety reveals the guest for self-perfect-
ion. Adler was led to this conclusion by two factors: 
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a) First, his early interest in organ inferiority 
and compensation led him to the conviction that feelings of 
inferiority are always relative. That is, a feeling of 
inferiority reveals one's acquaintance with a relevant 
excellence not yet achieved. He gives credit to Pierre 
Janet for clarifying for him the sentiment d'incomptetude, 
but criticizes Janet for failing to see 'that a feeling of 
incompleteness always interacts with striving toward a 
goa1. 1 
b) Second, ·his early work both on organ inferiority 
and drive confluence convinced him that the self must be 
seen as a functional unit. Such unity would require a 
prepotent dynamic force which subordinates the segmental 
drives, or primary needs. He postulated first the aggress-
ion d;ive 1 then later the masculine protest, and finally 
the guiding self-ideal as this dynamic .force. When he gen-
eralized from his work with neurotics, Adler saw the aggress-
ive drive for superiority as basic. Later the enhancement 
or safeguarding of self-esteem through striving for masculine 
dominion and power was seen a~_. the central drive. When he 
began to develop a criterion for normality in his later car~··::·~ 
eer, Adler saw that overcoming (of external barriers), com-
1
ef. Ibid., p. 115. 
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pletion (of a task), perfection (of potential self) will 
alone explain inferiority feelings •1 'the first two pre-
suppose the last, and are specific situational aspects 
of its func~ioning. 
A sense of inferiority or incompleteness, then, pr&-
~: 
supposes a drive toward completeness. The unity of the self 
points to a prepotent dynamic force which is the sel~-system 
striving to become what it is meant to be. What can be 
said about this drive toward self-perfection? 
(1) First, it is innate. nThe striving for per-
fection is innate- in the sense that it is a part of life, 
a striving, an urge, a something without which life would 
be unthink.able.n2 It is not innate in the sense that a 
segmental drive is innate -- it is an intrinsic aspect of 
life itself or inherent in the definition of living as human 
beings live. 
(2) Second, self•perfection involves self-evalua-
tion. This evaluation is in pa.rt comparative. Thus, the 
· feeling of inferiority in a child is nalways preceded by a 
matching, a comparing of himself with others, at first with 
1For a fuller discussion see Ansbacher in Ibid. , 
pp. 100-103. 
2 .. 
Ibid., p~· 104. 
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the father -- at times with the brothers and sisters, 
1 later with every person whom the patient meets." These 
appraisals are usually keen and accurate. This evaluation 
is dramaturgic in method. Freud saw that dream life is 
organized like a good drama. Adler saw that all of life 
is so organized. ~lie root of the unity of personality is 
its "individuality11 , or its goal governing as a causa 
finalis. ''In other words, the psychological life of a 
person is oriented toward the final act, like that of a 
character create~ by a good dramatist.u2 The same thought 
is even more clearly expressed here: 
The individual is • • • botih the picture and the 
artist. He is the artist of hi~ own personality, 
but as an artist he is neither an infallible worker 
nor a person with complete understanding o~ mind 
and body; he is rather a w~ak, extremely fallible' 
and imperfect human being. 
This means, then,that the goal of self-perfection functions 
as a factor to interpret the' significance of each situation 
in terms of that goal. As in Freud's dreams, there is an 
evaluating, creative, and selective function at work in 
building a self. All environmental influences and exper-
iences are "perceived, assimilated, digested, and answered 
1Ibid. ' p •. 119. 2 Ibid., p. 94. 3Ibid. , p. 177. 
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by a living and striving being, striving for a successful 
achievement in his view."l Comparative evaluations take 
'their toll only as they are interpreted to be relevant to 
the dramaturgic evaluations. Extrins!i.ci demands cut deeply 
only when they are important to intrinsic demands. 
Third, this self-evaluation is largely unconscious. 
The "fictional goal" of self-perfection is "in accord with 
the unconscious· technique of our thinking apparatus."2 
This final goal is hence "blurred and pliable; it cannot 
be measured; it has been constructed with inadequate and 
definitely ungifted powers. n3 Here we see Freud's view of 
unconscious evaluative activity as inferior to logico-verbal 
evaluations, at least when the latter were employed by him-
self. Adler assigned to unconscious evaluations an almost 
unbelievable task -- the interpretation and selection from 
all the universe of experience the precise factors required 
to build a self -- and then he called it an inferior funct-
ion. 
From the above we can see Adler's unique contribution. 
The evaluative function which Freud saw at work in dreams 
and wit, and interpreted as.· distortive and defensive, Adler 
discovered to be at work in all of life, and to be reason-
1 . 1121£., p. 178. 2Ibid., p. 93. 3Ibid. 
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able and effective. He continued to describe this function 
as "fictionaln in relation to an asstlll\ed material universe, 
but he had no doubt that it was reasonable internally, and 
applicable to that universe. 
(3) Neurotic "self-enhancementtt is a protective 
form of the striving for self-perfection. When anxiety over 
one's self-est~em becomes too great, one develops various 
devices for p~otecting the self-esteem from outside threats. 1 
tt Safe-guarding tendencies tt set in ' or "se If-ehhancemen e' with 
its "self-boundedness.n2 Fearful, self-bound persons lose 
their interest in cooperative interaction with others, and 
concentrate on preserving their own threatened self-inte-
grity. Aggression, the nwill to conquer", the goal of· 
rrdomineering over othersn, and of "leaning ort(:otherstt, rep-
resent defensive means to preserve some limping hope for 
se If-perfection, under difficult circumstance's. 
Here we see for the first time in psychiatry a view 
of·neurosis which points toward a criterion of normality. 
A J?er·son is normal to the extent that he develops srsocial 
intex.-est", and seeks self-perfection through cooperative 
living. 
lc:f • .Thi!!·, p. 265. · 2Ibid., P• 112. 
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(4) Now, what is the relationship between shame-
anxiety and the striving for self-perfection? We may note 
the following relationships: 
(a) Fil:st, it must be seen that shame-anxiety is 
the negative aspect of a positive teleology. The fear of 
abandonment, or. inadequacy, or insignificance, or as Rollo 
May and the existential psychoanalysts later call it, 
"nothingness" -- is the Shadow .. side of the positive thrust 
toward self-perfection. Dread of being nobody presupposes 
the need to be somebody... It is the light of our "fictional 
final goal" which casts the shadow of our fear of failing 
to achieve that goal. The presence of shame-anxiety indi-
cates a self-evaluation which reveals a great deal of per-
sonal g~owth still to be undertaken. 
(b) Shame-anxiety of moderate intensity stimulates 
us to undertake the measures indicated to achieve personal 
fulfillment. Persons cannot endure feelings of inferiority, 
and so initiate compensating activity to strengthen the 
points of personal weakness. Coricre·te goals of overcoming 
are set up by the creat&ve imagination. Grief at the death 
of a loved one may le~d a<.:p~rson to set medicine as his 
vocational goal, in order to find a way to avert such 
tragic experience. The specific form such goals take 
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depends upon the ustrange melodyu of each person's crea• 
tive bent, and the meaning he gives to life. 1 
-Moderate amounts of shame-anxiety hence act a:s 
"signal anxiety" (Freud), stimulating us to take positive 
action. In a sense, this moderate anxiety is a precursor 
to a possible flooding of the system with paralyzing panic. 
Adler does not draw this distinction clearly, as Freud does. 
Some such distinction must be drawn, however, since there 
is a vast difference between anxiety as it stimulates 
cognition and action, and anxiety as it distorts cognition 
and paralyzes action. Mild anxiety may be seen as stimu-
lating anticipatpry imagination, which in turn projects 
I 
the curve of rising intensity to its normal culmination 
in pari!tc, and stimulates evasive action. Moderate shame-
anxiety, then, is a dynamic correlate with evaluation, as 
the progress of self-development is assessed~ 
(c) Under eKtreme conditions, however, shame-
anxiety indicates a defensive, clinging operation, as we , 
saw above. "Self-enhancing", or protective devices are 
employed. It is important to note that the fluctuating 
intensity of shame-anxiety, varying as it does with the 
evaluation of one's liklihood of achieving the inherent 
1Ibid., pp. 180-81. 
133 
requirements of self-hood, functions to determine the 
nature of coping activities. A higher intensity of shame-
anxiety indicates a greater situational threat to the self, 
and stimulates grasping, clinging, defensive activity. One 
loses the courage to battle the real issues, and employs 
his energy to preserve himself. 
Adler's therapeutic goals in therapy with children 
are very much to the poi.nt: "(1) to join with the child 
and give him the experience of a trustworthy fellow man, 
and (2) to increase and spread the social interest and thus 
to strengthen independence and courage."1 The revival of 
courage works to reduce anxiety to the level whereby the 
positive aspects of striving can be substituted for de-
fensive self .. enhancement and aggression. 
We note here that shame-anxiety functions in one 
dynamic system with self-evaluation -- thts coherent unity 
of function is affirme-d- by· Adler. · The same coherence 
between guilt-anxiety and evaluation was assumed by Freud, 
as we noted in Chapter II above. The relationship bet't-Teen 
the two types of anxiety must be discussed later. 
1Ibid., p. 119; cf. alsop. 341. 2Ibid., p. 99. 
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(d) . One more dimension should be noted to this 
interaction between shame•anxiety and the goal of self-
perfection: The goal itself may be compensation. Postu-
lation of a concrete goal reduces anxiety to its "lowest 
possible, albeit apparently causal amount.nl Dmaginative 
projection of future successes gives one the caurage to 
undertake remedial action. The emotions and feelings of 
success are imaginatively entertained as one fantasizes 
the future goal, and this reduces anxiety to a creative 
intensity, rather than a paralyzing one. 
4. A fourth implication should be noted: Shame-
anxiety presupposes field theory. The term "field theoryn 
does not mean simply that shame-anxiety relates to a social 
setting, as though the setting were peripheral. The sett-
ing is organically related; it is involved essentially. 
Ansbacher shows that Adler's earliest work on organ in-
feriority established him as a field theorist. 2 An organ 
is adjudged inferior in relation to the total range of envi-
ronmental and interpersonal demands, as well as the more per-
sonal need for significance and fulfillment. Later, when 
p. 99. 2a£. Ansbacher in Ibid. , p. 22. 
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he posited the·. aggression drive as the prepotent dynamic 
force in human living, Adler found it necessary to postulate 
a counter-drive, as a mask of respectability for aggression. 
Thus, we humiliate with our virtue, attack with passivity, 
hurt with our own suffering, and make ourselves small to 
appear big. 1 
This is very close to Freud's doctrine that social 
interest is a reaction-formation, a way of masking narcis~ 
sistic self-love in order to achieve by indirection what 
we cannot achieve by direct conflict. -· Even .. here, however, 
Adler was very much aware that aggression and affection 
relate from the beginning to the social field. Wherea.s 
Freud studied the individual in abstraction from society, 
and wooked upon social relationships as intrinsically and 
necessarily repressive, Adler saw that person and society 
are correlative terms. 
By 1930, Adler had developed trtsocial interestu as 
the criterion for normality. He noted in his work with neu-
rotics that self-esteem, or striving for superiority, and 
self-enhancement,.or self-bound striving are symptoms of 
illness.· The normal person strives for the perfection 
"which benefits alln, and works within the struct\lre of nthe 
1
ef. Ansbacher in Ibid., p. 144. 
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immanent demands of human society."1 Influenced in part by 
his early co-worker, ·Carl Furtmuller, Adler came to see that 
the ease with which socialization and interiorization of 
social demands takes place points to an innate predis-
·position toward social cooperation. The extent to which 
this nsocial interest" is developed is "the barometer of 
the child's normality."'2 This social interest is more than 
a feeling • .;:\·1Adier calls it a Lebensform or an "evaluative 
. 3 
attitude toward life.n Now, how does this social interest 
relate· to shame-anxiety? 
a). Fi3ist, the_only "true and inevitable compensat-
ion for all the natural weaknesses of individual human 
beings ... is social interest. 4 If shame-anxiety is not too 
great, the child will come to strive on the "commonly use..; 
ful siden of life. Even though each person defines his own 
success in uniquely individual terms, the feeling of self-; 
worth and value is achieved as we acquiescE!, atin _the conunon 
. advantages and drawbacks of our lot. n5 Thus: 
The individual feels at home in life and feels his 
existence to be worthwhile just so far as he is 
1Ibid., p. 114. 
4Ibl1d., p. 154. 
2Ibid., p. 154. 
5Ibid., p. 155. 
3 Ibid., p. 135. 
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useful to others and is overcoming common, in-
stead of private, feelings of inferiority.! 
Constructive identification with the hopes and sorrows of 
human life provides the "only salvation" from. nagging shame-
anxiety. It is interesting to note .that "identification" 
as Adler defines it. is very close to the relationship which 
is often termed "empathy". There is sympathetic interest 
involved rather than unreasoning ingestion of a feared per~ 
son's Super-Ego) as :F.reud saw it. 
b) Second, the ideal image of self is created as. 
one relates himself to "the log.ic of man's cotmnunal life. n 2 . 
The organizational structure, ·the "inherent rules" of one's 
social setting provide the tasks and the cognitive orienta-
.tion . in terms of which one evaiuates himself. The ques.t for 
perfection wh~chfunctions in dynamic mutuality with shameo.o 
anxiety is correlated with the tasks and roles defined by 
society. Tbe·specific means, then, or·concrete goals in 
terms of which one will evaluate his life are provmded by 
the cultural matrix. Shame-anxiety functions coherently 
with,an evaluative prihcess which has a dual reference-- self 
and social role. It is important to see even here, however, 
2Ibid., p. 128. 
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that it is a soqial role as the individual interprets it 
which counts. The final. arbiter remains the creative 
imagination of the individual, which may be distorted by · 
hi'S own limitations or emotional barriers. 
The cultural matrix provides alternatives which one 
weighs and interprets,. and from which he selects. 
c) Third, as we saw above, too' great an intensity .. 
of shame-anxiety leads one to lose his courage, to become 
self-bound and aggressive, to depreciate others, and hence 
never to develop his normal cap~city for social interest. 
Choice of a "socially useless goal • • • is conditioned by 
a lack of courage.nl Fear of defeat on the socially useful 
side leads orie into the degenerative cycle of ultimate 
failure. As we will see later, the evaluative processes 
themselves are di,storted by this unhappy condition. To 
safeguard security, one dogmatizes a neat conceptual system 
which stratifies the normally flexible interchange within 
the logic of connnunity. He lives in this private world 
rather than to risk himself to the give and take of communal 
identification. Therapy consists of providing an interper-
sonal setting within which one can develop confidence. It 
1Ibid. , p. 140. 
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is important to see here that the functional intent of 
shame-anxiety even at these extreme levels is to preserve 
conditions which will allow at least minimal fulfillment 
of self. A strategic retreat implies the hope of future 
victory. 
d) Fourth, shame-anxiety relates not only to one's 
immediate interpersonal milieu, but also to an immanent 
ideal of community, the "final fictional goal the perfection 
of mankind."l Man lives his life, as.Spinoza says, sub-
specie_aeternitatis, under the aspect of eternity. Shame-
anxiety stimulates one to endless· search for better adapt-
ation, for overc.oming, for self-perfection. 
This goal of perfection must bear within it the goal 
of an ideal community, because all that we value 
in life, all that endures and continues to endure, 
is eternally the product of social interest.2 
Adler sees the idea of God as the concrete expression of this 
immanent goal of self-perfection in ideal community; God's 
voice is then innate in all human striving. Even the dis-
torted and defensive depreciation of life is testimony to 
the innate potentiality to lift one's head to higher hope. 
Nor is this potentiality a passive capacity -- it represents 
lrbid., p. 106. 2Ibid., p. 107. 
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tne supreme motive in all striving, coloring and shaping 
the meaning of every limited objective. 
B. The Evaluative Function. 
In the discussion of shame-anxiety and self-perfect-
ion above, it became apparent that the quest for self-
perfection which is implied in the phenomena of shame-anxiety 
reveals a great.deal about the evaluative function. We 
evaluate ourselves in the light of a final cause, or im-
manent ideal of self. In this process, the characteristics 
of evaluation which Freud described in dream-work and wit 
are seen to be as big as life itself. His analytical and 
· reductionist bias kept Freud from integrating these pro-
cesses into his personality theory, but even then they were 
assumed in all of his work on neurosis, anxiety, guilt, and 
ego-defenses, and even in his therapeutic method. 
In Adler's writings all that Freud assumed about the 
evaluative·function is openly affirmed, and made the very 
heart of his personality theory. This may best be revealed 
by discussing the following insights drawn from Adler's work: 
1. The ideal self~system is.an evaluative construct. 
We saw above that this ideal self guides evaluation and 
stimulates evaluation· th:t;ough shame-anxiety~ It is a tacit 
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point of reference in assigning meaning and significance 
to every aspect of experience, Here we may see that tnis 
idealf,:seif:~_is a product. o£ evaluation. It is a cognitive 
construct, a coherent functional system achieved through 
creative ratiocination. Once achieved, it exerts a select-
ive influence on all further experience. The question nWho 
am I meant to be?" cries out for an answer, and finding some 
provisional answer) lives as best it can in its light. 
This may be brought out clearly by showing what 
Adler means by his term·. "fictional final. goal. 11 The term 
11fictional" is taken from the work of Hans Vaihinger, who 
influenced Adler decisively in his early years. "Fictions" 
are ideas and unconscious notions which have no counterpart 
in reality, but help us to deal with reality, according to 
.Vaihinger. They form an auxiliary construct, or a scaffold-
ing. Thus: 
Fictio means ••. an activity of fingere, that 
is to say, of constructing, forming, giving shape, 
elaborating, presenting, artistically fashioning, 
conceiving, thinking, imagining, assuming, planning, 
devising, inventing. Secondly, it refers to the 
product of these activities, the fictional assymp-
tion,fabrication, creation, the imagined case. 
. . 
Thus, fictions are imaginative constructs of the creative 
~ns Vaihinger, quoted in Ibid., p. 78. 
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mind, which are functionally real and necessary, but are 
objectively unreal, in terms of an implied materialistic 
metaphysics. They form the "as ifn world of values, reli-
gion, and scientific constructs. The term *'as ifn shows 
that all such constructs derive from comparative apper-
ception. These fictions may be abstractive (neglective) 
such as in the arbitrary determinations of science; symbolic 
(analogical} as in logical concepts; heuristic in the sense 
of facilitating dis~ove~, such as the principle of causat-
ion, for instance; practical (ethical) in order to allow 
responsible activity; or aesthetic. Aesthetic fictions, or 
nfigments" as Adler called them, have an artistic function. 
Dreams function in this way, according to Adler -- they 
arouse the emotions we need in order to solve our problems. 1 
In this we observe the constructive work of fantasy, 
as Freud would call it. We also find here a possible 
theoretical framework for unifying the evaluative activities 
·as they function in science, logic, ethics, and aesthetics. 
We see tha.t the creative process is o£ one cloth, whe:ttever 
it is revealed at work. Verification of an hypothesis is 
also justification of the conceptual scaffoJlding which entered 
into its formation. . Such verification takes place when a 
1 . . 
· ef. Ib1.d. , p. 82. 
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conceptual world coincides with the predicted perceptual 
world. 
Now, the ideal of self-perfection is for Adler a 
"fictional final goal", or a personal frame of reference. 
As Ansbacher says, this concept enables Adler to develop a 
'teleological view of personality and still avoid the teleo-
logical ddlennna. 1 The. "futuren or guiding ideal, as the 
Gestaltists would say, is an aspect of the present phen-
omenal field. The goal of life, itself a creative fabri-
cation, acts as an ever-present framework which guides 
future activity. Now Adler can affirm that causes, in-
stincts, experiences, sexual mechanisms 
cannot yield an explanation, but the perspective 
in which t~ey are regarded, the individual way 
of seeing them, which subordinates all life to 
the final goal, can do so.2 
It is important to see that this evaluative process, 
like Freud's dream-:work, is mainly unconscious. The individ-
ual is largely unaware ~f the true nature of his goal, and 
the processes by which he formulates that goal are in-
accessible to consciousness. 
Second, we must.see th~t this process is dramaturgic 
in method, as Freud • s d.-ream-work is so described. Experien-
1 Ansbacher, in Ibid. , p. 89. 2 Ibid., p. 92. 
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tial elements are selected, evaluated, and organized to-
ward an end like the characters in a drama. The standard 
of significance in this organizational process is the ideal 
of self. Adler insisted that we do not have the meaning 
of any act until we can relate it to this goal. "What is 
-
he trying to do?" is explicated in terms of "Who is he 
trying to ~?" 
2. In creating his "fictional final goal" the per-
son employs ••schema of apperceptionu. He orients himself 
to the psychological equivalent of meridians and parallels; 
in order to find his way through the flux of events. Every 
person relates to the world via a framework of subjective 
meanings, created in:· .. imaginative projection. This frame-
work of schema is "the way in which man looks at himself 
and the external world.nl Experiences are assimilated and 
utilized in terms of this schema, and to deny this relation-
ship "is like taking single notes out of a melody to exa-
mine them for their value and mean.ing.*'2 
Now, ideally, this fabric of schema is correlated 
with the structural requirements of the social scene. Adler 
brings this out clearly in his discussion of "intelligence" 
1 Ibid., p. 182. 2 Ibid., p. 183. 
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and "common sensen. The neurotic undergoes an "ideational 
shift11 .toward a rigid dogmatis'Ql. He creates a private 
frame of reference, his own nprivate map"', and strives on 
the "commonly useless side" precisely because his personal 
cognitive orientation does not correlate creatively with ·· 
the requirements of the social environment •. !Desperately 
afraid of losing his self-esteem, he schematizes sharply 
-· 
and abstractly, living in a neat system and becoming 
nestranged from concrete reality, where psychological elas-
ticity is needed rather than rigidity. nl Reasonable 
schematization of a situation, on the other hand, is based 
upon '~connnon sense~t ~ or the kind of solutions which make 
sense in terms of group living. Identifjring with others, 
one will grasp schematically the kinds of relationships 
which prevail among them. He will structure his life 
according to their needs and interests and so define his 
role in their midst. His own private orientation will be 
sensitively intertwined with the subtle changes and 
patterns of the interpersonal environment. Social feeling 
allows adequacy of evaluation. 
3. There is a third step to this evaluative process: 
Formulating an ideal self-system in interaction with his 
~l]?~d. , p. 248. 
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apperception of social requirements, a person develops his 
"style of life"'. The~, style of life is one's coherent, uni-
quely individual way of acting and reacting. It is the 
"strange melody of his own creation.ul 
It is important to see us~yle of life" as the most 
general concept by which Adler describes the individual. 
We see three elements involved in it: 
a) The goal of self-perfection and one's opinion 
of oneself in relation to that goal. 
b) The schema of apperception; or one's private 
picture of the world as it relates to him, more or less ac-
curate depending upon his courage, his social interest, and 
his imaginative capacity. 
c) A person's ~wn unique style, of striving, relat-
ing in part tq his constitutional make-up, and in part to 
the degree of his activity. 
This style of life, then, is a coherent individuality, 
formulated in evaluation. It is, in a sense, a living cog-
nitive system. It is an w"intermediate psychological meta-
bolism" assimilating, digesting, c:md defining the signifi-
cance and meaning of experiential situations. What does not 
1Ibid.' p. 181. 
147 
fit the style of life is excluded, or altered to fit. Ans-
bacher suggests that this is very·similar to the work of 
Krech and Crutchfield, in Theory and Problems of Social 
Psychology.l Combining insight from Gestalt theory, field 
theory, and purposive behaviorism, these authors show that 
beliefs and attitudes which are coherent with the life style 
are maintained "through the devices of selectivity in per-
ception and memory,cognitive.constancy, and of withdrawal."2 
Adler 1 s psychology of "use" is. very similar to this 
conception. He draws the distinction between psychology of 
~ and the psychology of possession. Those who stress 
possession trace all symptoms to peripheral or environmental 
influences. The psychology of ~'·'111emphasizes the creative 
appropriation and exploitation of all these influences."3 
One reUtes to the outside world in relation to his own 
interpretation of.himself in the social structure. He uses 
heredity and experiences as "bricks" in constructing hfs· 
own life. 
1
navid Hrech and R.s. Crutchfield, Theory and Pro-
blems of Social Psychology (New York: MCGraw - Hill Book 
Company, 1948). 
2Adler, loa. cit., p. 193. 3 Ibid., p. 205. 
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This has vast implications for ethics, as will be 
readily noted. Adler points this out. in his discussion of 
the opposite meaning which two persons·will give to the 
same childhood experience. We·· cannot know the meaning of 
an. act or an experience unless we can place it in the con-
text of a person's total life style. Why he has done it, 
and hence a large part of its significance, must await 
some understanding of the person himself. 
Now, it:;is important to see the re~jLat:tortSbip be7tween 
"life style"and cognitive processes. Adler undertakes a 
systematic exposition of this:l 
a) Perception: Perception is influenced by read-
iness; "selectivity, acuteness, and effect are determined 
by the goal."2 Man perceives what he can use in some way. 
b) Hallucination: The meaning and significance of 
an hallucination is found in the individual as a whole unit. 
c) Learning: Learning will be accepted only as it 
relates to the individual's style of life. It must focus 
on the interest, activity, spontaneity, and creativity of 
the learner. This conception suggests something about com-
mitment as it relates to moral decision. One may be encouraged 
le£. Ibid., PP· 209-218. 2Ibid.' p. 210. 
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to commit himself to a course of action only to the extent 
that it is coherent with his own interpretation of ideal-
self-in-society. 
d) Memory: Memory is an artistic ability, reshap-
ing experiences so as to assimilate what can be used and 
reject what is not palatable·. Forgetfulness is a narrowing 
of attention·to'shape things according to one's schetna.t1.c 
orientation. It will be noted that Freud's concept of~-: 
pression assumes the same sort of selective self-system, 
although he did not recognize this fact. 
3) Fantasy! Fantasy has a coping function, since 
we employ it to discover the directions we should take to 
solve a problem, and an artistic function, since it affords 
us the expectant feelings and emotions needed to make the 
effort. 
Equally important for our purposes in addition to 
this discussion of life style and cognition, is the relation-
ship between feelings and life style. Feelings are never 
in contradiction with one's style· of life, Adler says. To 
explain anxiety we must look to the end and purpose it serves 
within the self-system. Shame-anxiety is always intimately 
correlated with the coherent self which seeks perfection in 
the world ·of:·.other persons. The entire range of cognition, 
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from perception to creative anticipation is influenced by 
this system, and at the same time influences this system. 
II. Erich Fromm. 
A. Conscience and the Productive Orientation. 
1. Authoritarian and Humanistic Conscience. 
a) In Man for Himself Fromm makes a primary dis-
tinction between the "authoritarian" and the "humanistic" 
conscience. 1 The authoritarian conscience he describes as 
roughly analogous to Freud's "Super-ego."2 Authorities 
such as the parents, the church, the state, or public opin-
ion become internalized, and one feels responsible "to 
something inside, to one's ~onscience."3 Conscience, even 
though internalized, remains in a real sense external, since 
one is ruled not by one's own value judgments, but by the 
norms given by authority. Obedience, then, is the highest 
virtue, and rebellion against authority the greatest offense. 
Humanistic conscience is, on the other hand, "the 
expression of man's self-interest and integrity."4 Those 
1cf. Erich Fromm, Man for Himself (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1947), pp. 141-72. 
2 Cf. Ibid., p. 144. 3Ibid., p. 144. 
4Ibid., p. 159. 
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actions, thoughts, and feelings which further one's total 
well-being give a feeling of inner approval, and those 
which in~ure one's total personality produce a feeling of 
discomfort, or a "guilty conscience." 
Conscience is thus a re~action of ourselves 
to ourselves. It is the voice of our true 
selves which summons us back to ourselves, 
to live productively, to develop fully and 
harmoniously--that is, ~e become what we 
potentially are.l 
Humanistic conscience is a knowing function. It judges 
our "success or failure in the art of living."2 It is in 
touch with the state of our inner being, both its inner 
. order, or integrity, and its relative growth, or expan-
siveness. This knowing function, however, has an affective 
quality, and does much, of its ~ork below the level of aware-
ness. We may be influenced by its truth without even being 
aware of it. A feeling of tiredness or listlessness, or 
a vague feeling of uneasiness may be our only conscious 
reaction.3 
These two.types of conscience are often in canflict 
with each other. The authoritarian conscience arouses guilt 
when one is expressing his "strength, independence, product-
1 . Ibid., p. 159. 2Ibid., p. 158. 3cf. Ibid., p. 162. 
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iveness, and pride 9 "
1 
whli.le.:the:;::humanistic conscience 
arouses guilt if these fail to find expression. 
The paradoxical result is that the (author-
tarian) guilty conscience becomes the basis 
for·a "good11 conscience, while the good con-
science, if:one should bav7 it, ought to 
create a feeling ·of guilt. · · 
Fromm illustrates .this complex interrelatedness by tell-
ing of the man who. wanted to becon1e a musdcd.am.~but:.~became 
instead a businessman. to .satisfy his father •3 His effici-
ency in business~~gradually began to decline as. he. became 
increasingly·· depressed. Vnder analysis;· he discovered that 
his depre ss·ion was caused by. his guilt feelings for having 
disappointed his father. Ftirther analysis reveals a deeper 
layer of guilt, related not to his failure to please his 
. . 
father, ·but to his obedience to his father and failure to 
satisfy himself. Authoritarian guilt may be a rationaliz-
ation for a deeper guilt arising from the humanistic con-
science. 
b) What is.the relationship between these two 
types. of con.science and guilt- . and shame-anxiety? Fromm 
does not differentiate between guilt and shame, but uses 
1 . . 
Ibl.d. ' p •. 150. 2 .rug.' p. 150. 
3cf. Ibid., pp. 155-6. 
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"guU.lt" to encompass· all of the related phenomena. 
(1) The person who violates the authoritarian 
conscience suffers from-gutlt-anxiety. There is a com• 
plement of self-directed hostility involved here. Author-
ity has been internalized; one has taken over the vole of 
the authority ''by treatii.g himself with the same strictness 
and cruelty. nl The st:andards before<:which one stands con-
demned are relatively external, They are not fully one's 
own, or have not been integrated into the organismic whole 
of one t s personality!. · They retain a "must" quality, since 
they are relatively alien to one's need for autonomous self-
fulfillment. 
(2) The person who violates the humanistic con-
science suffers from shame~anxiety as we have defined it. 
The inner question is not "Have I transgressed?" but ".Am 
I acceptable?" Fromm alludes to this when he associates 
the humanistic conscience with the craving for self• 
approva1. 2 He considers this craving for self-approval to 
be the "expression of the all-pervasive though unconscious 
.guilt £eeling."3 It. is a major thesis of this paper that 
l Ibid., p. 151. 2 Cf. Ibid., p. 164. 3 Ibid., p. 164. 
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this all-pervasive craving for self-approval shoul.d;:be care-
'ful}.y.~distingidshed from·· the more· peripheral craving for 
the approval .O:E~· authority-flbgui:es. Fromm's analysis would 
perhaps be strengthened by the use of the term "shame" for 
the former, and "guilt" for the latter. The fact that these 
may function in contradistinction to one another emphasizes 
the importance of sharp differentiation. 
(3) A third level of anxiety is revealed when we 
ask how a person comes to adopt an authoritarian conscience. 
An authoritarian conscience is one aspect of an authori-
tarian characlt!er. The authoritarian. character "has found 
inner security by becoming, symbiotically, part of an aut-
hority felt to be greater and more powerful than himsel£."1 
He depends on this symbiotic relationship, because to lose 
it is to nbe thrown into avoid, to face the horror of 
nothingness."2 
·rn Escape From Freedom Fromm clearly shows that the 
authoritarian character is a mechanism of escape. Escape 
mechanisms result from the ninsecurity of the isolated 
individual."3 In order to avoid lin "tmbearable state:of 
1Ibid,' p. 146. 2 ' ~q p. 147 • 
. 
3Erich Fronm, Escape· From Freedom (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1941), P• 140. 
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powerlessness and aloneness" a person may either progress 
.to a npositive freedomn, expressing in love and work the full-
ness of an autonomous personality, or he can fall back into 
a symbiotic, authoritarian orientation. This escape exacts 
a terrible price. 
This course of escape ••• is characterized by 
its compulsive character, like every escape 
from threatening panic; it is also charac-
terized by the more or less complete sur-
render of individuality and the integrity 
of the self.l . 
Here is a more basic anxiety--fear of isolation, aloneness, 
nothingness. We might term this anxiety grief-a:nxiety, 
since it springs from fear of abandonment, or s~paration. 
Freud's initial definition of guilt as fear of loss of 
love, and hence abandonment of an infanc by his parents 
is closely related. The fact that one··will risk shame-
anxiety and loss of personal integrity in order to avoid 
the panic of aloneness indicates that grief-anxiety may 
function at a deeper level than shame-anxiety. 
The person who adopts the authorinarian character 
is faced with a double-bind situation. If he obeys the 
authoritarian rules he violates his own integrity. His 
life takes on a ~igid, compulsive aspect, growing out of a 
1Ibid.' p. 140. 
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deep awareness that he. is not truly himself, and preci-
pitated by shame-anxiety·at th-is violation of himself. On 
the other hand, if he breaks the authoritarian rule, he 
suffers from guilt-anxiety. This guilt-anxiety brings a 
charge of self-directed~J:iostility,. which results in a· 
lessened self-esteem and new shame-anxiety. This new fear 
of lost in:tegrity sends himback to the authority-figures 
for reassurance, and makes him even more dependent upon 
them. If he keeps the rule he suffers shame-anxiety, and 
if he breaks the rule he suffers shame-anxiety~.frtnil;;·:another 
direction. "You're damned.if you do and you're damned if 
you don'tn expresses this kind of a double-bind situation. 
The depression which the aspiring musician suffered1 re-
sulted, not from the guilt, as Freud would say, but from 
the hopelessness of a double-bind situation. 
The fact that.one will persist in such an author-
itarian escape indicates the primal nature ofthe anxiety 
which one seeks to avoid by it--grief~anxiety, or fear of 
separation and aloneness. 
(4) This ana~ysis of Fromm's doctrine of conscience 
suggests an anxiety-continuum roughly as follows: 
1 . .. . Cf. Fromm, Man for Himself ••• , p. 165. 
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(a) Fear--one may control his actions out of 
expediency, from fear of punishment or hope of reward. 1 
Here the object of threat is obviously external. 
(b) Guilt-anxiety--one may internalize authority, 
assume or introject the role of authority, and direct 
hostility gainst himself. This is more pervasive than 
fear, since it is a part of one's personality. It is still 
peripheral, however. The relationships With which it cor-
relates remain external in essence. The internalized value-
system is still not one's own. In intrapsychic functioning 
it continues to be relatively an autonomous syndrome. 
(c) Shame""anxiety-... the voice of the humanistic 
conscience, or restlessness in the presence of continuing 
violation of inner integrity. More:pervasive than guilt, 
it taps the deep need to retain internal coherence and to 
achieve persona~ expansion. 
(d) Grief-anxiety--the primal level of anxiety, 
fear of aloneness, powerlessness, nothingness. Why the fear 
of aloneness should.be associated with powerlessness and 
nothingness, as Fromm'observes, awaits further study. 
Here it is important to see that each of these 
levels of anxiety may function relatively autonomously, 
1 .4 e£. Ibid., p. 1 4. 
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although in mutual interrelation with the others. This must 
be affirmed in order to understand the way in which the 
more peripheral may be chosen as a defense against the more 
penetrating. One may choose a guilty act in order to avoid 
the deeper threat of humiliation. The motivational char-
acter of such an act, and its moral implications, will 
not be understood apart from this awareness. 
This has far-reaching consequences. Thus a young 
man who is deeply anxious about his masculine adequacy 
(shame-anxiety) may ttact out" sexually in order to prove 
- ' 
himself. He risks guilt.;.anxiety to avoid shame-anxiety. 
Now, to censure him in terms of a moral code which appeals 
to the nshamefulu nature of sex-related behavior is to com-
plicate his problem by exaggerating the shame-anxiety which 
is a part of it. 
This picture becomes even more complex if we con-
sider the deeper:,:layer of grief-anxiety. We have seen the 
way in which one may choose to suffe~ shame-anxiety in order 
to avert grief-anxiety. A system of moral sanctions which 
enforces the prescribed conduct by {1) shaming devices, and 
{2) threats of ~tracism and abandonment by beloved persons, 
involves its victims in a serious dilemma. Thus, a young 
man who has subconsciously chosen to "disownu his sexuality 
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by isolating it from:'.intrapsychic communication has sought 
to spare himself the threat of loss of the significant per-
sons from his life (grief-anxiety) by emasculating hims~lf 
psychically at the cost of shame-anxiety. His fear of loss 
of love is not assuaged by this defensive technique, but is 
rather exaggerated. He now needs sexual conduct desparately, 
in. order (1) to secure another saurceoof affection, and (2) 
to reassert his "disownedn manhood. Any "acting out", 
however, involvee him in forbidden acts which (1) threaten 
the imposition of sanctions as he evaluates his situation 
in relation to them, hence (2) create guilt-anxiety, with 
its attack upon his self-esteem and increased dependence 
upon the authority figures for reassurance and approval, 
which amplifies the deeper anxieties motivating the guilt-
related behavior in the first place. 
Surely ethical references to noughtness", or the 
simplicity of obligation, will be inadequate unless they 
include an understanding of this qualitative complexity. 
Similarly, one who develops a system of ideal norms, or the 
ethical criticisms of systems of pesscriptions and sanctions, 
must be aware of this interrelationship. 
2. Conscience Interacts With a Criterion of Self-
realization. 
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(1) The concept of nself-perfection" in Adler be-
comes "productive orientation" in Fromm's Man for Himself. 
Fromm says this term uproductive orientation" is an expan-
sion of the term "spontaneityn in his earlier work Escape 
From Freedom. 1 In this earlier wor~ the distinction is 
made between ttfreedom from" and nfreedom ton. Life has 
nan inherent tendency to grow, to expand, to express potent-
ialities."2 Freedom from the primary social and family ties 
prior to &ndividuation may not necessarily mean freedom to 
grow into full expression of one's potentialities. One 
may lose courage in the face of separation from those pri-
mary ties, may give up his individuality, and may settle 
for escape back into some sort of symbiotic relationship. 
There is, however, a productive way to face the isolation 
and doubt which freedom brings, nthat of spontaneous re-
lationship to man and nature."3 This freedom man attains 
only by being himself, and realizing himself. 4 "Positive 
freedom ••• is identical with the full realization of the 
1ef. Ibid., p. 84. 
2Fromm, Escape From Freed&m ••• , p. 269. 
3 4 Ibid., p. 70. Gf. Ibid., p. 257. 
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individual's potentialities, together with his ability to 
1 live actively and spontaneously.n 
The term "spontane-ity-11 reaains its connotation of 
self-realization as it is expanded into "productive o.rient-
ationn, but becomes more clearly defined. B.y norientation" 
Frounn means a syndro-.ne .. which results from a particular 
organization of character. It is a channeling of energy 
into a certain style of relating to the world. Once develop-
ed, this character orientation tends to perpetuate itself, 
so that one acts ntrue to character."2 ·we should note 
especially that an orientation is a mode of relatedness. 
Thus: 
The nproductive orientationn of personality 
refers to a fundamental attitude, a mode of 
relatedness in all realms of human experience. 
It covers mental, emotional, and sensory 
responses to others, to oneself, and to things. 
Productiveness i-s man's ability to use his 
powers and to realize the potentialities in 
him.3 · 
Man realizes himself, then, to the extent that he beeomes 
able to relate to the world productively. To live in the 
productive attitude and character orientation is to achieve 
1Ibid.' p. 270. 
2ef. Fromm, Man for Himself ••.• , pp. 57~and 59. 
3 
.,illg., p. 84. 
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self~realization. Here we see self-realization functionally 
defined, in contrast to the mystic goal of self-perfection 
in Adler. It is a style of living and relating to others. 
Fromm contrasts the productive orientation with 
the various nonproductive orientations, the receptive 
(accepting) , . the·· exploitative (taking) , theJ .. hoarding 
(preserving), and- the .marketing- (exchanging) orientation. 
These orientations are only relatively non-productive. 
In every character there is a blending of these orientations 
in various··social relationships. The degree of productivity 
or nonproduc-tivity varies in each orientation along the lines 
of a continutnn, and changes the quality of the behavior in 
relation to it. Thus, the quality of generosity in the 
marketing orientation may take on the negative quality of 
wastefulness·in the nonproductive personality. Or, to use 
another illustration, "rational systematic orderliness ••• may 
be found when productiveness is high, while, with decreasing 
productiveness, it degenerates more and more into irrational, 
pedantic !impulsive lorderlin.ess '~.ttl Thus virtue is not in 
honesty, but in hone·sty in a certain character context. 
1 Ibid. , p • 116 • 
" ' 
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b) In the section on Adler, we saw that self-
perfection and shame-anxiety are closely related. What is 
the relationship between anxiety and Fromm's nproductive 
orientation"? Fromm observes for the most part only the 
negative £unction of anxiety. Reaction to anxiety is "a 
common type of nonproductive activitytt, whether that anxiety 
is "acute or chronic. nl ~n gives up his spontaneity and 
escapes into an authoritarian relationship for fear of 
being "alone, isolated, threatened from all sides."2 It is 
ttinsecurity", or, in our terms, grief-anxiety which leads 
one to abandon the quest .for the productive orientation. 
Fromm speaks of the restlessness and depression 
which may result from failure to realize self. He does 
not see that anxiety of moderate intensity may stimulate 
the measures necessary for self ... fulfillment. 
·, 
c) In Adler, self-perfection is a "prepotent 
dynamic force.n The ideal self is an imaginative construct 
of the creative mind, which functions teleologically as an 
innnanent motivating fo't!ce~. Does the uproductive orienta-
tion" of Fromm function as a causa finalis in this way? 
1 ' 
:&bid.' p. 86. 
2Fromm, Escape From Freedom ••• , p. 62. 
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Fronnn speaks of it as man • s virtue, in the same ·sense in 
which Aristotle uses the term. Virtue, or excellence, is 
operative in actuating the capacities and potentialities 
peculiar to one's nature. 1 This suggests a teleological 
conception. 
The humanistic conscience is described as "the 
guardian of man's tnue self-interestn, the "voice of our 
loving care of ourselves.tt2 To live productively is to 
become what we potentially are, and our conscience does 
not give us peace when we fall short. This suggests that 
conscience is t.he ideal -self operating· as a motivational 
force. If ignored, it e~erts itself in restlessness, 
exhaustion, or depression. Psychoanalytic therapy relies 
on the strength and tenacity of the forces striving for 
health. A psychoanalyst usually is impressed with the fact 
that· "most of his patients_wouldlong since have given up 
the fight were they not impelled by an impulse to achieve 
. 3 
psychic health and happiness." 
Even more interesting in this connection is Fromm~s 
affirmation that the potential self riever ceases to exert 
1 Cf. Ibid., pp. 26 and 92. 
2Ibid., pp. 150 and 159. 3Ibid., p •. 223. 
165 
itself even though it may be suppressed. Thus, when a 
child's individuality is compromised by submission to 
authority, nthe basic contradiction between the authority 
and the child who submits tlo it is never eliminated."1 
The integrity of the self is asserted through hostility 
and rebellieasnass; ~ or,~repression of these with a secebnd-
layer damage to the sel-f and increasing dependence upon 
authority. The innate need to live spontaneously is 
"driven by the logic of its own dynamism", and uthreatens 
ha • • • u2 to c nge ~nto ~ts oppos~te. Spontaneity, or the produc-
tive orientation, even when repressed from awareness, 11 does 
not cease to exist as a potentiality, and indicates its 
existence by the conscious or unconscious hatred by which 
such suppression is always accompanied.n3 Man's potential• 
ity, or his truennature, then, has a udynamism of its ownn4 
which may either come to be e~pressed as productiveness, or 
may be expressed in its opposite, sadistic hatred. 
Here is a conception of the utmost importance to 
ethics. Destructive hatred is seen as a confirmation of the 
1Fromm, Escape From Freedom ••• , p. 
2Ibid., p. 270. 3Ibid., p. 288. 
30. 
4 Ibid., p. 289. 
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inherent moral intent of human ~ersonality. The intrinsic 
need to fulfill and to expand one's unique potentiality 
through productiveness is implied even in its very opposite. 
The functional intent, or meaning of an aggressive act is 
positive--hatred would be love if it could. 
3. Conscience ~resupposes Rield ~heory. 
In Fromm's theory conscience is understood only if 
we see its significance in a social setting. 
a) We have seen that man's character is defined by 
Fromm in terms of his relatedness. Self-actualization lies 
in thenaahievement of a certain mode of relating to others 
and to the culture as a whole. The immanent ideal of self-
realization, or the. "productive orientationn is an ideal · ·. 
way of relating to the wor'ld and to others. The inter-
personal is of one cloth with personal self-fulfillment. 
Here we can point out a majlor advance over Adler's 
theory. Adler's nsocial feelingn remains a vague social 
instinct theory, reminding one of Butler's concept of the 
instinct for benevolent action. Adler justified it main~y 
in biological terms in his early theories, but gradually 
began to identify self-realization with social interest. 
Adler saw that social interest increases with self-actualiza-
tion, but did not define this as an intrinsic relationship. 
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Fromm sees that. self-actualization and social involvement 
are of a piece. 
·One difficulty in Fromm's theory is that the self 
tends· to evaporate into·its relationships. The self is 
realized i.n certain customary.modes of social interaction, 
but it is not clear as to the content of the self which 
,is :interacting. Fromm'~ concept of socially patcerned 
defects, or defects which are structured into the life of 
a culture, seems to imply that there is a criterion of self-
actualization more basic than that. of the productive orient-
ation.1 That is, one may be producti-vely oriehted to others 
in a culture which is 4efective and still be crippled in 
his character development. Apparently what is lacking in 
Fromm is some concept similar to Maslow's hierarchy of pre-
potent needs. Self-actualization must be defined not only 
in terms of relationship, but also of need-fulfillment. 
'b) Humanistic conscience. is interpersonal. The 
humanistic conscience has.developed, like speech and thought, 
in a cultural matrix. 
The human race, •• has formulated ethical norms 
in its religious and philosophical-systems 
toward which the conscience of every indivi-
1 . . Cf, IbJ.d., p. 221. 
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dual must be orientated, if he is not to 
start from the beginning."l 
c) Grief- and shame-anxiety are involved in our 
interpersonal relationships. They are experienced not only 
in early family relationships, but in the contemporary 
relationships of adult life as well:.. 
When man loses genuine relatedness, such as he does 
under an authoritarian system, he ufeels powerless and 
extremely insecure.u2 In order to escape this insecurity, 
which Fromm describes as the fear of separation and alone-
ness, man may be willing to give up his spontaneity and 
individuality, living the life of an emotional invalid. 
As we described it above, man avoids grief•amdety by 
suffering shame-anxiety, and secondarily the crippling 
defenses which must be marshalled to endure a chronic sensi-
tivity to shaue-anxiety. 
Similarly, shame-anxiety relates to our interpersonal 
or cultural role. If in a marketing culture "one's value 
is determined by success on a· competitive market, one's self-
esteem is bound to be shaky and in constant need of confirma-
tion by others.n3 Here we see that security in interpersonal 
ltbid. , p. 172. 2Fromm, Escape From Freedom ••• , p. 253. 
3· Fromm, Man ·for Himself ••• , p. 72. 
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relationships is the only basis on which we can build a self-
system which is relatively free from anxiety. 
From the above we can see, too, that anxiety re-
lates to the structural characteristics of the interpersonal 
environment, or the prevailing patterns within the culture. 
Thus, in a Calvinistic society guilt and shame are vastly 
enhanced. It is a· socially patterned defect in such a 
society that its members suffer from anxiety. 
d) The major characteristic of the productive 
orientation is love. Fromm equates love with spontaneity 
in Escape From Freedom, and defines love as the "spontan-
eous affirmation of othersu, and the "union of the indivi-
dual with others on the basis of the pre·servation of the 
individual self. nl Sim.ilarly, in::::The Art of Loving, love 
is defined as "an orientation of character which determines 
the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole.n2 The 
productive orientation and love ar~ specifically correlated 
in this statement: "Genuine love is an expression of pro-
ductiveness and implies care, respect, responsibility and 
1 Fromm, Escape From Freedom ••• , .p. 261. 
2Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York: Harper 
and Brothers Publishers, 1956), p. 46. 
1 knowledge.n 
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B. The Evaluative Function. 
Fromm develops several conceptions which shed 
light upon the evaluative function and its relationship 
to ethics. 
1. Intelligence and Reason. 
One· distinction made by Fromm is that between 
"intelligence" and "reason." Intelligence is the tool 
for manipulating physical things. For practical reasons 
we must often concentrate upon the quantitative and external 
characteristics of things. The greater significance and 
internal qualities of things ma}1ynot be important to the 
manipulative task, and intelligence may ignore them. In-
telligence, however, may be irrational from a larger per-
spective. The preoccupation of the paranoid person with 
superficial perceptual clues, in order to bend their mean-
ing to his psychosis, is an extreme illustration. 
Reason, on the other hand, has the dimension of 
depth which "reaches to the essenc'e of things and processes. " 2 
It is concerned for all of the dimensions of a thing, espec-
ially as they illuminate its meaning. Man comprehends.the 
1Ibid.' p. 59. 2Fromm, Man for Himself ••• , p. 103. 
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world in two ways--through reason and through love. Reason 
enables him to relate to objects by penetrating through 
their surface and grasping their essence. Love helps him 
to relate to other persons. 
To be irrational, then, is to miss the significant 
or essential aspects of the world by concentrating narrowly 
upon their surface aspects. Fromm uses nirrationaln in 
another connection, too. nrrrational faith" is "the belie£-~ 
in a person, idea, or symbol which does not result from 
one's experience of thought or feeling, but which is based 
on one '-s emotional submission to irrational authority. nl 
"Irrational authority", in turn, is authority which roots 
in manipulative power, rather than in competence.2 "Irra-
tional doUbt" is doubt which stems from unconscious emo-
tional conflict, and is a compulsive ,'\ trationalization of 
inner despair and isolation. 3 
What do these definitions of irrational have in 
common? They all relate to thoug~t or behavior which may 
be internally consistent, but which is circumsctibed by the 
demands of a narrowly confined task. The task may.be that 
1Ibid.~ p. 201. 2~f. Ibid., p. 9. 
3ef. Ibid., 199-201. 
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of manipulating things, or that of ruling or submitting 
to others within a power syndrome, or that of finding a 
tolerable basis for enduring one's neuroses. In every 
case the ratiocination required to accomplish such a task 
is "irrational" in a larger context. In the light of one's 
total well-being it is seen as distortive and incoherent. 
2. Productive Thinking. 
Fromm sheds further light on this in his discussion 
of reason and character. He says: "The mature, productive, 
rational person will choose a system which permits him to 
be mature, productive and rationaL ul One's system of 
ideas will reflect his character. Thinking is a product 
of character; one tends to distort the significance of 
reality according to his character orientation. Thus the 
exploitative person will use .intelligence to appropriate 
things and to justify that appropr±ation. Our typical 
Western "marketing" orientation puts a premium upon the 
kind of thinking which enables us most easily to grasp and 
hoard things, and to grade and degrade people. 
Productive character,· then, results in productive 
thinking. The produqtive person relates to the objects of 
1Ibid.' p. 49. 
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thought in the same way that he relates to other persons 
in love. He cares about the object, which arouses his 
interest precisely because it· is nrelevant from the 
standpoint ~f his individual life or that of human exis-
tence.111 He responds to his object, and respects it, or 
is content to .allow it to retain its own unique configura-
tion. Objectivity is possible only to the mature, pro-
ductive person who sees nthe object as it is and not as 
he wishes it to be.n2 
Rational thinking, then, is thinking which issues 
from the fullness of the productive orientation. It 
issues from the coherent integrity of a xnaturerpersonality, 
and defends and supports that which leads to mature per-
so~ality in others. Whether or not a particular a~t is 
"rational't is defined in terms of its total meaning within 
the context of one's life. 
We should note here that for Fromm that which is 
moral, or ri~ht, or good,.is identical with the rational. 
A sadistic person will distort any virtue, however subtly, 
to force it to serve his need to dominate and to hurt. 
Similarly, the feeling of obligation, or noughtnessu may 
1Ibid. ' p. 103. 
2 . 
. Ibid., p. 104. 
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serve the interests of irrational authority-figures. Any 
act or expression which relates to a nonproductive per-
sonality orientation is both iuimQral and:: irrational, and 
for the same reasons. It is an aspect of a total situat-
ion which does not lead to personal wholeness. Any act 
or thought is validated contextually. One must discover 
its meaning in the personal-social milieu in which it 
occurs, and not apart from that milieu. If an act or 
thought is valid morally, it is also rationally valid, 
since the same criterion applies in either case. The 
moral is the reasonable; the reasonable is the moral. 
3. Frames of Orientation. 
Why does character relate so intimately to ration-
ality? The answer to this question is found in the gene-
sis and function of rational systems~ Rational systems 
are imaginative constructs. Fromm uses the term "frames 
of orientation and devotion.t•1 This is roughly equivalent 
to Adler's nschema of apperception.u A person lives in 
the world by 
constructing an all-inclusive mental picpure 
of the world which serves as a frame of 
reference from which he can derive an answer 
1Ibid. , p. 48. 
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to the question of where he stands and what 
he ought to do.l 
What is the motivation for this imaginative develop-
ment? Man's own imaginative. capacity is in part responsi-
ble. It is his curse as well .as his blessing. · Because 
man has self-awareness, he knows his powerlessness, his 
physical nature, and his impending death. He is out of 
harmony with nature because he is able to stand aloof from 
it. This means that he must give his own meaning to his 
existence, or live :in boredom and discomfort. Man must 
"create a world of his own in which he can feel at home 
with himself and his fellow nie~. " 2 ;, nHe must give account 
to himself of himself, and of the meaning of his existence.tt3 
Man cannot be himself and realize himself except as he re-
lates to others within a fabric of meaning. Thus "moral 
aloneness", or a lack of relatedness to "values, symbols, 
patterns"4 is an intolerable situation, which he will avoid 
at all cost. The need to find meaning, or to gra{ip the 
decisive structural patterns which 'define the essence of 
situations and facilitate fulfillment in productive love, 
is at the heart of all cognition. Here we see that the need 
lrbid., p. 47. 2rbid., p. 41. 3rbid., p. 41. 
4Fromm, Escape From Freedom .•. , p. 19. 
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to find meaning is intimately related to grief-anxiety. 
The desparate fear of being alone prods us to the cogni-
tive assessment of the relationships which assure companion-
ship. 
This quest for meaning may be a matter of spirit-
ual life or death. Our very identity as persons may be 
at stake. In an instrumentalized, materialistic culture, 
for instance, genuine relatedness.may be threatened. Per-
sons may relate to each other only via the narrow channel 
of tasks defined by the market. Competition makes real 
love difficult. Under such conditions, persons may suffer 
extreme insecurity. What is the source of this insecurity? 
"A profound doubt of one's own identity."1 We know who we 
are only as we relate to each other and to life through 
a coherent, adequate framework of values and norms. Any 
threat to that system is a threat to. our identity, and 
hence to our psychic existence. 
Must each man create his own system of values? 
Fromm assumes this to be true. Each person does not create 
in a vacuum, however. The culture in which he lives defines 
the limitations and the setting within which he will find 
1 Ibid., p. 254. 
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his place. For the most part Fromm stresses the limiting 
aspects of culture. In one passage, however, he stresses 
the enabling aspect of culture: 
The human race, in the last five or six 
thousand years of its cultural develop-
.ment, has formulated ethical norms in 
/its religious and philosophical systems 
--=~·toward which the conscience of every 
individual must be orientated, if he 
is not to start from the beginning.l 
Fromm notes that among thinkers in all ages and cultures 
nwhose aim was the growth and happiness of mann2 there has 
been an amazing degree of agreement in these values and 
norms. 
Such systems are called nframes of orientation and 
devotionn because religious systems have this function of 
enabling self-fulfillment by relating persons meaningfully 
to others and to the universe. A neurosis, then, can be 
described as tta particular form of religion·; "3 since it 
is a private orienting system. 
We can point here to one apparent difficulty in 
Fromm's system. For him, obedience, self-sacrifice, and 
duty are terms which belong to an authoritarian ethic.4 
1Fromm, Man for Himself ••• , p. 172. 
2Ibid., p. 172 3Ibid., p. 49. 
4cf. especially Ibid., pp. 12 and following. 
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They are part and parcel with a crippling power system 
which does not trust men to choose rationally. Is it not 
true that duty and obedience may also relate to a humanistic 
ethic? The valid norms of a mature culture must still be 
assimilated by those within it who are growing into matur-
ity. At some stages in their personality development the 
valid system will appear to be external and unwelcome. Per-
haps no person ever becomes so productively oriented that 
some unreasonable and segmental desires do not occasionally 
tempt him. 
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III. Harry Stack Sullivan. 
A. Anxiety and the Self-system. 
1. The Meaning of Anxiety. 
Harry Stack Sullivan ordinarily defines anxiety 
as it is experienced in its extreme manifestation. He 
terms it "uncanny ~motion."1 Words such as dread, horror, 
loathing, and awe can be associated with it. It has "a 
sort of shuddering, not-of-this-earth component which is, 
I believe, a curious revtval from very early emotional 
experience."2 Later we will see that Sullivan speaks of 
an anxiety gradient, which in various levels of intensity 
has different effects upon behavior. Like Freud's "signal 
anxiety", however, even minor twinges of uneasiness threaten 
to expose one to the full-dress horror of primitive "un-
canny emotion." Only in infancy is the full, blazing 
intensity of this emotion felt; layers of defense and avoid-
ing behavior•patterns are soon developed to protect the 
personality from this assualt. In the organismic depths 
of our being, however; we never forget the pain of anxiety 
~arry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of 
Psychiatry, edited by Helen Swick Perry and Mary Ladd Gawel 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1953), pp. 10 and 315. 
2Ibid., p. 10. 
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at its worst, and the avoiding of anxiety becomes the 
major motive in all interpersonal relationships. 
tfuat is the source of anxiety? Anxiety is brought 
about by disturbance in interpersonal relationships. In 
earliest infancy, the anxious mother induces anxiety in her 
baby. Some emotional ·disturbance in the mind of a signi-
ficant person in an infant's life disturbs the relation-
. . . . . 1 
ship of empathy, and the baby feels threatened. Sullivan 
considers empathy _to be indefinabl~, but ordinarily iden-. 
tifies it with a relationship of tenderness. 
Sullivan contrasts fear with amdety. Fear is the 
"felt aspect of tension arising from danger to the exist-
ence or biological integrity of the organism.n2 Fear can 
be diminished by ·satisfaction of physico-chemical needs. 
Anxiety, on the other hand, cannot be managed so easily. 
Anxiety comes by induction from another person, and hence 
cannot be released. 3 We can differentiate needs and take 
appropriate action for their satisfaction, but nit is hard 
to get experience of anxiety in the past to fit into inter-
preting present instances of it, and anxiety can almost be 
said to cut off foresight." 1 Anxiety is a paralyzing 
llbid. ' pp. 9' 41. 
3lbid.' p. 43. 
2lbid.' p. 50. 
4rh id. , p • 44 • 
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emotion, something like a "blow on the head."l It not 
only blocks further need satisfaction, it blocks compre-
hension of its own significance. 
Sullivan differentiates three tension-systems 
~qhich are the basic motivations ruling human life: 
(1) The first is the need for satisfaction of physico-
chemical needs. (2) The second is the need for inter-
personal security, which is expressed in anxiety. This is 
likely to be prepotent, in the sense that anxiety inter-
feres with:all other tensions. (3). The third is the need 
for sleep, or the phasic aspect of living which alternates 
with awareness. Unsatisfied needs and anxiety both tend 
to interfere with the need for sleep. Sullivan does not 
relate this to ~he cognitive awareness which an incompleted 
tension-system demands. Sleep is difficult for a neurotic 
person precisely because an uncompleted cognitive task con-
tinues to require alertness. 
2. Guilt-anxiety. 
It appears to be characteristic of interpersonal 
psychiatrists generally to ignore the phenomena of guilt. 
lrbid., PP. 314, 160. 
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It is ordinarily true that those theories which emphasize 
personality as a creative process of self-discovery and 
self-fulfillment within a social field are unlikely to 
think of guilt as the powerful factor Freud conceived it 
to be. 
In The. Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry Sullivan 
makes only three references to guilt, each time simply 
listing it with shame, embarrassment, humiliation, and 
the like. He speaks of the "inculcation of guilt" as a 
factor in influencing the child.to adopt the proper sex-
role.1 Again, punishment at the hands of the parents by 
which "the complex anxiety derivatives of shame and guilt 
are inculcated" is seen as the source of the deception 
which leads to covert thought. 2 Anxiety, he says, appears 
not only as awareness of itself, but also in the experience 
of "complex" emotions such as ~:embarrassment, shame, humi-
liation, guilt, and chagrin.u3 These emotions result from 
past training and socialization, especially of a restrictive 
and punitive nature. To defend ourselves against them, we 
develop security operations designed to disparage others 
by imputing to them, or provoking in them, the same feelings. 
libid., p. 219. 2Ibid., p. 345. 3Ibid. , p. 379. 
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Thus all disparaging feelings root in anxiety, and re-
present an attempt to expand one's own self-esteem in 
relation to others.l 
Sullivan does discuss the hostility or rage 
components which Freud assigned to guilt. He shows that 
"rage behavior'' arises in the infant when ''certain types 
of physical restraints" are imposed, especially those 
which threaten the oxygen supply and involve fear, or 
terror. 2 In the infant, this rage is likely to result 
when intense crying interferes with breathing. ~fuat is 
the situation most likely to 17ad to this? t~en both the 
"danger of need and infantile anxiety induced by the 
mother's anxiety" pose a double threat to the connnunal 
existence of the infant. 3 In later childhood, we learn 
from angry parents the "peculiar utility of angern, and 
we express anger toward our toys and companions. Most 
people come to use anger frequently, especially as a sub-
stitute for anxiety. Mild anxiety calls out anger. 
There may take place a further, unfortunate develop-
ment to this trend. Anger expressed against authority 
figures leads to punishment, usually accompanied by 
la f . Ibid. , p • 3 7 9 • 
3 Ibid . , p . 54 . 
2Ibid. , p. 211. 
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induction of parental anxiety. Here the peculiar combina-
tion of fear (threat of pain and other physico-chemical 
discomfort) and anxiety (threat arising from induction of 
an anxious feeling-tone from the interpersonal environment) 
provokes an angry reaction which only aggravates the 
situation by calling out more fear and anxiety. Anger 
learns to go underground. Resentment is called out, or 
the "felt aspect of rather complex processes which if 
expressed more directly, would have led to the repressive 
use of authority.nl Resentment must by its nature be 
concealed, and it~is this concealed resentment, cut off 
from evaluative re-appraisal, which may eventually result 
in psychosomatic and other difficulties. It is important 
to see here that physical threat may or may not be accom-
panied by anxiety in the punishing parents. The anxious 
parent arouses more rage and is most anxious when the 
child expresses that rage. 
Sullivan shows that anxiety and rage are closely 
linked to the evaluative processes which he calls npersoni-
fication". In place of Freud's view that the infant 
ingests a foreign image of the angry parent, Sullivan 
libid. ' p. 213. 
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develops the concept of nbad-me".l In an interpersonal 
setting involving strong components of fear, anxiety, 
rage, and covert resentment, the chi~d may develop the 
"rudimentary personification" of "bad-me". This is not 
an ingested image, but rather the child's own personifi-
cation of himself, developed in an imaginative appraisal 
of his place in the interpersonal setting. As we will 
see, Sullivan regards this personification as a "dis-
sociated system", along with "good-me" and "bad-me". In 
this way, he acc01.mts for the relative autonomy of these 
components within the self, but not in Freud's terms of 
primitive ingestion, but rather in terms of intrapsychic 
evaluative processes. 
Sullivan does not speak of guilt as self-directed 
hostility. Freud would see covert rage and resentment 
as being directed against the self. Presumably the 
epithet "bad-me" carries some 6f the same connotations. 
This would be indicated by Sullivan 1 s linking resentment 
with psychosomatic difficulties, although even here he 
probably would not stress self-attack so much as a general 
disruption of physiological processes caused by chronic 
rage-reactions. 
1 . . . Ib1d., pp. 162, 206) ·316. 
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3. Shame-anxiety. 
Sullivan's ord:i.nary use of the term "anxiety" is 
similar to our working de£'initi.on of st>ame-anxiety. Anxiety 
arises in one system wit~ one's prehended, perceived, or 
imagined significance or role in the interpersonal envir-
onment. 
a) lve saw above t'hat the infant fi.rst knows 
anxiety as he prebends an anxious feeling-tone· in };is 
interpersonal environment.! The primary source of this 
anxiety :i_s the mother, or "toJhoever relates to the infant in 
a motl>ering role. ~.fuy may the motl..,er be anxious? Her 
social responsibility to turn her infant into an acceptable 
'human being may be threatened by the child's behavior. 
His crying or restlessness may cast doubt upon her compet-
ence as a mother~ her esteem in her motrering role is at 
stake. Similarly, if he plays v1ith his genitals or in-
dulges in similar srocking behavior, as be may very 
naturally do, her mothering role is immediately threatened. 
She will feel humiliated, thinking that surely a worthy 
mother should have a more chaste child, and this humilia-
tion cuts deeply into her identity as a mother. This real 
1sullivan uses the tfuiteheadian term "prehension", 
and once refers to Alfred North tfuitehead. .££'. Ibid. , 
p. 102 and the note on that page. 
~' '11 I 
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or presumed disapproval of herself as a mother creates her 
anxiety in relation to her baby. This will disturb her 
emp~hic relationship with him and change the qualitative 
torte of the interpersonal field in such a way that the 
baby experiences anxiety. In this connection, Sullivan 
summarizes: 
Unless ••• ! have very considerable and well-
fotmdedesteem for something that I do, 
ano:t:.Her person's criticism of what I do, or 
even the suspicion that the other person 
feels critical toward me for what I do, is 
tantamount to my being anxious.l 
The circular way in which anxiety may be reinforced in 
an interpersonal field may be illustrated here. The 
mother being anxious about her role tends to make the 
baby more restless, which seems to justify the mother's 
disparagement of herself, to increase her anxiety, and 
to set up the sort of emotional cycle which so often leads 
to later difficulty. 
b) The above discussion reveals the way in which 
anxiety relates to one's self-evaluation. This self-
evaluation is relative to one's role in society. A further 
point is made by Sullivan: the self is created to avoid 
anxiety. 
l!bid. ' p. 114. 
., ' ~· 
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Sullivan says that the infant very soon learns to 
personify three phases of himself--good-me, bad-me, and 
not-me. Godd-me is the personification resulting from 
rewarding experiences of need-satisfaction and interper-
sonal tenderness. Bad•me; as: we saw above, results from 
experiences of anxiety. .. Thus: 11The essential de sir-
ability of being good.;.me is just another way of commenting 
on the essential undesirability of being anxious."1 Now, 
warned by n slight forhiddingu, or u slight anxiety", a 
"secondary dynamismn is formed, which is the self-system. 2 
The self-system is a dynamism employed to enable one to 
live with significant other persons. 
The self-system thus is an organization 
of educative experience called into being 
by the necessity to avoid or tQ minimize 
incidents of anxiety. 3 · · 
How is.the self-system formed? Sullivan speci-
fically contrasts the process of personification with 
Freud's nintrojection", which he terms a "rather reckless 
oversirnplification."4 Our rudimentary personi"fications of 
ourself lead')' to personification of the significant people 
lrbid~, p. 165. 2rbid., P· 164 and fol].owing. 
-· 
3_Th1&.' p. 165. 4rbid., p. 166. 
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who are separated from us visually and audibly. This 
process is an extremely comp~ex one, and cannot be con-
ceived as an ingestion of the values of another. We 
organize, creatively and imaginatively, both our con-
ceptions of ourselves, and those of others. 
The relation of personifications to that 
which is ersonified is alwa s com lex 
and sometimes multiple;. and personifi-
cations are not·. adequate descriptions 
of that which is 'personified.! 
This personification of others utilizes visual cues of 
functional significance, such as forbidding gestures on 
the part of the mother. 2 It is always complex, in the 
sense that our image of nmother" never quite grows beyond 
the infantile multiple concepts of good-mother and bad-
mother.3 It takes place through the organizing of signs 
and symb9ls, which are. assessed in terms of their possible 
usefulness in integrating situations which'will secure 
satisfaction and minimize anxiety. 4 The process Sullivan 
describes is the evaluative function as we have described 
it. A personification is a ~'conceptual. structure. uS 
1Ibid. ' p. 167. 
4rbid. , p. 119. 
2 Ibid., p. 118. 
s,Th!4., P· 361. 
3rbid. , p. 188. 
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We have seen that Sullivan describes the self• 
system as a dynamism. What is implied in this term? 
Sullivan refers to Alfred North Whitehead and his concept 
of the universe as an organism. The ultimate reality in 
the universe is energy, the organismic structuring of 
which may be called a dynamism. Any living organism is 
a particular dynamism made up of sub dynamisms. A dyna-
mism is the smallest useful abstraction which can be 
employed to study an organism. It is 
the relatively enduring pattern of energy 
transformatfans which recurrently charac~ 
terize the organ~sm in its duration as a 
living organism.! 
The·i'psychiatrist is especially interested in the enduring 
patterns which "recurrently characterize the interpersonal 
relations ••. which make up the distinctively human sort of 
being. 112 What are those patterns? "The functional inter-
play of persons and personifications, personal signs, 
personal abstractions, and personal attributions."3 
The self-system, then, is a cognitive construct 
created by organizing the. interpersonal milieu relative 
to its significance for meeting needs, but especially 
lrbid. , p. 103. 
3Ibid. , p. 103. 
2rbid. , p .. 103. 
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for escaping anxieties. Sullivan usually speaks of this 
as an unfortunate development. Once formed, the self-
system "is the principle stumbling block to favorable 
changes in personality", although mercifully "also the 
princip~e influence that stands in the way of unfavor-
able changes in the personality. 111 The self-system is 
formed primarily to avoid anxiety by protecting our 
self-esteem. It is "involved in all inadequate and 
inappropriate living and is quite central to the whole 
problem of personality disorder and its remedy. uZ 
Sullivan does not share the insight of Adler and 
Frommuat this point. Anxiety may stimulate one into 
formulating a wholesome self-system. Crippling and 
excessive anxiety is ordinarily the source of the rigid 
self-system described by Sullivan. Adler and Fromm would 
view as patholo~ical the compulsive self whose only goal 
is security and physico-chemical satisfaction. 
c) We have seen that anxiety is induced in the . 
infant in an interpersonal field where the relationship 
of empathy has been disturbed. The infant feels threatened, 
1Iuid.' p. 169. 2rbid. , p. 247. 
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and is stimulated to undertake the evalUa.tive formulation 
of self-systems. These systems are cognitive constructs 
which are perpetuated tenac:i,.ously;'!as a means to achieve 
interpersonal security. This may be a self-defeating 
development. Under certain conditions, a person may -
come to suffer from low self-este~m. "~eelings of infer-
iority", Sullivan says, ·should be described as low self-
esteem, in which "the person's personification of himself 
' is not very estimable by comparison with his personifi-
cations of significant other peopie."l The process of 
self-evaluation and personification taking place in an 
· interpersonal field which is anxiety-ridden may lead to 
a chronic condition of low self-esteem. 
We should note here the way in which the process . 
may be circular, although Sullivan does not specifically 
relate this. Shame-anxiety leads to the personification 
om oneself as inferior; this gives some· relief to anxiety 
· by lowering one's expectations. At least then the ugood-
me" personification does not demand a great deal. An 
inferior rating of self also helps to explain the anxiety; 
that is, the anxiety is lessened somewhat if it can be 
1 . Ibid., p. 350. 
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given a justifiable meaning. This is a trap, however. A 
low self-esteem makes one more sensitive to possible shame-
provoking situations, and tends to isolate one socially, 
which only aggravates the anxiety problem it was designed 
to solve. 
B. Anxiety and the Interpersonal F~eld. 
Sullivan considered psychiatry to be closely 
related to social psychology. The field of psychiatry 
is "the field of interpersonal relations.n1 The 
psychiatrist does not treat an individual in isolation. 
He is "a participant observer interacting with his 
patients in the context of life as it has to be lived." 2 
That which is immutably private in each individual can 
never be the object of scientific study, and in fact is 
"invariably much less significant in the person's living 
than he has been taught to believe."3 
One does not study an isolated individual in 
psychiatry, then. He studies an interpersonal situation. 
In fact, Sullivan defines personality as "the relatively 
enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations 
1Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psy-
chiatry (New York: W.W.i' Norton & Company, Inc., 1950), p. 5. 
2Ibid., p. vi. 3Ibid., p. vii. 
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which characterize a human life."~ This does not mean-
that the person is only a passive recipient of environ-
mental realities. Sullivan often speaks in such a way as 
to suggest a doctrine of the vacuous self. He means that 
to study a person is to_ study his >situation, or "the action 
which indicates the situation and the character of its 
integration. u2 The person is active in affecting that 
integration, or in some cases disinrtegration. 
1. We have already obse~ed that .anxiety is 
interpersonal in character. Anxiety can be expressed as 
the "need for-interpersonal-sectirity."3 It is a distur .. 
bance of "empathy", which is described as a ;'peculiar 
emotional linkage" of any person with significant others; 
it.· is "emotional contagion or communion.n4 More specifi .. 
cally, anxiety is the empathized feeling-tone of an 
interpersonal situation ;J.n which the significant other 
is disapproving of one's wotth or behavior. Disapproval 
by others may or may not be real; it may be a misreading 
of cues by one who is predisposed to find disapproval 
because his personification of himself or others renders 
Lrb · d • 
__!_. ' p • v~. 2Patrick Mullahy, in~., p. 123. 
3Ibid. , p. 43. 
4sullivan, Conceptions of Modern ••• , p. 8. 
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liim chronically supersef!.Sitive. Here we see that anxiety 
is a sensitive meter to·ane's fluctuating evaluation of 
himself-in-situation. Another word for this complex 
conceptual image is ~- We saw above· that it is in 
terms of her role as mother that a woman is anxious in 
the presence of her baby.l 
2. Some reference was made above to the person's 
activity in integrating his situation. It is important 
to understand what Sullivan means by "integrating 
tendenc.ie s '! . 
It can generally be said that Sullivan lacks any 
conc~ption of sel£-realizationas a "prepotent dynamic 
force", to use Adler's term. Persons are :motivated, not 
b~ a teleological impulse to realize se>lf., .but by the need 
to satisfy the biochemical demands necessary to sustain 
life, and the need for interpersonal security. In this 
connection we may examine Sullivall.'s.conception of 
"power motive 11 • He speaks of the ITexperiences of unex-
pected powerlessness'\.mh!i:.C.h::!oame to the baby upon the 
interruption of an accustomed process. 2 Ordinarily when 
1ef. Sullivan, Interpersonal Theory •.• , pp. 141-45. 
2tbid., pp. 70-72. 
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the baby cries the mother's nipple appears; but the baby 
soon learns to his chagrin that crying does not always pro-
duce the nipple. His illusions of "magical potency" have 
been punctured, and he doubts the utility of his vocal 
apparatus. 
This feeling of powerlessness represents a rather 
disturbing development in an infant's life, and very 
quickly stimulates the rudimentary cognitive processes 
which lead to foresight and recall. 1 The infant feels the 
need to understand cause-and-effect relationships in order 
to improve the instruments he uses to secure his bio-
chemical needs. The "power motive" is here·. seen at work. 
Sullivan agrees with Adler that a 11power ·drive" as domin-
ance over others is a pathological development. The power 
motive is the activity whereby the person satisfies his 
needs and expands and maintains himself in his envi~onment. 
It is the will to reach out and to interact effectively 
with widening circles .of the·environment.2 
The need for interpersonal security is subordinate 
to the power motive, and. arises from early feelings of 
1cf. Ibid., pp. 38 and 71-72. 
2e£. Patrick Mullahy, in Sullivan, Conceptions of 
Mode;n ..• , p. 121. 
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helplessness. In the interests of survival, the infant 
must integrate his situation. The earliest illustration 
of this is that of the infant's lips and the mother's 
, nipple. Even this relatively simple operation requires 
integration of "sundry interpersonal infant-mother situ-
ations."1 As the infant matures, we note increasing 
11develop~nt of- the <:!:Ppropriate dynamisms for integrating 
and maintaining situat:ions11 , and the choice of uappro-
priate and adequa~~ energy transformations or activities 
for the achievement of the resolution o£ the situation.n2 
Integration involves a great deal of interpersonal co-
operation. We can think of the power motive as an 
nintegrating tendencyu, or an innate tendency to create 
and maintain a situation. 3 
How does anxiety relate to the-integrating ten-
dency? To see this we must speak of the need for ~-
de mess. . "Need!' for Sullivan, always refer·s to peri-
pheral or biochemical desires. We do not often see the 
Gestalt concept of need as a tension-system in presence 
of a goal, or the conc~pt of ego-needs as Hartmann devel-
lsullivan, Interpersonal Theory •.• , p. 93. 
2Ibid., p. 151. ·· 3ef. Ibid., p. 96. 
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oped it. Biochemical need may, however, be spoken of 
function&lly as nintegrating tendency", and secondarily 
as the ''need for tenderne,ss." That is, satisfaction of 
all needs requires the "tender cooperation of another." 
All needs may then "be considered as implying, at the 
interpersonal level, a need for tenderness."1 
How does anxiety relate to tenderness? Anxiety 
interferes with this relationship of tenderness, and 
hence is a direct threat to the existence of the organism. 
Anxiety is a disjunctive or disintegrative 
tendency in interpersonal relations, which 
opposes the manifestation of any integrative 
tendency in the work of creating and main-
taining an interpersonal situation.2 
Not only does anxiety interfere with the relat~onship of 
tenderness, it is the result of such interference. In 
the infant, the mother's anxiety blocks her eKpression 
of tenderness, and arouses anxiety in turn in her infant. 
This takes a more complex form in childhood: 
A child may discover that manifesting the 
need for tenderness toward the potent 
figures around him leads frequently to 
being disadvantaged, being made anxious, 
being made fun of, and so on, so that, 
according to the locution used, he is 
hurt, or in some cases he is literally 
hurt.3 
1 Ibid., p. 99. 2Ibid., p. 95. 3Ibid., p. 214. 
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Consistent rebuff of tenderness, then, leads to shame-
anxiety, which in turn blocks further expression of ten-
derness and of integrating tendencies generally. This is 
especially tnue when rebuff of the tenderness causes one 
to pe~sonify himself as inferior. A low self-esteem is a 
serious handicap to the manifestation of "conjunctive 
motivations."1 The leading conjunctive motivation is 
love, which uhas its great root tendencies in the many 
impulses which make up the need for intimacy.n2 We see 
evidenced here a degenerative cycle: 
a) Rebuff of tenderness leads to anxiety, which 
results in: 
b) Low self-esteem,. and consequent exposure to 
further anxiety, which in turn leads to: 
c) Social isolation and disjunctive motivations, 
secondary defenses which result. in further deprivation of 
tenderness, and finally chronic anxiety. 
Similarly, the·expression of tendernesswhen it is not 
rebuffed allows the development of love., ,or the ~perience 
of intimacy. This experience npermits validation of all 
components of personal worth.n3 This facilitates develop-
libid.' p. 350. 2Ibid., p. 351. 3 Ibid. , p. 246. 
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ment of mutuality in interpersonal striving, or the sense 
of team spirit. A reward structure of prestige and status 
may develop in which persons may be relatively free from 
anxiety. 
We see here the basi:c insight we; no,ted in both 
Adler. and Fromm. Anxiety is a phenomenon which interacts 
within one dynamic system with the need for fulfillment 
in love. This leads Sullivan to e~press a criterion of 
maturity very similar to that .of Adler and Fromm. In 
maturity anxiety will be decreased. as the need for intimacy 
is fulfilled. -Mature persons 
will be quite sympathetically understanding 
of the limitations, interests, possibilities, 
anxieties, and so on of those among whom 
they move or with whom they deal·~l ·. . 
3, We may now return to the dist:i:netion we made 
in the Fromm section between shame-anxiety_and grief-anxiety. 
This can be done most clearly· in the- light of Sullivan's 
rubfil! "loneliness. n He.· says: 
The fact.that loneliness will lead to inte-
grations in the face. of severe anxiety q.uto-
matically means that lonelines~ in itself -
is more terrible than anxiety. 
llbid., p. 310. - 2Ibid., p. 262. 
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We might take loneliness to be a situation characterized by 
a great deal of grief-anxiety, or personal threat growing 
out of deprivation of love. As a person attempts to seek 
love by expressing tenderness, he may be· ntaken advantage 
ofrr, humiliated, and embarras~ed, especially if his self-
esteem level is low. · This humiliation is shame-anxiety, 
or threat to the self-esteem. 't'o Sullivan grief-anxiety 
,, 
is more intolerable than shame-anxiety., Sullivan also 
shows us that shame-anxiety is derivative of grief-anxiety, 
at least in the sense that as the person seeks to overcome 
loneliness he is often met with humiliation. The self-
system was initiated in the first place as a means of 
averting the helplessness of abandonment; once it is formed 
it exposes us not only to the primordial fear of abandon-
ment, but now also to the·fear of self-dissolution. 
4. It is in this context that we must examine 
Sullivan's term "malevolent transformation." When children 
find that the expression of tenderness o.ften leads to being 
made fun of or put at a disadvantage, ",ther,development 
course changes to the point that the perceived need for 
tenderness brings a foresight of anxiety and pain. rrl Under 
1 Ibid., p. 214. 
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these circumstances the youngster begins to personify 
other persons as enemies, and the environment generally 
as a place of danger. This trend often starts a vicious 
circle, since it prompts behavior which brings angry 
retaliation and confirms its own suspicions. The child 
begins to think: rtOnce upon a time everything was lovely, 
but that was before I had to deal with people. nl 
Since shame-anxiety is the source of the malevolent 
transformation, we see another cy-clical development. A 
great deal of shame-anxiety leads to chranic.low self-
esteem. This combined with the personification of others 
as enemies may lead to disparagement, which Sullivan 
characterizes as one of the most unfortunate trends in 
personal development. Disparagement is the maintenance 
of self-esteem by pulling down the stand~ ·Of others. 
Sullivan expresses it as uthe doctrine that if you are a 
molehill, then, by God, there shall be no more mountains."2 
This trend is tragic, because it, .purports to build 
security by striking at the roots of the. ·interpersonal 
relations which might allow security. It distorts 
evaluation_ of personal-worth hy destroying valid standards 
1 Ibid. , p. 216. 2 . Ibid., p. 309. 
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of excellence. It reinforces the disjunctive motivation of 
hate. Worse, it tends to lead to social isolation, to 
concealment of one's feelings, and hence it blocks the 
important relearning opportunities of adolescence which 
could facilitate a reflective re-appraisal of one's own 
worth. We will see this as we discuss the importance of 
"consensual validation." 
Here we have noted that hatred and disparagement 
are distorted pers~nality developments. They result 
when a person is prevented from growing into love by an 
excess of anxiety. Hatred, as Sullivan says, is "a de-
rivation of anxiety."1 
C. Anxiety and the Evaluative Function. 
1. Modes of Experience. 
Corresponding roughly to Freud's distinction 
between primary and secondary process, Sullivan defines 
various modes of experience. By experience he means the 
2 
"'inner' elaboration of events." It becomes apparent that 
this elaboration of events is the assessing of their mean-
ing or significance to the person, and the organizing of 
those meanings into coherent cognitive structures which 
1
rbid., p. 351. 2Ibid., p. 29. 
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facilitate and guide action. Use of the term rrmode" 
indicates that Sullivan is discussing methods of function-
ing. We are talking about the evaluative function. 
Sullivan differentiates three modes of function-
ing,\·:the prototaxic, the. parataxic, and the syntaxic. 
Freud's term uprimary process" encompasses the first two, 
and "secondary process" .the third. Freud's classification 
of uunconsciousn, "preconscious", and l!conscious" is 
suggested here--but Freud's language is static, and his 
classification suggests·a structural truncation of the 
self. 
a) Prototaxic mode. 
The prototaxic mode is uthe simplest, the earliest, 
. 1 
and possibly the most abundant mode of experience." In 
the earliest stages of life it is very close to the type 
of experience which is usually termed sentience. The pro-
totaxic mode of eRperience is the simple prehension of 
"the discrete series of momentary sta.tes of t:he sensitive 
organism, with special reference to the zones of inter-
action with the environment."2 
Sullivan is careful to affirm that prototaxic 
experience is experience, not si$ply biological behavior 
1 b . I id. , p. 29. 2Ibid.~ p. 29; cf. alsop. 75. 
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alone. Representation is involved. Further, the entire 
organism-enviil:onment complex is organized and elaborated 
in each moment of this experience. 1 One aspect of this 
organization is the tensional history of the organism. 
Tension, or npotentiality for ac:tionn2 is a felt discomfort 
in the prototaxic mode which:' soon begins :to be different-
iated in terms of "direction toward its relief, which 
am~unts to increasingly clear foresight of relief by 
appropriate action."3 These tensions include.both physico-
iiiiiiii=:;;::. .... .-..."LcJ.U""'\-'""1 need and anxiety. We note here a:jaonaepor '>·~ :::·1; 
of gradient anxiety which both stimulates rudimentary 
cognition and is a feeling tone concomitant with it. 
Sullivan specifically identifies anxiety at this point 
with goal-tension, and refers to Kurt Lewin 1 s theory of 
tensions. 4 
We mentioned the representative nature of proto-
taxic experience. Sullivan utilizes three terms in this 
connection: signs, signals, and symbols. A sign is: 
A particular. pattern in the experience 
of events which is differentiated from 
or within the general flux of experience 
1sf. Ibid., PP· 75-ff. 2Ibid., P· a5. 
31bid., p. 38. 4cf. Ibid., p. 35. 
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(at this stage of life prototaxic exper-
ience); and their differentiation occurs 
in terms of recall and foresight.l 
The complex organization of experience which includes the 
tactile and thermal sentience of the mother's nipple in 
the mou~h comes to "mean foreseen satisfaction,"2 and 
hence is a sign that satisfaction will follow. This total 
experiential unit with its "meaningn or anticipatory cue 
to immanent satisfaction is also a signal, in that it 
signals or triggers off nursing reactions. This experience· 
to be elaborated according to its significance into 
~-~--good and satisfactory nipple which satisfies hunger and 
signals nursing activity; good and unsatisfactory nipple 
which gives milk the infant does not want, and signals 
rejection; the wrong nipple-in-lips which gives no milk 
and signals rejection; and the evil nipple of the anxious 
mother which arouses painful anxiety'and signals avoidance. 
We observe here an important variant from Freud's 
theory of early symbol-formation. Freud assumed a dicho-
tomy to exist between early somatic sensations and the 
symbols constructed by the psyche to make reference to 
them. The model here is that of aesthetics, or the 
construction of symbols. Sullivan sees the early pre-
1Ibid.;p. 77. 2Ibid., p. 76. 
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hension to be a complex organismic integration of an entire 
state of the organism~in-environment, together with the 
feeling-tone which qualifies it as a referent to appro-
priate activity and the processes of recall and foresight. 
The model here is not the aesthetic construction of sym-
bols which apply to somatic states, but rather the cog-
nitive apprehension of a complex organismic state the 
feeling-tone of which defines its significance. 
As visual and auditory capacities mature suffici-
lf~~~ to allow distance perception, symbols are discrimin-
·~ 
a ted. Symbols are "signs of signsn, or "signs of cate-
gord:.es of signs. "1 Specifically, the infant experiences 
certain .organismic states which includ~, discrimination 
of vocal tones, gestures> and facial expressions on the 
part of the mother. These are prehended in one complex 
unity with their feeling-tone of anxiety. Thus a motion 
may be apprehended as a ttforbidding ge;g.ture"; it means 
anxiety which requires avoiding activities of one kind 
or another. 2 
At the most rudimentary levels of perception, 
percepts carry symbolic meaning with reference to their 
1Ibid., p. 87. 2cf. Ibid., p. 86. 
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value in satis~ying needs or their disvalue in trigger-
ing anX:iety. 
From the very beginning the potent in-
fluence of anxiety permits the organiza-
tion of experience, prevents the organiza-
tion of experience, or gradually shoos 
the direction of experience into approved 
channels. Thus it is quite obvious-that a 
great deal of what goes on by the time one; 
is a year old, even if it·is inborn; is 
very highly symbolic. 
b) Parataxic MOde. 
Patrick Mullahy describes Sullivan's concept of 
~pa~taxic mode as the level of maturation 'i~ which nthe ~ . :~~~inal undifferentiated wholeness of ~~perience is . 
broken.n2 . The· discrete par.ts of experience; or states 
of the organism, . are. not reiated ,or connected logicall.y ~ 
They simply occur in serial,~r~~r·with no s~nse of tem-
poral connection or logical order. "The child cannot 
yet. relate them·: to one another or make logical distinct-
ions among them. u 3 This description of the parataxic mode 
does not entirely do justice to Sullivan's own descriptions. 
While it may be true that parataxic e~perience is not 
ltbid~ ' p. 186. 
3 Ibid., p. 28. 
2Mullahy, in Ibid., p. 28. 
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characterized by logico-verbal distinctions, its contents 
do have coherent order achieved by a creative process, as 
we shall see. 
Parataxic experience may be described first of all 
as covert rather than overt experience.- This term "covert" 
substitutes for Freud's nunconscious." It may express 
Freud's intent better than the Freudian term does, since 
it has more dynamic connotations. It describes a mode of 
functioning rather than a simple dearth of awareness. 
'"1"-~t'\_implies that active force·s may be at work to prevent 
~~ its coming into awareness. Thus Sullivan says that symbol 
operations connected with lust. are mosc-.,often conducted 
in the parataxic mode, because nthe culture is so hardn 
on verbal communication relative to lust . 1 ·· 
.. 
Elsewhere Sullivan describes this experience as 
autistic. "Autisticn is 
an adjective by which we indicate a 
pri"Dtary, unsocialized, unacculturated 
state of sytnbol activity, and later 
states pertaining more to this primary 
condition than to the conspicuou$ly 
effective consensually validateEl symbol 
activities of more mature personality.2 
1 . . 
6£. Ibid., p. 286. 
2sullivan, Conceptions of MOdern .•• , p. 17. 
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Autistic experience is the private use of symbols, in-
cluding verbal symbols learned from other persons. What 
is the significance of autistic thinking? It is "sub-
limitory reformulation of patterns of behavior and 
covert process."! That is, in early childhood it is 
learned that certain social values or ethical judgments 
of worth as e~pressed'in moral tales will be a source of 
shame-anxiety for the child. They will be surrounded by 
expressions of disapproval of him, and repressive measures 
. -to control his conduct. He learns the contrast between 
what can be expressed or revealed and "what goes on but 
must be treated as if it did not," or which t~inust remain 
covert in the presence of authority figures."2 The child 
wants more information on these considerations, but ex-
periences anxietyin.expressing them, so asks apparently 
pointless questions to conceal what is being inquired about. 
If he suddenly finds that he has revealed himself, and per-
haps suffers indignity or punishment because of it, he may 
even come to the conviction that adults are capable of 
reading his mind. 
lsullivan, Interpersona 1 Theory •.. , p. 234. 
2Ibid., p. 220. 
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Under certain circumstances a great deal of this 
sublimatoryevaluati,on goes on.· If the child has a very 
active imagination, and is lonely, he has a "very rich 
fantasy life.ttl He may have no audience or significant 
participation with others, so nmakes up for the real 
deficiencies by multiplying the so-called imaginary personi-
ficationsn which preoccupy him. 2 He may not be able to 
distinguish these fantasies from "reality .. , and as he 
attempts to relate to other people may be humiliated by 
exposure of material which is repelling to them. This 
process may become circular. 
Already the .child has had to develop a 
very rich ·fantasy life to make up for the 
lack of audience and of participation by the 
authority figures, and from this lack the 
child is apt to be relatively undeveloped in 
the very quick discrimination of what is 
his private fantasy and what· may be con-
sensually validated; that in turn exposes 
the juvenile to ridicule, pun~shment, and 
what not, and so3tends to give'the feeling of risk in life. . 
We can see here the close connection between these covert 
imaginative or referential processes and fear of hUm.ili-
ation, or shame-anxiety. Anxious about areas of his life 
which bring disapproval to him, but afraid to discuss them 
lrbid. , p. 223. 2rbid., p. 223. 3Ibid. , p. 225. 
·---~ 
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openly, the child attempts to interpret them by his own 
private fantasy. Low self-esteem, or a low personifi• 
cation of himself relative to others may tend to make 
him avoid them except on the level of insignificant or 
external contact, which now stimulates fantasy as a means 
of giving himself someone to talk to. Fantasy in both 
cases plays a positive and important role in the protection 
and, hopefully, the eventual fulfillment o,fi his personality •. 
What is the functional methodo-Logy,, or operating 
mode of such fantasy? 
In his discussion of the covert and overt symbolic 
processes associated with lust, Sullivan describes the 
way in which the parataxic evaluation o.f events takes 
place. 1 We may integrate in this graphic· description 
other statements which amplify various facets of it: 
(1) Observation and identificat~on of experience 
with reference to several factors: 
(a) The felt aspects of the inner tendency, in 
this case the tende~c~, .. -.toward ~xpress&i:.on:~'of{1lust. /:·.·Pre-
sumably this involves identification, arid the assessment of 
both its relative intensity and the rising or.falling trend 
of that intensity. 
lcf. Ibid., PP· 286-££. 
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(b) The interpersonal situation as including an 
·"tibject", or a fitting subJect with whom a lustful situation 
may be integrated. If the interpersonal environment is 
evaluated as.bereft of a fitting object, some satisfaction 
may be obtained by bhe personification of ari object in 
fantasy. Personification in itself is a highly complex 
process, as we noted above. There is more than personifi-
cation involved'here, however. In such fantasy there is 
the dramaturgic construction of an interpersonal situation 
peopled with the appropriate characters. This imaginary 
scene functions as a means both to provide substitute 
satisfaction and to define and clarify the .s~teps wntch 
are required to achieve more permanent satisfaction. Else~ 
where S.ullivan points out that learning proceeds mainly 
by education, or the "pulling out of relations."1 We might 
better say the creative construction of relations which 
are more or less veridical. 
(ci) The .interpersonal situation as to its total 
suitability for satisfaction of lust. A fitting object 
may be present, but integration may be inappropriate under 
certain circumstances. Anxiety relates directly to situ-
ations where "incongrl1ity and inappropriateness are about 
libid., p. 156. 
-
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to become evident," Sullivan says elsewhere. 1 "Inter-
personal environm.enttt here· is a cognitive construct, or 
a p~ivate perspective which may be more or less valid 
as it is projected upon the real situation. Anxiety 
relates to cognitive inappropriateness.· 
(d) The interpersonal situationas'characterized 
with respect to anxiety. This involves~,, as Sullivan s~ys 
elsewhere, nthe old game of getting hotter or colder", or 
the charting of behavior with an inner eye to the rising 
and falling intensities of gradient anxiety. The inner 
assessment of this trend is taken as a signal that contem-
plated behavior is inappropriate, and adjustments are made 
where possible. Gradient anxiety, then, does permit the 
realization of the situation in which it. occurs, by· stimu-
lating more careful attention to the cognitive requi~-
ments of the situation and· by inhibiting incongruous be-
havior under threat of intense and disabling panic. Thus 
Sullivan says that of outstanding importance to our coming 
to be human·beings acceptable to our society 
is learning on the·basis of the anxiety 
gradient•-that is, learning to ciis·crimi-
nate increasing from diminishing anxiety 
1 . Ibid., p. 300. 
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and to alter activity in the direction of 
the latter.l 
(2) In addition to observation and identification, 
foresight may be an aspect of parataxic experience. Fore-
sight can be described as the imaginative projection of 
what might be expected to occur in the immediate future. 
Such projection is an extension of the conceived trends 
in the gradients of anxiety and need as they interact with 
the creative anticipation of trends in the. 'total situation. 
Sullivan points out that projection is .really xoresight. 
Such anticipation of future experience is,. inadequate only 
if it is distorted by some exaggerated emotional need. 2 
(3) Activity in pursuit of avoidance of a goal 
is accompanied by many covert referential processes which 
represent an in-process assessment of progress and the 
prospect of satisfying culmination. 
(4) Finally, witting and unwitting retrospective 
and prospective analysis takes place to evaluate the total 
meaning of the experience recently completed. There is 
always "some review and prospective analysis, with the 
idea of improving one's capacity for achieving contentment 
and success in this field of life. u3 
1 Ibid., p. 152. 2e£. Ibid., p. 359. 3 Ibid., p. 287. 
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This assimilation of an experience, Sullivan fur-
ther says, is influenced by the personality warp of other 
persons in the integrated situation. 
(5) We must add another aspect to this para-
taxic experiencing, which Sullivan does not integrate 
with the above schema, but discusses in reference to ex-
perience in the syntaxic mode. Many complex covert pro-
cesses are going on which channel aspects of a situation 
into "focal awareness11 (consciousness) and exclude others 
from such awareness. Components of an experience may be 
unrepresented in focal awareness "due to selective inatten-
tion, to masking processes, to misinterpretation, or to 
- - l 
the manifestation of a dissociative process in the self.n 
We customarily ignore aspects of an experience which are 
of little moment or significance to us. We may ordinarily 
make this complex judgment of an event's insignificance 
and the steps needed to ignore it without being in any 
sense aware that we have done so. MOre important, we may 
forcibly ignore aspects of an event which are of the highest 
importance, because the anxiety surrounding them is too 
great.2 In a real sense, they are of such great signifi-
1Ibid. , p. 288. 2ef •. Ibid. , p. 233. 
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cance that we do not trust ourselves to face them. A 
dissociative system is·an entire range of experience 
which is assigned to a ttn.ot-metr personification to avoid 
the pain of facing its overwhelming significance and 
massive threat. 1 
As anxiety blocks some events from awareness, it 
also thrusts others into awareness. Thus: 
Effective manifestations of awareness are 
sternly shepherded by anxiety to be more 
or less in the syntaxic mode--the mode of 
experience which offers some possibility 
of predicting the novel, and some possibi2 
lity of real interpersonal communication. 
One's personification of his "good-me" or. ideal self is 
employed as a frame of reference to evaluate· the potential 
worth of an event. Events forboding massive threat are 
dissociated or disowned;· events of little significance are 
ignored; events of significance which can be used effectively 
are guided into focal awareness. Dissociated systems, 
unfortunately, do not go away. Being unresolved, they tend 
to divert interest to themselves. Apparently minor·signs 
of a dissociated system become the subject of intense pre-
occupation.3 Intra-psychic attention is diverted to the 
2rug., p. 233. 3c£. Ibid., pp. 356-58. 
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place of greatest significance, even as the eye tends to 
focus on the point of brightest light. Interest and 
attention always reflect judgments of value. 1 
c) Syntaxic Mode. 
The syntaxic mode of experience is that which 
utilizes symbols which have been "consensually validated." 
A symbol has been consensually validated when "a consensus 
can be established with someone else."2 Under the appro-
priate circtttnstances such symbols "work quite precisely 
with other people."3 Consciousness, or "focal aware-
ness" centers around them precisely because they are so 
valuable for interpersonal communication. Ordinarily 
such symbols are words, although gestures and facial 
expressions may evoke predictable, dependable meanings. 4 
What is the functional significance of symbols in 
the syntaxic mode? For the small child words are used 
"as pictures might be used in a book; they decorate, con-
centrate, or illuminate referential processes which are not 
verbal."S Even for adults, "most of living goes on" by 
means of "nonverbal referential processes" or wordless 
lsee also Sullivan's conception of "fascination," 
Ibid. , p. 322. 
2Ibid., p. 224. 3 . Ibid., p. 224. 4cf. Ibid., p. 183. 
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thinking. 1 The major function of syntaxic symbols is to 
facilitate dependable communication with others. This 
communication is c~Ucial for many reasons: 
First, it allows gratification of the intimacy 
needs which are so important to self-fulfillment·~:z Second, 
it allows "validation of personal worth.'!3 Disto:r;ted 
personifications of the self which are formulated in 
imagination may be re-evaluated and corrected by dependable 
knowledge of others. Third, it allows the wider range of 
experience "which is needed for the correct appraisal of 
the situation .with respect to its S
1
ignificance. u4 .. Not 
only one's own worth, but the total environment may be 
more adequately evaluated. through dependable communication 
with others. Fourth; wherever communication with others 
can take place in a protective atmosphere of love and re-
spect, there is the possibility that dissociated systems 
can re-enter intrapsychic communication.and be assimilated 
into the total personality~~ Sullivan sees adolescent 
'. 
friendships and psychotherapy as instances of this kind of 
redemptive fellowship. 
libid. ' p. 185. 
3Ibid. , p. 246. 
2cf. Ibid., p. 246. 
4Ibid., p. 262. 
56£. Ibid., p .• 327. 
CHAPTER IV 
PSYCHOLOGICAL INDICATIONS FOR A VIEW OF OBLIGATION 
Having surveyed various psychiatric theories in 
their treatment of guilt, sh~e, and evaluation, we now seek 
to develop a coherent view of obligation based upon those 
theories. 
Four conclusions will be drawn in this chapter. The 
first two are offered in support of the thesis that consci-
ence is functionally co~nitive. Conscience is identified with 
obligation, which is seen to be a complex experience of shame, 
guilt, and interest. It is noted that the experience of obli-
gation is intimately correlated with evaluation. Where there 
is an apparent break or discontinuity between them, as in 
neurotic guilt, continuity is discovered at a deeper level of 
intrapsychic discourse. 
The second two conclusions go beyond the form of obli-
gation to indicate its content. The central core of all eval-
uation is the inherent ideal of self-actualization in harmony 
with social requirements. 
In general, the· work of Freud and that of the inter-
personal psychiatrists will be summarized and comparisons 
made between them. Where the argument is strengthened or 
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the major ideas enriched by the introduction of other re-
levant psychological material, such material is employed. 
Thus reference is made to Heleri Lynd, Robert White, A. H. 
Maslow, Peter A. Bertocci, and Theodore R. Sarbin, among 
others. 
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I. Obligation as a Complex Anxiety-Interest Experience. 
Obligation is a complex experience which encom-
passes the vague threat of anxiety on the one hand, and 
organismic engrossment in an uncompleted task, or interest, 
on the other. 
A. Guilt, Shame, and Gradient Anxiety. 
In the introduction to this study reference was made 
to the distinction which Gerhart Piers made between guilt 
and shame. Of all the forms of intrapsychic tension, he 
says, those resulting in feelings of guilt and shame are 
most important. He points to the necessity for drawing a 
sharp distinction between the two. 
Following this provisional distinction, we studied 
guilt and shame in Freudian theory and the interpersonal 
theories of Adler, Fromm, and Sullivan. We noted that Freud 
was primarily interested in guilt-related phenomena to the 
neglect of shame, whereas the interpersonal psychiatrists 
saw shame as the most decisive determinant of behavior, and 
either followed Freud's definition of guilt or used the term 
as a synonym for shame. 
1. Guilt. Freud's pioneering genius is responsible 
for the major concepts and assumptions about guilt in modern 
psychotherapy. We may point to the following conclusions 
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drawn from· our study of his work.: 
(a) Guilt is a species of anxiety. Freud's earliest 
view was that guilt is social anx:iety, or fear of loss of 
love, and hence ·the threat .. of abandonment. Later, he defined· 
guilt:as,:a. variety o"f aJ?.xiety; to a great extent unconscious. 
l(b) Guilt involves self•directed hostility. Freud 
saw this hostility i.n two ways, corresponding to his two 
theories of aggression. First, it is the introjected con-
demnation which is integrally related to the punitive 
parental image, and hence a self~attack in the role of 
authority-surrogate. Second, he sees it as the eternal 
death-instinct, originally directed against the father, 
but turned back on oneself becaus;e of remorse at the thought 
of the Oedipal murde:t~·of~- the father. We suggested the possi;.. 
bility that this self-directed hostility may relate to the 
reactive theory of aggression, which sees hO!;ltility as a 
normal reaction to the thwarting of a conative drive. In a 
guilt-related experience I react with hostility to my own 
role as thwarting agent. Sullivan lends some weight to this 
possibility with his conception of the ''bad ... me" personifica-
tion. In an-interpersonal setting involving strong components 
of fear, anxiety, rage, and resentment, the child comes to 
conceive of himself as worthy of punishment, and hence the 
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object of his own anger. At any rate, Freud noted that a 
large measure of the anxiety related to guilt stems from 
one's hostile attack upon his own ego, either in the adopted 
role of righteous authority, or the self-defined role of 
agent of deprivation. 
(c) Super-ego guilt of the rigid, sadistic-
masochistic type relatesto unresolved childhood dilemmas, 
especially tho~e surrounding the violent love-hate feelings 
which the growing child experiences ~ithin the family circle. 
This concept of the super-ego as introjected authority is 
considered to be normative in orthodox psychoanalysis, and 
is often identified with the entir~ range of morality. MOral-
ity,. according to this view, is an irrational element in 
human nature, characterized by megalomania and exaggerated 
narcissism. The formation of the super-ego is a defense 
mechanism to protect against anxiety engendered in violation 
of a parental norm or law. 
(d) Freud points beyond his own system to guilt as 
an ego-function, or anxiety arising from a contemporary moral. 
dilemma. In his discussion of ego defenses, for instance, we 
see the defenses are reactions to subconscious signal-anxiety. 
His illustrative material shows the source of this anxiety to 
be mainly the tramsgression of interpersonal rules, either in 
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reality or in imaginative anticipation. Freud's discussion 
of dreams and wit reveals the same process. The creative 
formulations which are made in dreams are an attempt to re-
solve the personal dilemma surrounding a forbidden wish. 
Similarly, tendency wit is an attempt to avoid the guilt-
anxiety which would be engendered in a naked expression of 
some forbidden wish. 
2. Shame. Freud's statement that guilt attacks and 
diminishes the ego, causing more intense anxiety, points to-
ward a deeper layer of psychic functioning which is threaten-
ed by a guilt~related situation. Not only the relationship 
between the ego and external norms is at stake, but the inner 
integrity of the ego itself is in danger. Gerhart Piers and 
Helen Lynd identify this deeper anxiety as shame. 
Adler showed that shame-anxiety relates to self-
evaluation; it is threat to the comparative worth of the 
self, not only in relation to others, but in relation to 
one's own ideal of self. Evaluations which compare oneself 
with others, such as we see in sibling rivalry, are only 
the occasion for challenge or confirmation of one's own 
drive toward self-perfection. 
Fromm speaks of the craving for self-approval which 
gives rise to anxiety. This anxiety is the voice of the 
,. . ' . ~. 
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humanistic conscience, which roots in the need to retain 
internal integrity and personal fulfillment. 
Similarly,_ Sullivan's ordinary use of the term 
"anxiety" corresponds-to this schema. Anxiety is "need 
for interpersonal security-", which first stimulates crea-
tion of the self-sy'stem in order to organi~e experience into 
some manageable form, and which thereafter fluctuates with 
one's evaluation of one's performance in-the role chosen. 
Helem Lynd offers a rich description of the pain-
ful experiences which enter into the complex experience of 
·shame. The first has to do with unexpected exposure, parti-
cularly of the "peculiarly sensitive, intimate, vulnerable 
aspects of the self."l Exposure to others of an ugly 'or 
awkward aspect of oneself is humiliating, but the unexpected 
uncovering tlo one's own eyes of an incongruous aspect of 
the self is even more painful. Shame also follows the 
inappropriateness of an act which exposes the inadequacy 
. -
of our image of self; we discover that our "assumption of 
being one kind of person living in one kind of surroundings" 
is false, and we are suddenly left without personal orient-
ati:6n.2 A threat to trust is involved; the "coherence, 
1 . - . --Helen Lynd, On Shame •.. , p. 27. 2Ibid., p. 35. 
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continuity, and dependability" of the world which defines 
one's personal identity within it can no longer be depended 
upon. "Thus shame, an experience of violation of trust in 
oneself and in the world, may go deeper than guilt for a 
specific act."1 Shame is an experience which involves 
threat to one's entire self, one's inner integrity, the 
congruity om one's achievement with this ideal self-image, 
one's assumed worth and competence among other persons, 
and even one's cognitive bearings. 
Robert White stresses the threat to competence which 
is involved in the experience of shame. He accepts the defini-
tion of Piers and Singer, that shame implies short-coming, 
whereas guilt implies transgression of a moral boundary. 
In my own words I should say that shame is 
always connected with incompetence. It occurs 
when we cannot do something that either we or 
an audience thinks we should be able to do •••• 
It means belittlement and loss of re~pect. 
In contrast, guilt does not imply that one is 
unable to do something; it signifies that one 
had done, or is thinking of doing, something 
within one's powers that is forbidden.2 
·Shame, then, is a lowering of self-respect following a 
diminished sense of competence. 
lrbmd., p. 47. 
2Robert White, ncompetence and Psychosexual Urgesn, 
in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Marshall R. Jones, ed. 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), p. 126. 
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3. Guilt-Shame Cycles. Gerhart Piers points to 
the cyclical manner in which guilt and shame may tend to 
become mutually reinforced in a type of self-aggravating 
syndrome. He traces this phenomenon through two type.s of 
clinical situation.l Sexual impulses often cause a young 
man to feel guilty, for instance, since their expression 
appears to contradict established rules of conduct. To 
counter the guilt, he represses or inhibits sexuality. This, 
however, puts him in conflmct with the male .sex-role expected 
of him by his peers, and creates deep feelings of shame and 
inadequacy. To,·counter the shame he over-compensates by 
acting out in guilt-ridden behavior. The resulting guilt 
may call out further defensive inhibition of his sexuality, 
and hence new shame. Similarly, hostility may take such a 
cyclical form. Aggressive acts cause guilt, resulting in 
their inhibition. This inhibition spreads to all forms of 
assertive activities, causing passivity with resulting 
shame-anxiety. Shame activates overcompensatory aggressive 
fantasies or behavior, creating new guilt. In both sexua-
lity and aggression, the sequence appears to result: act-
1cf. Gerhart Piers and Milton B. Singer, Shame and 
Guilt •.• , pp. 17-19. 
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impulse~guilt~inhibition of act-impulse~shame-anxiety~ 
overcompensatory behavior~guilt. 
Fromm pointed to the conflict between the "authori-
tarian" and "humanisticn conscience, which might illustrate 
this same cyclical process as it grows out of a concrete 
social situation. A person caught in a family structure, 
or perhaps any interpersonal situation which demands his 
passive dependence upon an authority figure may become the 
victim of a guilt-shame cycle. Passivity takes its toll in 
shame-anxiety, but self-assertion creates guilt, which being 
a painful experience, discourages further activity and dooms 
one to sink back into the dependency relationship. 
Neither Piers nor Fromm, as we will see later, pays 
sufficient attention to the self-evaluative activities 
which are involved in these cycles. They tend only to see 
the avoiding activity called out to reduce the load of 
guilt, rather than the self-esteem crises which the guilty 
activities themselves may create. Here it is important to 
see that the guilt-shame cycle is testimony both to the 
need to distinguish shame from guilt, and to the close inter-
relationships between them. 
4. Gradient Anxiety. It remains in this section 
to recall the nature of anxiety as a gradient phenomenon. 
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While Freud typically conceived anxiety to be a destructive 
factor in human life, he developed the concept of "signal-
anxiety", which has the positive function of prodding one 
to take preventive action.· Freud felt that the ego pro-
duces mild forms of anxiety as it anticipates immanent 
threat, and guides behavior into defensive action if 
necessary to avoid flooding the psychic system with stimuli 
too intense to handle. 
Similarly, Sullivan typically refers to anxiety as 
a paralyzing and disruptive emotion blocking all cognition 
and any effective coping activity, but at the same time 
speaks of learning on the basis of the anxiety gradient. 
In all interpersonal relationships we play "the old game of 
getting hotter and colder" as we guide our activities with 
an inner eye upon the rising intensity of anxiety, in this 
case shame-anxiety. 
Adler, too, indicates that shame-anxiety of moder-
ate intensity stimulates positive measures which lead to 
self-fulfillment. Such mild anxiety stimulates anticipa-
tory imagination, which in turn~·p~ojects the curve of 
anxiety, assesses its meaning, and takes measures to alle-
viate the threat. Under extreme conditions, of course, 
anxiety calls out the defensive "self-enhancing" activities 
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which may lead to a crippling of personality. Adler's 
therapeutic goal was the reduction of anxiety to the point 
where more constructive ways of living become possible. 
One would suspect that mild twinges of anxiety, 
whether guilt-anxiety as Freud ordinarily conceived it or 
shame-anxiety as Adler and Sullivan used the term, are 
the experiences which most people identify with "ought", 
or obligation, Anticipation of an anxiety-producing 
situation, whether one foresees vague threats of retali-
ation, loss of self-esteem, or disrupted interpersonal 
relations, tends to make an alternative course of action 
seem more inviting. That obligation may mean signal-
anxiety is attested by such common expressions as "I'd 
feel terrible if I did thatu, presumably referring to a 
sense of obligation to do otherwise. 
B. The Interest Gradient. 
The way in which mild anxiety functions as a tension-
system prodding action might invite us to identify the 
experience of obligation with anxiety alone. This conclus-
ion would seem doubly enticing when we see that when Freud 
uses the term "anxiety" he invariably refers to the threat 
of forbidden wishes. While he identifies guilt as a species 
of anxiety, anxiety appears mainly. to be identified with 
guilt-related situations in his writings. 
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We noted that all three of the interpersonal psy-
chiatrists we consulted used "anxiety" and "inferiority 
feelings" in a way to suggest the threat to personal iden-
tity, self-esteem, and competence we have associated with 
·shame. Seen in this light', obligation would appear to be 
nothing more than the vague threat of exposure to the more 
intense and painful pole of the a~~iety gradient. 
1: Voices have be,en raised recently to call into 
question such an identification of obligation with anxiety. 
Peter A. Bertocci, for instance, defends the unique nature 
of the experience of "oughtingn. He describes it as "an 
experience which seems ultimate, or sui generis, in that 
it has to be taken on its own terms."1 Similarly, guilt is 
different from anxiety. They do not feel the same. "Guilt 
stems from disobedience to one's felt duty; anxiety from 
insecurity, be it as a consequence of feeling guilt or not."2 
Guilt may cause anxiety but they are not the same experience. 
In a more recent article in The Review of Metaphysics Dr. 
Bertocci makes a similar appeal to introspection, inviting 
the reader to note the different feel of guilt, anxiety, 
1 . 
Peter A. Bertocci, Free Will, Responsibility, and 
Grace (New York: Abingdon Press, 1957), p. 45. 
2Ibid., p. 52. 
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"oughtingu, and willing. 1 · Faced with a conflict in value, 
one decides that A is better than B. 
The moment he decides that A is better than B, 
he feels the obligation to do A •••• The making of 
the decision and the enacting of it involves 
initiatory will•agency.2 
As the experience of willing differs from that of "ought-
ing" so the experience of guilt cannot be identified with 
that of anxiety. The subjective feel of broken obligation 
is qualitatively different from the insecurities which 
stem from many affective-conative sources. 
It is surely very much to the point to distinguish 
the qualitative feeling-tone of guilt from that of anxiety •. 
·We have se.en that anxiety varies phenomenologically accord-
ing to its referential meaning. Guilt-anxiety is a different 
experience from shame-anxiety. Perhaps we may also identify 
the unique experience of grief•anxiety, as we have suggested 
in discussing Fromm 1 s work. It may also be true that a form 
of existential anxiety underlies all these as thinkers such 
as Paul Tillich and Rollo May have been suggesting. 3 This 
1Peter A. Bertocci, "The Moral Structure of the Person'', 
in The Review of Metaphysics (XIV, 3,· 1961), pp. 372-2e7. 
2Ib.d ., 387 
__1:_ • .; p. • 
3cf. Paul Tillich, The Co'lirage to Be {New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1952) , and Rollo May, ed. , Existence: A 
New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology {New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1958.) 
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would seem to be born out by A.H. Maslow's distinction 
. 1 between esteem needs and safety needs. · Threat to esteem 
needs.wouid presumably give rise to shame-anxiety, and 
threat to safety needs a generalized sense of insecurity 
such as that attending hunger or economic crisis. 
In addition.to the anxiety component of obligation, 
Dr. Bertocci points out, there is, as the word implies, an 
obligatory component. Having decided the best course of 
action, one feels obligated, not to avoid anxiety, but to 
. . . 2 
will the best he knows at the time. The feeling of ·~ought", 
then, is experienced as na unique kind of authority."3 So 
strong is this aqthority that one may choose death rather 
than violate the inner integrity its imperative implies. 
What is the nature of this obligating component? H.L. 
Hollingworth hints at a possible answer when he shows that 
"ought" always points to some requirements within a func-
tional system. It is an imperative laid upon hs by the 
need to come to a correct logical or mathematical conclusion, 
1
cf. A.H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), pp. 85-90. 
2
cf. Peter A. Bertocci, Free Will ••• , p. 49. 
3Ibid., p. 382. 
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or to complete a pattern or organized whole.l 
Freud noted that when we observe a special atten-
tion being given to an object nwe are wont to regard this 
as proof that a peculiar psychic value (a certain degree of 
interest) attaches to the victorious idea."2 Here we see 
interest as psychic intensity, or energy invested in an 
object because of its assessed value. A situation or idea 
which is evaluated as broadly significant to one's well-
being is given psychic intensity, and attracts continuing 
attention and a priority place in intrapsychic discourse. 
In the phenomenon of displacement in dream-work it 
--~ 
is this psychic value which is transferred. In such a case 
the logic of unfulfilled needs assigns value to an object, 
but guilt-anxiety is aroused by this interest, since the 
more inclusive logic of one's role in the interpersonal 
milieu forbids such interest. In dreams we can see the 
struggle to redirect segmental interests in order to pro-
teet holistic interests. Anxiety attends the threat.of 
disruption of one's identity ~hich a forbidden interest 
symbolizes. The experience of obligation would presumably 
1
cf. Campbell Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Intro-
duction (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 345. 
2 Freud, Interpretation of Dreams ••. , p. 337. 
... 
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include the investment of interest in a course which 
strengthens and perfects one's total life, u.n,der.pa:i.n of 
anticipated anxiety. 
3. Sullivan discussed the place of interest in 
pathology. Dissociated systems, cut off from intraphysic 
discourse because of the anxiety they portend, remain un-
resolved. Seemingly trivial signs of such a dissociated 
system, he saw, become the subject of intense preoccupation. 1 
Sullivan chose the word "fascination" to describe the hypno-
tic appeal of a dissociated impulse, which will cause one 
at times to walk "wtl:.th one's eyes shut'' into a situation 
where expression of the impulse would be appropriate. 2 
Robert'White's concept of "incUbation" is suggested 
here. 3 ·A neurotic nucleus, he says, is formed when a 
terrifying experience in childhood is fraught with such 
anxiety that defensive mechanisms are employed. Because 
of defensive inhibitions, the· situation is forcibly for-
gotten and reappraisal is made impossible. Under such 
conditions the fear does not diminish, but rather increases, 
1cf. Harry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory •.• , 
pp. 356-8. 
2Ibid. , p. 322. 
3Robert W. White, The Abnormal Personality (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1948.), pp. 215-231. 
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forcing the formation of second and third layers of defense 
to contain it. An aura of 11compulsive intensity11 comes to 
surround a neurotic core:::of that type. 
Our suggestion would be that psychic intensity is 
invested in situations according to their significance for 
the economy of one's life. It is the negative value of 
massive proportions attending a terrifying experience which 
demands its dissociation. It is this same horrible signifi-
cance of the dissociated system, and its character of being 
"unfinished business" which continually pulls attention 
toward it, even to the point of hypnotic trance. This would 
indicate that the compulsive interest-found in pathological 
conditions is on a continuum with the more benign interests 
of normal life. 
The possible dimensions of the interest continuum 
are suggested by Theodore R. Sarbin, in his description of 
role enactment •1 He p6:i.nt·s to the "organismic dimension" 
of role enactment. A role may be enacted with varying 
degrees of "organismic involvement", or psychic intensity. 
At the low end of the ·scale, the self and the role are 
1c£. Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory", in Gardner 
Lindzey, ed., Handbook. of Social Psychology (Cambridge: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1954.), pp. 232-235. 
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minimally in contact, in casual relationships like going 
to the supermarket, for instance. A more intense involve-
ment is illustrated by the .role of a dramatic actor; if he 
nlives his rolen he may become even more deeply involved, 
even to the point of feeling the appropriate emotions. 
Hypnotized subjects, hysterical seizures, conditions of 
ecstasy, and even the extreme moribund involvement seen in 
voodoo death, all illustrate the 'extreme intensities of 
. 1 
organismic involvement. 
It is this variable of organismic involvement which 
we have termed the interest gradient. Presumably the almost 
compulsive quality which may attend an experience of obli-
gation illustrates the varying levels of organismic involve-
ment which may accompany a duty, depending upon the scope 
and depth of its significance to one's total well-being. 
Compulsive guilt would then be seen as a chronic, tragic 
investment of attentio~ and ener~y in a situation which is 
both deeply significant) ·and at the same time irresolvable, 
. either because of it:s character as a dissoc.ia:ted system, 
1
cf. also· Morton Deutsch, nField Th~ory in Social 
Psychology", in. Gardner Lindzey, ed. ,··Handbook ••• , Vol. I, 
pp. 202-203, for experimental evidence of the power of task-
completion needs. Thus, when a child is frustrated in attempt-
ing to complete a task, regression results. · 
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or, as we will suggest later, because it is a "double-bind" 
interpersonal relationship which knows no innnediate solu-
tion. 
C. Conclusion. 
If our argument.is sound, the experience of obliga-
tion accompanies apprehension of a situation as requiring 
completion or resolution in some coherent and satisfying 
way. ·The thinly veiled penalty for failure is exposure to 
the ravages of guilt• or shame-anxiety, or worse, perhaps 
to some chronic syndrome involving both, in mutual rein~ 
forcement. Go[dstein's work with brain-damaged patients 
reveals the ultimate, disabling panic which signal-anxiety 
portends. He labels the result "catastrophic behavior.nl 
Sullivan feels that we probably had one such experience in 
infancy; which as long as we have our faculties intact we 
will never repeat, even at the cost of schizophrenia. 
On the positive side, obligation is restlessness 
.in the presence of an unresolved situation which has signi-
ficance either for damage to the self, or enrichment and 
expansion of the self. This interest impelling task-
lKurt Go[dstein, Human Nature in the Light of Psycho-
pathology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 85. 
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completion may involve the imaginative projection of feel-
ings•.of competence, mastery, and :J;:"elief attendant upon a 
successful outcome. Robert White points to the motivating. 
force of such a "sense of competence", relating it not 
only to successful employment of the external environment, 
but to effective social reiliations as well. 1 We do commonly 
refer a feeling of obligation either to fear of consequ-
ences or the requirements of some interest to us. We feel 
either a negative or positive statement to be legitimate in 
answer to the question "Why do you feel you ought to do this?" 
but commonly give the superior place to the positive. 
II. Obligation Coordinates With Creative Evaluation. 
A. Freud Assumed Guilt and Evaluation are Correlated. 
Freud affirmed a one-way correlation between guilt 
and subconscious evaluation. He saw guilt as a primitive 
"given" which distorts evaluation. Reading Freud between 
the lines, however, brings us to the conclusion that even 
his conception of the super-ego as the introjected image of 
the prohibitive parental role would have to be predicated 
upon extensive precon~cious evaluation. In his work on 
dreams and wit we have one of the first detailed descr~pt~ons 
1cf. Robert W. White~ "Competence ••• ", pp. 97-141. 
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in print of the dramaturgic method of the evaluative capaci-
ties, and we note that guilt-anxiety is intimately correlated 
with them. 
1. Freud's conception of ·the super-ego is ordinar-
ily identified with irrational guilt. Conscience is an 
intuitive, even primitive introjection of the punitive 
parental role. We saw that even .this definition presupposes 
many dimensions of evaluation, of the type which psycho-
analysts call "reality testing", and hence presumably down-
to-earth and reasonable in its context. The process of 
introjection would involve: i. Recognition that guilt-
anxiety is increasing in intensity, and imaginative ex-
tension of its curve; ii. Symbolic reference of this 
rising anxiety to the interpersonal family situation as 
threatening; iii. Formation of an image of the parental 
role; iv. Judgment that it is expedient to shift roles. 1 
The reader is directed to Sullivan's concept of 
"personification" as it is ·discussed in this dissertation 
for an appreciation of the complex evaluative processes 
involved in the defining and shifting of roles. Similar 
conclusions may be drawn from the work of role psychologists. 
1 Cf. above, pp. 98-ff. 
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In Sarbin's work the self appears as a cognitive structure, 
defined in part by the even more complex cognitive con-
struct which one's role im.age-:~represents. 1 
This discussion would lead us to see that "irrational" 
guilt may not be the product of distorted evaluation, but 
rather the realistic evaluation of an unfortunate inter-
personal situation. Even guilt which is clearly neurotic 
need not reflect its isolation from reasonable evaluation; 
one may be doing the best he can with a parental image 
which cannot be perceptually reappraised, either because 
the parent is not available or his presence produces such 
anxi_ety as to block effective relearning. It is interesting 
to note that Freud's therapeutic goals presuppose t~at 
guilt is always rational; that is, that adequate analysis 
will reveal an intrapsychic system within which the:: patient r s 
guilt is understandable. 
2. In.his analysis of dreams, and his description 
of the hidden psychic forces at work in wit and art, Freud 
showed us that creative imagination is the typ~cal functional 
mode of preconscious evaluation, and that guilt-anxiety is 
erganismically.:.~oodrdinate·d' with· it. · 
1
cf. Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory" ••• , p. 251. 
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Freud defined "cynical wit" as that which attacks 
the claims of morality, but under a disguised form. Barbed 
wit may mask aggression, to allow a person.to avoid the 
anxiety of an expression which violates his self-ideal. 
Here we see guilt-anxiety, partially subconscious reformula-
tion of a verbal expression to disguise its intention, and 
the personification of oneself in a certain character, all 
integrated into one functional system. 
Similarly, in dream-work the creative imagination is 
functioning under the impetus of guilt-anxiety, both con-
structing images of problem situations, and restructuring 
them in order to keep anxiety within manageable limits. 
Psychic symbols are, in dream-work, typically arranged 
dramaturgically, or. coherently with reference to an immanent 
meaning. 
Unfortunately, Freud stressed the .defensive, dis-
tortive aspects of this unconscious evaluative activity. 
Only when he apeaks of. dreams in terms of wish-fulfillment 
does he see that they have a coping function. When he speaks 
of other types of fantasy, he sees their positive intent to· 
be the facilitation of effective action. Of course, Freud 
assumed that the distortive.processes of dream-work had the 
ultimate intent of allowing some positive value-achievement, 
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whether by means of substitute-gratification, or keeping 
the anxiety level down to prevent its blocking further 
evaluation of a problem situation, or providing a way to 
avoid dealing with it at all if it were too much of a threat 
to one's well-being. 
B. Adler and Sullivan Correlate Shame with Evaluation. 
In the thought of Adler and Sullivan we observe that 
shame-anxiety has the same close relationship to subcon-
scious evaluation which Freud assumed to be true of guilt-
anxiety. 
Adler saw that the ideal self-system by which he 
explained "feelings of inferiorityn, or shame-anxiety, is 
itself an evaluative construct. ·The self not only guides 
evaluation and stimulates evaluation through shame-anxiety--
. it is also a product of evaluation. The purpose inherent 
in one's "style of life" is an imaginative construct, just 
as the life style itself is a living cognitive system main-
tained in part by selective perception. Adler was as con-
vinced as Freud that the evaluative process is largely un-
conscious and dramaturgic. We are not usually aware of the 
gtlal of our own lives, and the processes which formulate 
that goal are even more thoroughly inaccessible to-conscious-
ness. Once the core of one's life style is established, 
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experience is selected, evaluated, and organized with the 
immanent meaning of that s:tyle as the key to the entire 
plot. The experiential elements in one's life have the 
1 same kind of meaning as that of a single note in a melody. 
Sullivan, too, sees one's personification of him-
self as an evaluative construct which is formed in a context 
of gradient shame-anxiety. Much autistic experience centers 
on the situations in a person's life which are shameful. 
Anxious about areas of one 1 s life which bring censure from 
other persons, and too anxious to face them openly, one 
builds his own interpretation of them in private fantasy, 
of which he is only partially aware. He is both construct-
ing and employing multip:J_e ·:personifications of himself 
throughout this process of assessing his place among others. 
Sullivan sees that very complex processes go on 
beneath the level of awareness. Gradient anxiety is per-
ceived and given symbolic reference to some interpersonal 
situation~ Inner needs and goal-tendencies are weighed and 
evaluated. Foresight, or the imaginative projection of one's 
probabl~ future,. and retrospective analysis to improve per-
formance is undertaken. Personifications of one's own identity 
1cf. Adler, in Heinz .L. and Rowena R. Ansbacher, ed., 
The Individual Psychology ••. , p. 182. 
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and that of others are made. A complex screening process 
decides which aspects of experience may enter into aware-
ness and blocks others from awareness, excludes certain 
threat-systems from intrapsychic discourse and signals the 
impending collapse of the defensive devices which keep them 
isolated. 
C. Interest Correla:tes with Evaluation. 
We have seen that both guilt and shame are coordi-
nates of evaluation, and that this evaluation is dramaturgic 
in form. What can be said of the second variable in obliga-
.tion, the interest gradient? Does one's preoccupation with 
an event vary with its significance? 
It is surely a working principle for Freud that 
psychic intensity, the investment of energy, and attention 
in intr~psychic discourse varied with the significance of 
an experience to one's well-being. Freud always assumed 
that every connnunication had some reasonable meaning, and 
that the feeling-tone and level·of preoccupation accompany-
ing it was a key aspect of that meaning. Feeling follows 
significance for Freud, and is symptomatic of some hidden 
value-system which justifies it. While Freud affirmed that 
only the libido needs of the id define one's interest in an 
object, it is apparent that he know the importance which 
247 
interpersonal relationships_have_ in one's life. Certainly 
he described as few thinkers have the intense anxieties which 
attend the temptation to jeopardize those relationships to 
accommodate the id. In addition, he saw in his analysis of 
art and wit that one may become preoccupied with and take 
pleasure in the aesthetic and cognitive Gestalts represented 
in an artistic production or the facile turn of a phrase. 
The direct embodiment of imaginative competence could become 
an object of interest. 
Adler and Fromm indicated that the ultimate interests 
expressed by the terms nfictional final goal" and the "pro-
ductive orientationu are defined by a fabric of meaning 
created in imagination. One's experience tends to be steered 
into certain channels, and.his life to take on a certain 
orientation, by the selective screening of impulses and 
perceptions. Literally, one's obligation, or the unique 
definition of his identity and role which circumscribe the 
field of his interests and the focus of his anxieties, is 
a product of evaluation. Of the therapists whose theory 
was investigated, only Fromm identifies evaluation with ver-
bal systems only. 
Sullivan, too, revealed the extent to which selective 
inattention, masking processes, interpretations and misinter-
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pretations, cause us to ignore experiences of lesser moment 
to us, to block those of too great a negative significance, 
and to focus our attention and interest upon those of most 
importance. He revealed that even pathological preoccupa-
tions such as those represented in schizophrenia and paranoia, 
are a continuation of the same interest gradient. A dis-
sociated system may demand absolute attention precisely be-
cause it has been evaluated as of absolute significance. 
D. Conclusion. 
I£ the above analysis is justified, an anxiety-
interest experience, or sense of obligation, is prima facie 
evidence of a creative judgment having been made following 
extensive subconscious evaluation. 
We can go even further and say that the devices a 
person may employ to defend himself against guilt-anxiety, 
or to disguise its significance, are evidences of such a 
subliminal moral judgment. Thus, Freud's ego-defenses all 
presuppose extensive evaluation. The ego-defenses he most 
closely associated with guilt, such as identification, self-
aggression, and repression, he assumed to be dependable 
symptoms of guilt-anxiety which ha4 legitimate meaning in 
some intrapsychic context. Repression, too, was evidence 
that an experience had been denied a hearing because of its 
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psychic value, or intensity of interest testifying to its 
nature as an ultimate concern. 
The same affirmation can be made about pathologi-
cal guilt. We saw that Freud's super-ego or neurotic guilt 
presupposed an amazingly astute analysis of his actual situa-
tion on the part of a child who introjects the parental role, 
and that the process of introjection itself involved ex-
tremely intricate cognitive processes, and that the carrying 
over into adult life of the introjected parental role has 
its own legitimate reasons which can be discovered in ther-
apy. 
Looking again at the guilt-shame cycles which Piers 
and Fromm defined, we can see that much that we think of as 
pathological guilt is involvement in such a cycle. Neither 
Piers nor Fromm adequately perceive the role of self-evalua-
tion in such cycles. They see only that in a situation 
which demands passive dependency, either by the denial of 
a segmental impulse such as sexuality, or the holistic im-
pulse tlo affirm self, actuation of the impulse causes pain .... 
ful gUilt, and the pain of further action reinforces the 
passivity. In this case the guilt of activity feeds into 
the shame of passivity. We can.see another dimension to 
this, expressed in a phrase like: "I will hate myself if 
I do this.n A guilty act is typically taken as a symbol 
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of diminished worth, feeding the shame which attends a low 
self-evaluation. Here it is important to see that the 
processes of evaluation are deeply involved in the pathologi-
cal guilt which is a chronic guilt-shame cycle. 1 
Chronic guilt, we seem to be saying, reveals pene-
trating insight into one's actual situation, either 1) as 
the guilty one is deeply involved in an-interpersonal situa-
tion which denies legitimate expression of a wide range of 
self-validating behavior, or 2) as he clings for reasons of 
safety to an inappropriate role formulated in his early 
childhood. Intense and unexplained anxiety, or the deep 
self-preoccupation or self-directed interest we observe in 
obsessive-compulsive behavior, are indications of a crisis 
in obligation. This crisis need not relate to some overt 
guilty act, as Hobart Mowrer says, but may accompany an 
imaginative assessment of one's wishes as dangerously for-
bidden, or a dissociated system relating to a neurotic nucleus 
carried over from childhood, or the double-bind situation 
1The reader is referred to the book by Howard J. 
Clinebell, Understanding and Counseling the Alcoholic (New 
York: Abingdon Press, 1956), pp. 48-53, .for a concrete 
illustration of the self-evaluations involved in guilt-shame 
cycles. Here we see evidence that a guilt-shame cycle is 
often escaped by formation of a guilt-pe:rfectionism cycle 
which is doubly unfortunate. ·· 
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represented. by a guilt-shame cycle.l In such a cycle one 
is literally obligated by shame-related anxieties and in-
terests to do one thing, and by guilt-related anxieties and 
interests to do the opposite. Whatever happens, he loses, 
unless a change of situation or a therapeutic relationship 
helps him to escape the vicious cycle. 
We have chosen to refer to this organismic relation-
ship between the anxiety and interest gradients and the eval-
uative function as the doctrine of the rational conscience. 
The term "rationaln includes the inner logic of dramaturgic, 
subconscious evaluations as well as the narrower logic of 
verbal syntax. 
III. Obligation Relates to Self-actualization. 
The evaluative processes which are stimulated, guided 
by, and at the same time productive of the anxiety and inter-
est gradients are a functional tool of a person seeking actual-
ization.· Obligation grows out of the needs and interest of 
persons. 
A. Freud Assumed the Self as Center of Evaluation. 
It has often been noted that Freud's functional 
1c£. o. Hobart Mowrer, The Crisis in Psychiatry and 
Religion (New York: D. Van Not:' strand Company, Inc·., 1961) , 
p. 84. 
252 
hypothesisc.tends to compromise and obscure the unity of the 
self. The terms "id", "egon, and "super-ego" tend to be-
come hypostatized and assigned to discrete entities. 1 When-
ever Fraud portrays the imaginative work of the evaluative 
function, however, whether in dreams, wit, ego-defenses, 
or art, he sees that it is sensitively correlated with one's 
self-evaluation. The unified self is seen as the agent of 
evaluation, and the ideal self the standard-of evaluation. 
1. Freud makes evaluation in dream-work defensive, 
therefore distortive. That is, the function of the creative 
imagination is to disguise guilt-ridden dream contents. What 
Freud does not see clearly is that when one constructs a 
dream-image the self which is being defended is a unity 
achieved by the constructive and positive work of evaluation. 
The self, a cognitive achievement which is maintained by 
selective inattention to unworthy or guilt-ppoducing impulses, 
is threatened with panic as discarded or repressed elements 
seek attention. Reacting to advance warnings· of signal-
anxiety, one is stimulated to take some defensive action. 
1cf. Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory ••• , 
pp. ~02-13 and 397-400, to observe the way in which con~em­
porary psychoanalytic theorists hypotastize the super-ego 
and make it an explanatory principle. 
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In dreams especially we see. that defensive evalua-
tion presupposes positive evaluation, and both presuppose 
the self as a functional unity; a) A self-system has been 
constructed under the guidance of an immanent ~deal, large-
ly by the exclusion of unassimilable impulses. In dream-
work, all material must "avoid the censor."1 The censor 
here is clearly the need to protect the self from more 
reality or insight than it can bear, and to suppress the 
guilt-related impulses which threaten its coherence. b) 
Second, this self-system has evaluated its condition as 
one of threat, guided in part by the rising intensity of 
anxiety. c) Third, highly creative distortive work is 
done on the dream content, but with the positive intent 
of allowing revelation of as wide a range of truth about 
one's total situation as is possible without causing panic. 
The functional intent of all defensive activity is the well-
being of the self. 
2. In his work on tendency wi.t Freud sees guilt as 
a type of signal-anxiety which stimulates the reformulation 
of a verbal communication to allow expression of a forbidden 
motive in disguised form. Here, very clearly, a person is 
seen at work judging himself in the light of his role":" 
lcf. Freud, .The Interpretation of Dreams ••• , p. 463. 
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conception, as determined in part by the expectations of 
others, and in part by his own ideal of self. 
3. Freud's conception of "psychic value" assumes 
an immanent center of value which is the focus of evalua-
tion. The inherent rationality of the self is a hidden 
Freudian assumption, and interest and evaluation are co-
herent with this rational self. 
Thus, prior to the scrambling process which dream-
formation inflicts upon them, dream-thoughts and their 
hierarchy of value as e:spressed in interest-levels form one 
coherent system. , Anxiety arises out of this coherent order 
and is presumably of one fabric with it. The task of the 
censor is to protect this logical coherence from the threat 
of its own internal truth by shuffling the elements into an 
image a little easier to bear. Interestingly enough, before 
the dreamer awakens a "first interpretation" is made of the 
new image to make it presentable to waking thought, since 
"it is natural to our waking thought to create order in such 
material, to clonstruct relations, and to subject it to the 
requirements of an intelligible coherence.nl Here Freud 
assumes that unconscious thought is acquainted with the 
1Ibid., p. 463. 
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logical requirements of reflective consciousness, as well as 
the deeper truth of one's coherent self. 
In Freud's dream-work we have seen preconscious 
evaluation, guilt-anxiety, and interest) all ordered into 
the coherent self, both expressing,~nd protecting the well-
I ". 
being of the self as it faces, no;t;: . only the burdens placed 
upon it by neurotic trends, but .. its contemporary tasks as 
well. This seems to support our conclusion that obligation 
is a complex anxiety-interest experience indicating some gap 
in the coherence of the self. 
B. Interpersonal Theory and Self-actualization. 
' . 
Many of the hidden assumptions of Freud become ex-
p;J..icit affirmations inAdler's thought. Adler saw that 
"inferiority feelings" led to "compensation", and that both 
revealedi:~the functional unity of the self. 
More important, it becomes clear as we read Adler 
that shame-anxiety is the negative side of a positive 
teleology of self-actualization. Dramaturgic self-evaluation 
is a constant concomitant of the "sentiment d'incomplitude" 
which urges the self toward greater achievement and orders 
experience into a value-system centered on the goal of per-
fection. In the light of our "fictional final goal" we 
_experience anxiety at our failures, and this anxiety stimulates 
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us to new endeavors, or under unfortunate handicaps diverts 
us to neurotic protective devices. The anxiety pole of 
bbligation, then, is a concomitant of an inner thrust to-
ward self-completion. 
Adler is one of the early theorists to note that the 
ideal self-system is a cogqitive construct. The "fictional 
final goaltr which becomes the valuational criterion to 
order all experience is itself an imaginative construct of 
the creative mind. The formulation of this goal and the 
ordermng of experience takes place mainly below the level 
of awareness. Here we see shame-anxiety, the ordering of 
experience around a self-ideal, and subconscious cognition 
in one coherent functional system. 
Erich Fromm uses the term "the productive orienta-
tion" in a way to suggest Adler's "fictional final goal." 
The inherent need to function productively in the world is 
seen as a teleological force, in that the "non-productive 
orientations" are always pathological distortions of the one 
prepotent force. The charact!er of evil imbibes the strength 
of potential goodness. Similarly, the nhumanistic con-
science" is the "expression of man's self-interest and in-
tegrity."l It is the assertion of our hidden potentiality. 
lc£. above, pp. 150-ff. 
-,-
1 
l 
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Here conscience interacts with a criterion of self-realiza-
tion. 
Of all the thinkers we have studied, Sullivan saw 
most clearly that anxiety plays both a formative and a pro-
tective r~le in relation to the self, and that the self-
system is a cognitive construct. He sees "personification" 
as a subconscious cognitive functioning interacting with 
anxiety to organize experience into a "secondary dynamism", 
the self-system. 1 The self, once formed, is a complex image 
which continues to structure experience through "selective 
inattention" and defensive devices, Sullivan saw that the 
self as a single dynamism assesses its worth in various self-
esteem problems and in the devastating experiences of humilia-
tion. Subdynamisms may be formed, such as "bad-me", "good-
me 11 , and 11not-me" personifications, to express various aspects 
of self-evaluation. 
Like Fraud, Sullivan affirms only a defensive func-
tion for the self-system, but assumes a positive function for 
the self which is thus defended. 
'e. Conclusion. 
We appear to be led by the snudy of guilt- and shame-
anxiety and "organismic involvementn into some type of self-
lcf. above, pp. 188-ff. 
I 
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actualization theory. The self is a cognitive system, 
formed and protected by certain screening activities, order-
ing and limiting the broad range of. experience in light of 
an immanent purpose. Several affirmationa might be made 
of the self: 
1. The self is an organismic unity, organized in 
Gestalt form, not by the primitive ingestion of an alien 
role, but by dramaturgic evaluation. .Sub-systems may be 
given relative degrees of aut:onomy, but a dissociated system 
is always a festering sore in the side of the self. 
2. Adler's conception of "compensation" and Goild-
stein's conception of "homeostasis" must always be supple-
mented by a growth principle, or thrust toward actualization 
and expansion of an inherent ideal.l Adler had to alter his 
original conception of the self as a closed system to allow 
the teleological pull of the "fictional final goal", which 
is open to continual reformulation as experience grows. 
3. Fromm's self tends to evaporate into its relation-
ships. Sullivan, too, comes dangerously close to the doctrine 
of the vacuous self, a functional dynamism with no unique · 
identity of its own. It appears that the vague conception of 
lcf. A.H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 124. 
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self-actualization must be explicated in terms of specific, 
innate needs which require fulfillment. This points toward 
the Gestalt view of universal structures, to which persons 
instinctually respond. It indicates that some conception 
similar to Maslow's "instinctoid needs" must be seen as pre-
potent in the formation of value. 1 We noted above that 
Fronun 1 s conception of "socially structured defects" pre-
supposes some such system of universal human needs. 2 
4. Freud and Sullivan express only the defensive 
aspects of· the self, althoqgh they assume the underlying 
reality of the self which is defended, and perhaps better 
than any other theorists describe the amazing creative pro-
cesses it employs in its defense. Maslow's work with "self-
actualizing persons" points toward an elaboration of the 
more positive and constructive endeavors of persons. 3 Robert 
White shows that shame-anxiety relates to 11effectance motiva-
tion", the need to master both the social and the physical 
enviromnent, "which has its immediate satisfaction in a feeling 
of efficacy and its adaptive significance in the growth of 
1 . Cf. Ibid., Chapters 6, 7, and 8. 
2 Cf. above, p. 167. 
3Ibid., Chapters 12-15. 
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competence."1 These psychological incursions upon the 
realm of normal persons tend to correct the biases born of 
the psychiatric clinic. 
IV. Obligation Relates to the Social F·ieid. 
The self is defined and perfected in dynamic inter-
action within a social field, not alone in interaction with 
other persons, but also with the molar structures which de-
fine the social field. 
A. Freud Related Guilt to Interpersonal Situations. 
While Freud's typical conceptual model portrays the 
person as a closed energy-system, Freud was the great pioneer 
in observing the deep emotional dependence everyone has upon 
significant other persons, especially in the early days of 
childhood. Indeed, Freud has been criticized by Fromm, Sulli-
van, and others for overemphasizing the ultimate emotional 
impact of the family constellation in the first five years of 
life. We observed that Freud's conception of separation-
anxiety remained an integral aspect of guilt. Threat of aban-
donment by the introjected parental image is a major source 
of anxiety in super-ego guilt, and is an emotional carry-over 
~obert White, "Competence and Psychosexual Stages .•• ", 
p. 138. 
261 
from infantile fears of loss of the beloved parents.1 While 
Freud tended to conceive it along sexual lines, fear of loss 
of the love-object is an important motivating force in all 
adult life, and the leading factor.in the formation of culture. 
In addition, Freud felt that personality development 
was deeply influenced by certain innate images expressing 
universal interpersonal structures. The Oedipal situation is 
one such universal pattern. We observed that the super-ego 
approximates a radial inheritance, since my i~gested image of 
my father does not include his total character, but.his super-
ego, which presumably. he ingested from his father before him. 
More important, we have repeatedly noted that when 
Freud turned his back upon his view of the super-ego and 
concentrated on the living situations ·expressed in dreams 
and wit he assumed that guilt grew out of contemporary dilem~ 
mas. Not only this, but we feel guilty in a situation because 
of our depth understanding that we are about to threaten the 
social fabric which affords our love-objects and defines our 
life. The pur~ose of dreams and wry humor is t~ restructure 
this scene in order to render the anxiety somewhat more toler-
able. Freud's inveterate suspicion of all culture, and his 
1
cf. Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory ••• , 
p. 105. 
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messianic urge to salvage persons from a repressive social 
envirornnent, prevented him from seeing the.more positive 
values of interpersonal relationships. 
B. Self-actualization' and the Social F~ema. 
. . . 
All three·- of the interpersonal psychiatrists studied 
expressed some conception of love as a prim~l goal immanent 
in all motivated activity. Adler felt that "social feeling", 
or constructive identification with the human cause, is the 
"only salvation" from chronic shame-anxiety. The "fictional 
final goal" of perfection is an immanent ideal of community. 
Fromm .felt that the ''productive orientation" is most decisive-
ly characterized as love which exercises care, which is re-
sponsible, respectful of the autonomy of others, and under-
standing of their·deeper needs. Self-realization is of one 
cloth with·a relationship of productive love. Sullivan felt 
that anxiety is the "need for interpersonal security" which 
fulfill~ "tenderness needs." Unlike Fronm, Sullivan always 
put the need to love ·in the passive vo.ice, except that there 
are indications of active self-giving in his term "integrating 
tendencies." 
It is important to observe that in all three of these . 
positions the need for self.-t;ealization is indissolubly bound 
up ·with the need for constructive relationships with others. 
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Love is a vital aspect of the immanent goal of all liVing. 
Even the evaluative :.:function is at its mercy, in that 
cognition is distorted by the inability to love and receive 
love. We will love if anxiety does not cripple us. Hos~ 
tility_ and chronic resentment are distortions of love under 
conditions of severe•...,anitie:J=Y. In Aristotelian terms, the 
essence of man now emerges as the creature who dares to love. 
The more one grows in love the more he will reason coherently. 
Adler and Fromm observed the importance of some 
cognitive map or orienting schema in defining one's identity. 
Ideally, this cognitive map corresponds to the actual struc-
tural requirements of the social scene. Thus Adler saw that 
personality develops along the lines of "schema of appercep-
tion" formulated in creative imagination. Ideally, the social 
structure and the uschema of apperception" coincide. Fromm 
talks of "frames of orientationtand devotlion." Man cannot 
realize himself unless he relates to others within a fabric 
of meaning which he himself creates __ imaginatively, but which 
may nevertheless grapp the essence .of his social existence. 
This insight opens the possibility that moral norms 
and laws fiorm an accepted frame of reference, which serves to 
express the molar characteristics of the social organization 
necessary to sustain human value. To the extent that personal 
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identity is achieved in terms of such orienting schema, any 
threat to the fabric of norms is a threat to the internal 
coherence of the self. This puts the threat of guilt-anxiety 
and the imperious demands of obligation in the strongest 
possible light. Obligation defends personal integrity, and 
in extreme cases takes on the character of spiritual life or 
death. Violation of the fabric of trust is violation of 
self. The loss of iiientity which guilt-ridden persons often 
express in therapy is explicated by this. The deeper shame-
anxiety which guilt signals speaks of threat to one's cogni-
tive confidence, since he has violated the cognitive map 
which he himself created, and which defines his life. Intima-
tions of incompetence assail a person who by the uwild fact" 
of his guilty acts cuts a destructive swath across his own 
identity. To what extent extreme depression could be identi-
fied with cognitive despair would make an interesting subject 
for study. 
Sullivan was most deeply aware of the social roots of 
personality. Personification takes place in an atmosphere of 
interpersonal evaluation. The feeling-tone of the interper~n:,:1:: l 
sonal environment is prehended in its character either of 
empathy or of anxiety. The quality of the interpersonal field 
as one conceives it defines the entire attitudinal structure 
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of the personality. Failure to integrate a social situa-
tion, with its attendant loneliness, will be avoided even 
at the cost of humiliation. To be trapped in one's autistic 
fantasies without the corrective influence of an intimate 
relationship is the worst of fates. 
Perhaps Sullivan should be read in conjunction with 
Robert White's article on "competence." The need to inte-
grate situations, which Sullivan symbolizes by the baby at 
the breast, should be supplemented by the Hbattle of.autonomy", 
expressed in the ncompetence model" and nrepresented by the 
child's exploratory play~"l Freedom of self-expression is 
as important as freedom from isolation. 
Fromm noted that shame-anxiety may relate, not to 
in~ompetent striving but to parental smothering. Howard 
Clinebell offers a concrete clinical illustration of this. 
Repressive control by rigid, puritannical parents often leads 
to the self~esteem crises Which may be expressed in alcohol-
ism.2 In fighting for personal autonomy one is not seeking 
isolation, however. He is seeking interpersonal relationships 
which are characterized by mutual respect, as Fromm indicated. 
lRobert White, ncompetence and Psychosexual Stages ••• ?, 
p. 112. 
2 . Cf. Howard J. Clinebell, Understanding and Counsel-
ing the Alcoholic (New York: Abingdon Press, 1956), pp. 44-53. 
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Probably certain conceptions from the field-theorists 
and role psychologists illustrate even more graphically the 
organic relationship between personal identity and inter-
personal orientation •. Lewin' s,~conception of "life space", 
where "person and environment .J:"are:_;_/. viewed as ~ con-
stellation of interdependent factorsn is important here. 1 
Perhaps even more interesting is the concept of role as 
employed by Sarbin and others. Here we see that the self 
is a cognitive structure, but it is formulated in interaction 
with role-conceptions, which are even more complex cognitive 
structures defining one's identity relative to the social 
scene, and for that matter, the universe.z 
A strong case could be made for saying that a complex 
role conception would include various sub-systems, including 
at least the following: i. The image of one's identity, 
formulated in retrospective evaluation and imaginative pro-
jection within a social field; ii. The image of one's ideal 
.self, with overtones of reference to "What any man ought to 
be", ·or a universal htiman pattern; iii. A working conception 
\iorton Deutsch, "Fd:eai.! Theory in Social Psychology", 
in Gardner Lindzey, Handbook of Social Psychology ••• , Vol. I, 
p. 185. 
2cf. Theodore R. Sarbin, nRole Theory" ••• , pp. 248-55. 
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of the interpersonal environment as a whole, including its 
significance in terms of threat, redemption, and value-
fulfillment, with overtones of a social ideal; iv. A rule-
of-thumb understanding of the technical requirements of the 
universe, including refe1:ence to·specific manipulative tasks 
to be mastered; v. A vague personal cosmology, perhaps 
articulated to same extent'in religious or philosophical 
systems; as expressed in such questions as "What does God 
want me to do 'l" 
CHAPTER V 
THREE ETHICAL THEORIES 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the ethi-
cal thinking of three contemporary philosophers, especially 
as it relates to their view of obligation, to set the stage 
for a later critique based upon the view ofobligation 
which was developed in the chapter above. 
The philospphers' chosen, H.A. Prichard, C.L. Steven-
son, and Brand Blanshard, represent three distinctive posi-
tions on the nature ofobligation. 
I. A Deontologist: H.A. Prichard. 
The school of ethical thinkers which came to be 
called deontologists was responsible for stimulating much 
of the recent philosophical interest in obligation. Harold 
Arthur Prichard, then Professor of Moral Philosophy at 
Oxford University, wrote the article .which defined the 
direction of t~is interest •. In 1912 his article "Does Moral 
Philosophy Rest.~n a Mistake?" appeared in the journal Mind. 1 
1Mind, N.S. Vol. 12 (1912). Reprinted in Wilfrid 
Sellars and John Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory (New 
. York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), pp. 149-162. 
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Mainly written to challenge the central assumptions 
of utilitarian ethics, the form it takes shows the influ-
ence of G.E. MOore. Seven years earlier MOore had written 
Principia Ethica, in which he discussed the intrinsic mean-
ing of the word "good". In his analysis he referred to the 
many variant meanings of good. Some hold that ethics con-
cerns good or bad conduct, he pointed out. Others say it 
is a feeling toward a thing. All of these definitions 
fail to tell us what p~operty it is which makes all good 
things good. His answer was that "good" is indefinable. 
It is a,non-natural property which cannot be analyzed. 
His famous conclusion was: "'Good' is a simple notion, 
just as' :}yellow' ::.:t.s a simple notion. nl Being a simple 
notion, it is apprehend~d only intuitively, as one might 
perceive the color yellow. All good things, then, have 
this simple non-natural property which we appi!ehend and 
denote 1;>-y the term "goo,dn. To define "good11 in terms of 
. ' 
any natural object in which it is perceived to exist. is 
to commit the ttnaturalistic fallacy."2 
1G.E. MOore, Principia Ethica, (2nd ed.; Cambridge: 
University Press, 1956), p. 7. 
2 . 
Th.i4·, p. 9-ff. 
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Where does the experience of obligation fit into 
this theory? Moore said that the intuition vtgood" also in-
eludes the connotation "ought to exist." Thus, when a 
person says a thing u·ought to exist" he is evidencing a 
subjective reaction to the intuition in the object of "the 
unique property of things, which I mean by 'good 1 • nl Now, 
when we ask what we ought to do, or what conduct is right, 
we must make an empirical investigation to discover what 
will produce the most good. nAll moral laws ••• are merely 
statements that certain kinds of actions will have good 
effects."2 No moral laws, then, are self-evident. 'What 
is good in itself is self-evident, and the proposition that 
this good "ought to be" is self-evident, being implied in 
the very intuition of good. There is, however, no self-
evident experience of my duty. "No sufficient reason has 
ever yet been found for considering one action more right 
or more wrong than another. er:3 The experience of obligation, 
then, is definable only in utilitarian terms; it is rela-
tive to production of good. This is the proposition which 
Frichard denies, even as he continues the intuitional bent 
of Moore's philosophy. 
1Ibid., p. 17. 2 . Ibid.,.p. 151. 3Ibid. , p. 152 • 
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A. "Ought" as an Intuition. 
The thesis which Prichard defends is that moral 
philosophy rests upon a mistake. By "moral philosophy" he 
means not only utilitarian thoug~t but Moore's intuition-
ism as well. What is. the mistake? That of "supposing the 
possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly 
by an act of moral thinking."1 What does this mean? 
Moral philosophers, he says, invariably answer the 
question "Why shoul-d we do so and so?" with the answer that 
the doing will lead to something we want, or the act itself, 
when we appreciate its full nature, is something we want 
or should take. The question then becomes: "Why should we 
keep our engagements at our own loss?"2 The utilitarian 
answer is always inadequate. In can do no more even at 
best than tor.make us want to keep our engagements, and 
wanting is different from the sense of obligation. 
In answer to Moore, Prichard says that all conten-
tions that if something is good we ought to act for its 
procurement "presupposes an intermediate link, viz. the 
1 H.A. Prichard, in Sellars and Hospers, Readings ••• ", 
p. 162. 
·2 Ibid., p. 151. 
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' further thesis that what is good ought to be. An 'ought', 
if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from 
another 'ought'. ul Moore's indissoluble intuition that 
ngood" also tnought to ben is illegitimate. We cannot move 
from talk about "good~11 to statements about "'ought" without 
building some sort of bridge between -them. The sense that-
we ought to tell the t~uth or pay our debts does not arise 
from the recognition that we will be originating something 
good. 
I£ the motive in respect of which we 
think an action good is the sense of 
obligation, then so far from the sense 
that we ought to do it being derived 
from our apprehension of its goodness, 
our apprehension of its goodness will 
presuppose the sense that we ought to 
do it.Z 
The real question, then, is not what is good) but 
what is the-nature of the apprehension or appreciation of 
right, or moral obligation? Here Prichard .rejects MOore's 
property of goodness, but retains his intuitionism. Thus: 
nThe sense of obligation to do, or of the rightness-of, an 
action of a particular kind is absolute1y·underivative or 
immediate·. n 3 In this sense we cannot say that an obligation 
1 Ibid. , p. 152·. 2Ibid. , p. 153 ~ 3Ibid., p. 154. 
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needs proof from outside its sphere; it is self-evident. In 
the same sense, we cannot speak as though··an obligated act 
had an "endu or "purpose". It has a motive, namely that of 
a Sense of obligation, but it has no purpose. If an act is 
· motivated by the wish to bring goodness into the world, the 
desire for goodness is its end, not a sense of obligation. 
Such an act may be praiseworthy, but it is not strictly a 
morally good action. Any morally good action must be "done 
because it is right, i.e. from a sense of obligation."1 
B. Intuition in Prichard and Moore. 
So far, Prichard's discussion of obligation as an 
immediate, self-evident experience parallels Moore's faith 
in the apprehension of goodness. We soon note an important 
difference, however. When Prichard uses the term "immediate" 
he does not build upon the model of perceptual simplicity 
which Moore employs. This can be seen as we attend to the 
following observations: 
1. First, we may legitimately ask "Why should we. 
do thi.s supposedly obligatory act?" The person asking this 
question is not blind to "oughtness", as Moore might say he 
were blind to "goodness". Rather, he has not been shown the 
1Ib:iid.' p. 157. 
-
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complete nature of the act in question; the ttpreliminaries 
to appreciating the obligation" are incompletely stated. 1 
Now we see that uowing to a lack of thoughtfulness11 a per• 
son may fail to appreciate or to apprehend an obligation. 2 
The appreciation of obligation depends upon a thoughtful 
perusal of the Gestalt to which obligation belongs, or the 
total meaning of the situation in question. For this reason, 
it is possible to differ on matters,of obligation. Some 
moral capacity is required to appreciate an obligation. 
nThe appreciation of an obligation is •.•• only possible for a 
developed moral being, and ••• different degrees of develop-
ment are possible. n 3 
2. What is the nature of this .capacity for thought-
ful conside1:ation of a situation which may enable us to 
appreciate its obligatory character? This passage illumi-
nates decisively the difference between the intuitionism of 
Moore and that of Prichard: 
The sense that we ought to do certain -
things arises in our unreflective con-
sciousness, being an activity of mo.ral 
thinking occasioned by the various4situ-ations in which we find ourselves. 
1Ibid. ' p. 155. 
3 .. 
Ibid., p. 156. 
2Ibid., p. 156. 
4Ibid., p. 161. 
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The terms nunreflective consciousness" and umoral thinkingn 
are decisive here. It is evident that for Prichard the 
immediate apprehension of obligation depends upon some pre-
liminary cognitive process. In a real sense, the sudden 
gra~p of an obligation is a creative insight. 
3. We note, too, that obligation is seen as we con-
sider the full meaning of a situation. This leads to a 
further point. The bbligation to speak the tt1uth, for in-
stance, 
involves a relation consisting in the fact 
that others are trusting us to speak the tnnth, 
a relation the apprehension of which gives rise 
to the sense that communication of the tnuth is 
something owing by us to them.l 
Here we see that a sense of obligation depends not upon 
the perception on some non-natural, simple quality, but 
upon the insightful awareness of the significance of an 
interpersonal relationship. 
When Prichard says no reason ~an be given for an 
obligation, and no purpose assigned to it, he means no 
reason or purpose extrinsic to the complex relationship 
involved. A sense of obligation has its reasons, b~t they 
are intrinsic to the nature of the obligating situation and 
1Ibid. , p. 155. 
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the "unflective moral thinking" of the person who is eval-
uating it. This leaves open the possibility that a "self-
evident" intuition of "ought" may be explicated in terms 
of the evaluative function. If so, a sense of obligation 
is not so much "self-evident" as it is "evident to a self." 
It is not the apprehension of a simple quality, but the 
achievement of a rich insight. 
4. The above possibility seems even more hopeful 
if we consider the following passage in Prichard's article. 
What is to be done, he asks, in the event that we forget 
why an obligation is to be kept? 
The only remedy lies in actually getting 
into a situation which.occasions the obli-
gation, or--if our imagination be strong 
enough--in imagining ou~selves in that 
situation and then letting our moral capa-
cities do their work.l 
Here creative imagination is made the seat of moral obli-
gation. If this proposition can bedefended, the thesis 
which this dissertation defends merits serious consideration. 
II. An Emotivist: C.L. Stevenson. 
A.C. Garnett describes the way in which the intuition-
libid.' p. 162. 
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ism of G.E. MOore led into emotivism.l Moore denied that 
ethical terms can be defined with reference to uthe greatest 
good for the greatest numberu, or any other naturalistic 
form of reference. "Goodn is a·non-natural property which 
one intuits much as he perceives the quality "yellow". 
This intuition of goodness contains the implication that 
the perceived goodness 1'o-gght to be", and obligation is 
simply the subjective feeling that one has toward the good-
ness which "ought to be". Prichard denied this intJ,lition 
of "ought to be", limiting "oughtn to voluntary action and 
affirming that "oughtn is the direct intuition of a morally 
qualified ''unreflective" thinker, which has. no reasons 
beyond itself. Deontologists generally agreed that ethics 
can be justified only in terms of a unique, nop.-natural 
property which one apprehends in direct awareness: 
Thus.a whole generation of British philosophers 
••• was trained to look for this elusive, 
intuitable, non-natural property or relation 
and to regard it as th,e only proper basis 
of any possible assertion·that anything is 
either right or wrong.2 
1cf. G. Campbell Garnett, Ethics: a Critical Intro-
duction (New York: The Ronald Press, 1960), pp. 271 and 
297-99. 
2rbid., p. 297. 
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The scene was set for those who denied they had any 
such elusive intuition, and who thus denied that ethics has 
a cognitive base of any sort. Thinkers such as A.J. Ayer 
and C.L. Stevenson, who studied under Moore, utilized the 
new discipline of semantics to press home their critique. 
Semanticists had seen that language may have the function 
of expressing our feelings and prescribing modes of action, 
as well as describing facts. Why not say, then, that an 
ethical statement refers to no non~natural property; indeed, 
that it has no factual m~aning, but is either expressive or 
prescriptive? This possibility was reinforced by the 
epistemology of logical positivists, who asserted that the 
meaning of any factual_ statement is defined in terms of the 
observable operations used to verify or discredit it. Since 
a direct intuition of "right" or "good" cannot be verified 
by any empirical operation, statements including such 
ethical terms are factually meaningless. Their only possi-
ble meaning is their usefulness in expressing feelings or 
prescribing a course of action. 
A. Ethical Terms Have Emotive Meaning. 
Stevenson describes his ethics as a type of interest 
theory. It differs from traditional interest theories, how-
ever, which hold that ethical statements are primarily 
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descriptive alii an "existing state of interests.nl Ethical 
terms "recommend an interest in an.object, rather than 
state that the interest already exists."2 Their primary 
function is to "create an interest11 , to·"change or intensifyu 
interests. How does one use ethical terms to change in-
terests? Not by employing them in a logical argument which 
persuades by its cogency of reasoning, but by "a quasi-
imperative fdrce ••• operating through suggestion,.and 
intensified by ••• tone of voice. "3 Ethical terms are in-
struments in the complicated interplay of human interests, 
chosen for their utility in playing on the suggestible 
nature of human beings. The pri~ry meaning of ethical 
terms is emotive, rather than cognitive. "The emotive mean-
ing of a word is a tendency of a word, arising from the 
history of its usage, to produce (result from) affective 
responses in people. 114 
When we say "X is goodtt, then, we really mean to 
say nwe like X."s The expression nx is good" contains the 
1A.C. Stevenson, 11The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms", 
in Wilfred Sellars and John Hospers; eds., Readings in Ethi~ 
cal Theory (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), 
p. 419. 
2Ibid., p. 419. 
5Ibid., p. 423. 
3Ibid., p. 419. 4 Ibid. , p • 422 • 
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descriptive meaning of indicating the speaker's interest, 
but it also contains the hidden meaning of assuming the 
listener must surely agree. In this way it carries a 
subtle kind of suggesti~n, which has the "quasi-interjectory, 
dynamic function"·of encouraging the listener's compliance. 
Similarly, to ask "Is X good?"· is to ask "Do you approve of 
X and shall I?" In this expression "the phrase 'Shall I?' 
is a request for influence and can roughly be compared to 
a request to be commanded."l Ethics depends, then, primarily 
upon "nonrational methods", such as persuasion. It depends 
upon "the sheer, direct emotional impact of words." 2 This 
is true not only of the term "good", which because of its 
"pleasing emotive meaning" is particularly fitted to suggest 
a favorable attitude. It is also true of terms such as 
"duty", "ought", and "moral obligation."3 To say something 
is "goodn and then to add "it is your duty to do it" is 
simply to create a more powerfully cumulative emotional 
effect by bringing up stronger ammunition. 
B. Two Important Qualifications. 
1. Stevenson does recognize a peculiar force to terms 
referring to moral approval. "X is good" ordinarily means 
1 C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Ya:le · 
University Press, 1944), p. 93. 
2Ibid., p. 139. 3cf. Ibid., p. 141. 
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"I like .. X", plus the subtle suggestion that everyone else 
surely does, too. Moral uses of "goodu, though, refer to 
"a different kind of interest. Instead of being about 
what the hearer and speaker like, it is about a stronger 
kind of approval. nl We are "shocked" when we do not 
approve of a moral action. 
2. There are some factual considerations in ethical 
discussions, Stevenson admits. First, as we have seen, 
a statement "X is good" is surely a factual statement about 
the present state of the speaker's interests. Second, while 
ethics is primarily concerned with disagreements in interests, 
as we can see from its use of emotionally-charged terms of 
persuasion--such disagreements in interests may root in a 
disagreement in belief. "That is to say, people who dis-
agree in interest would often cease to do so if they knew 
the precise nature and consequences of the object of their 
interest."2 The empirical method applies to ethics, then, 
in that ethical judgments may require supporting reasons. 
When a person expresses a moral imperative, the hearer may 
always ask "Why is this good?", to which a cogent reason 
may be given. 
lc.A. Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning ••• ", p. 425. 
2 Ibid., p. 427. 
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The reason, supporting the imperative, 
locates a possible source of disagreement 
in belief; and if the latter is settled, 
then, since be1iefs,and attitudes stand 
in intimate causal relationship, the dis· 
greement in attitude may be caused to vanish 
in a way that makes the imperative willing-
ly .obeyed.l 
Stevenson thus admits that matters of belief, with 
. which science has to deal, have some applicability to 
ethics. He is careful to state, however, that rational 
defenses of ethical statements are not validating reasons, 
but only "substitute proofs", mere emotional persuasions. 
Here it almost appears that Stevenson is searching for a 
criterion of absolute certainty in ethics, and finding 
none concludes that ethics is noncognitive. 
III. A Rationalist: Brand Blanshard. 
Brand Blanshard, in an article in The Philosophical . 
. Forum, described the "impasse in ethics" created first by 
the deontological denial that right has any significance 
in relation to good, followed by the emotivist insistence 
that goodness is not a knowable quality at all, and the 
naturalistic contention that ethics reduces to natural 
science. Blanshard answers the deontologists by showing 
1c. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language ••• , p. 28. 
283 
that such obligations as the keeping of engagements, the 
telling of truth, and the doing of justice do derive from 
the good; their betrayal would "tear a huge hole in the 
ne'twork of relations that makes society possible. nl He 
speaks to emotivism by showing that it makes all statements 
about past and future judgments impossible, and all our 
attitudes arbitrary and groundless. 
Blanshard concludes that good is rooted deeply in 
human nature. Goodness relates to satisfaction, or intrin-
sic value, and to the fulfillment of a human faculty. "To 
fulfill and satisfy what nature prompts is not only good; 
it is what goodness means."2 Duty, then, is the "impera-
tive of our own reason, telling us that if our central 
strivings and those of others ••• are to be fulfilled, we 
must act thus and not otherwise."3 
For a fuller exposition of these ideas we must turn 
to Blanshard's recent book Reason and Goodness. 
A. Goodness. 
Blanshard points out that the term "good" has no 
single referent; hence it is not subject to simple verbal 
1Brand Blanshard, "The Impasse in Ethics ..• ", p. 8. 
2Ibid., p. 22. 3Ibid., p. 22. 
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·analysis. nGoodtt is a term like "lifen, "feeling", or 
nthought", which "carry a vague cloud of cognitive and 
other.meanings."1 Goodness is relative to the human pro-
cess of seeking, which is a set of a-ctivities beginning in 
impulse, maturing into desire, and directed toward ends of 
varying degrees of explicitness. Thus: 
Value is so fundamental in human life that 
its true character can be seen only against 
the background of human nature •••• I am convinced 
that if we find certain things good, it is not 
merely because they fulfilh1needs; such fulfill-
ment enters into the very meaning of goodness. 
A sound theory of value can be deve~oped only 
from an underst~ndi~g of the soil or setting in 
which value arises~ 
Blanshard develops his conception of goodness in a 
series of propositions, which can perhaps be condensed into 
four without doing violence to their meaning: 
a. "Desire grows out of the experience of satis-
faction and is limited by it.n3 
The experience of things done with satisfying re-
sults, motivated initially by impulse, defines our desires. 
The Gestaltists have shown us, however, ·that the form of 
our impulses is defined congenitally, at least in the sense 
1Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1961), pp. 290-91. 
2Ibid., p. 293. 3Ibid., p. 295. 
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that some patterns appear to be inherently appealing to all 
persons. Our ideas of what is desirable also stem from the 
satisfactions we experience. Satisfaction is an intrinsic 
value which enables us to define the valuable. 
b. "Our major goods answer to the main types of 
impulse-desi~es."1 
Thus, for instance, instinctive curiosity develops 
into the desire for understanding. We normally want to 
understand the connections among facts which make them 
intelligible. The implicit aim of the theoretic impulse is 
consistency and interdependence o; a broad range of facts 
and relations within an intelligible whole. Every advance 
in this task _gives satisfa·ction, but satisfaction is not 
the goal. The goal is fulfillment of the cognitive im-
pulse. "This double service of fulfillingand of satis-
fying is what makes knowledge good. It is also what makes 
anything good."2 
In the same way, beauty relates to aesthetic impulse-
desires as one way in which some things are goo~. Two in-
dependent variables define goodness: i. fulfillment of an 
impulse, drive or need, with ii. the satisfaction which 
1 Ibid., p. 301. 
2 . 
. Ibid., p. 301. 
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accompanies any:· experience of fulfillment. The goal of 
any activity is mainly fulfillment o£ some universally 
human impulse, and only secondarily the satisfaction which 
results. Blanshard thus agrees with the hedonists that 
satisfaction is an intrinsic human good, but denies that 
it is the primary motive of behavior. 
c. uThe good or desirable always outruns the de-
sires."1 
This .is true, first, because the realization of the 
good is teleological in nature; our aim is dimly conceived 
and defines itself in the course of its realization~ An 
impulse "carries its compass and criterion within itself."2 
In addition, it is an empirical fact that the best men are 
usually the most discontented with their achievements. 
Growing maturity invariably brings a redefinition of values 
and an enlarging of the horizons of value-possibility. 
d. uThe good, in the sense· of the ethical end, is 
the most comprehensive possible fulfillment and satisfaction 
. 3 
of impulse-desires .. " 
If impulse-desires conflict, a personmust consider 
his good as a whole. He will assess his f!.ptitudes, interests, 
1 . Ibid., p. 305. 2 Ibid., p. 305. 3 Ibid., p. 311. 
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and abilities, and give prior reign to some impulse-desires 
among others. The ethical end, then, or summum bonum, is 
wise choice among impulse-desires which allows the broadest 
range of satisfactoriness, or satisfaction in union with 
fulfillment. 
B. Obligation. 
Blanshard defines the right as that action which 
tends to bring into being the most good. All goods are 
ethical goods, in that when values compete a decision must 
be made as to the right course of action. 
a. How do we a-p.swer the deontologist's conviction 
that right has nothing to do with goodness? Deontologists 
often argue that the keeping of a·promise is obligatory 
though the utilitarianrule of the greatest good for the 
greatest number is violated. In fact,. they argue that the 
keeping of promises adds no intrinsic goodness to any com-
munity or person, and is not even motivated by that possi-
bility. Blanshard disagrees. The keeping of a promise, 
he says, is bound up with the order of life itself, and the 
undermining of the fabric of duty which it illustrates 
would lead to far-reaching and disastrous consequences. 
Without confidence in the entire system of commitments we 
could not count on other persons, and chaos would result~ 
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I 
I 
Thus, the keeping of ¥n obligation does contribute 
ness, since the sociat order and human life itself 
I . . 
·t 1 I upon 1. • 
to good-
depend 
b. Duty is a categorical imperative, in that the 
impulse-desires to whlch it relates are integral to human 
nature. The theoreti,al impulse, for example, cannot be 
carved out of man "wi bout annihilating him as man."2 The 
same is true of the o her impulse-desires. They define 
human nature. For·::th · s reason deontologists are correct in 
saying that duty has 1 certain inherent compelling quality 
"?hich ideal utilitariahism has not accounted for. 
. I 
c. "The ethic~l ought is like the logical ought; 
I 
indeed the logical oug~t is a special case of the ethical."3 
In this statement Blan~hard builds a bridge between the 
I . 
theoretical impulse, tpe rational teleology which defines 
I . . . . 
the goal of every impu~se, and the imperative nature of 
obligation. Duty is tfe imperative:.prescribed by human 
nature itself, as it sreks its good:; the fulfillment of its 
I 
inherent impulses and fhe satisfaction which fulfillment 
affords. I 
I 1cf. Brand Blaishard, Reason and Goodness ••• , pp. 
324-330. 
2Ibid., p. 330 3rbid., p. 332. 
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d. Duty, while defining the logical requirements 
of good, ifHitself an intrinsic good. 1 All of the impulse-
desires may be aimed at perfecting the moral mechanism. It 
is entirely correfit to say that a person may take an in-
terest in his own moral achievement. A healthy moral 
interest, however, should be centered upon the goods to 
be achieved. The Kantian duty is a vacuous good, with only 
itself to aim at. "Moral goodness is one of those price-
less things, of which culture is another, that tend to 
wither away when placed in too bring a light. 112 
C. ·Thought and Desire. 
What part does reason play in the moral life? 
Reason's place in the moral life is very similar to the 
role it plays in theoretical life. "Reason is in neither 
case a form imposed from without on a content alien to it. 
It is already working immanently in desire just as it is 
at work in perception."3 Thought is closely related to 
desire, which plays so large a part in the moral life. In 
fact, thought and desire are means to the same end, the 
"removal of a maladjustment between idea and fact. ·~4 Thought 
1 .2 Cf. Ibid., pp. 332-33. Ibid., p. 334. 
3 . 4 Ibid., p. 343. Ibid., p. 347. 
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attempts to mpdify the idea in conformity with5:fact; de.:.. 
sire to modify fact in conformity with. idea. In this sense 
we can say: "Thought is the architect of the good.m1 _ 
Blanshard notes the followip.g functions of reason as 
it influences desires: 
a. Reason gives impulse an object by creating de-_ 
sires. Just as it turns sensation into perception, it 
turns impulse into desire. 2 . Impulse is blind until it:·:.is 
guided by an imaginative thought o£ its own completion. 
A desire, then, is a construct of creative thought, the 
expectancy born of experience and imaginative p~ojection 
that an impulse ~y be fulfilled by certain types of acti-
vities and objects. · 
b. Reason operates between desires to exclude in-
compatible ones and bring coherence among them. Intelli-
gence duly notes that desires contradict each other, and 
that priorities must be established. 
6. Desires carry broad implications which reason 
must illuminate. The satisfaction of a desire is not an 
1Ibid.) p. 347. 
2
cf. Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought ••• , Vol. I, 
· pp. 51-75, for his discussion of perception as a product of 
Unreflective judgment. 
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isolated event; it has repurcussions which reason must 
predict. 
. d. Most important of all,· reason is constitutive· 
·as well as regulative of. impulse.. A "rudimentary int:elli-
gence works through the domain of instinct" far down the 
evolutionary scale •1 As Gordon Allport has pointed out 
by research on "the functional autonomy of motives",· in-
terests and motives are defined by experience. 2 Similarly, 
Freud showed that ideas operate subconsciously to define 
motives. 3 One reason that the desirable always outrtms 
the desired is that we recognize that our interests do 
not exhaust the potentialities, and that as knowledge in-
creases, interests change. 
Value is defined,.:(as we saw, by two independent 
variables--satisfaction and fulfillment.·. Fulfillment 
is organic to the impulse, endowing it with its 
special character, and ••• is itself so plastic 
to intelligence, so shaped and reshaped by it, 
so susceptible to its excisions and corrections 
and enlargments, that one may almost say it is 
constituted by 4 in-telligence. Human good is a rational g9od. . 
1Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness ••• , p. 352. 
2Ibid., p. 363. 
4Ibid., p. 366. 
3cf. Ibid. , p. 363. 
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Human good is never wholly rational, however. With exper-
ience our values are continually improved, both in scope 
and in internal order. 
CHAPTER VI 
CRITIQUE OF ETHICAL THEORIES 
In this, the last substantive chapter in this study, 
we take up the critical task of commenting upon the ethical 
theories above, drawing upon the view of obligation which 
was developed in Chapter IV. 
The value to ethics of any such theoretical formula-
tion of obligation must be demonstrated in its usefulness 
in shedding light upon problems in ethical dialogue, and to 
indicate the directions in which such dialogue might fruit-
fully move in the near future. The critical comments which 
follow have the dual purpose of strengthening the central 
thesis of this dissertation, and suggesting directions for 
future ethical thinking. 
I. Comments on Prichard's Deontology. 
We have concluded that the experience ofi obligation, 
like many other qualita:tziil~lyit'tlt!li:.que experiences (such as 
jealousy, for instance) is a complex one. It includes com-
ponents of anxiety, which is itself a complex experience, 
with the anxiety qualified by the feeling-tone we call 
guilt shading over into the more deeply threatening and 
more intensely painful feelings of shame and incompetence, 
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with perhaps elements of grief and basic existential dread 
blended into the whole. Components of interest, or organis-
mic involvement impelling completion of an unfinished Ges~ 
talt of experience, which we feel as the logical or moral 
"ought" are involved. We not only do our duty because we 
are afraid not to, but because it is "to our interest" to 
do so. We saw that the very presence of such anxiety-
interest feelings, or even the defenses which disguise their 
silent influence, are indications of evaluation, though it 
be mainly unconscious. We concluded that even pathological 
guilt is not isolated from evaluation; it is nothing but 
fitting in some intrapsychic or interpersonal contexts 
which are rapidly becoming known to psychotherapists. 
Whatindications can we.find in this analysis for 
the ethical philosophy of H.A. Prichard? We can see worth 
in Prichard's conviction that obligation is an experience 
which is ttappreciated" following certain "preliminaries."1 
We would agree with him that these "preliminaries" include 
thoughtful consideration of a situation in "unreflective 
consciousness, ••• an activity of moral thinking."2 This 
1 . Cf. H.A. Prichard, nooes Moral Philosophy ••• n, p. 155. 
2Ibid., p. 161. 
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moral thinking ;Lnvolves imaginative projection of ourselves 
into the problem situation in question, in order that we 
may see it in holistic balance. 1 It presupposes the "moral 
capacity" of a "developed moral being", which is subject to 
considerable variation. 2 Certain qualifications ·are in order: 
A. Moral Thinking Not a Unique Cognitive Function. 
"Moral 'thinking" is not a unique cognitive func-
tion, but the evaluative function which we employ in all 
defensive, coping, and expressive activity. 
We observed that Freud pref~rred to restrict sub-
conscious evaluation to defensive activities, which distort 
and falsify reality to protect a person from guilt. We 
noted also that the intent of such defensive cognition is 
to enable one to cope with the real situation, and in-
volves very astute and realistic analyses of that situation. 
Evaluation thus serves a coping fl.mction, and defensive 
devices are simply a st~ategic method facilitating it. 
Freud saw, too, that evaluation serves expressive interests, 
in art and wit, for instance. It appears here that the 
. . 
function Freud associated so closely with guilt and interest 
(psychic intensity) is the same function we employ in all 
cognitive activity. 
2
cf. Ibid.,p. 156. 
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Similarly, Sullivan's three "modes of experience", 
which he observed to be organismically correlated with 
gradient shame-anxiety are the•,verbal and perverbal cogni-
tive processes which are involved in every aspect of life. 
It would appear that Sarbin is correct when he 
identifies the "moral dilemma" with conflicts between 
broader and narrower self-roles, which are themselves 
"cognitive structures. nl Robert White leads us in the 
same direction when he connects shame with incompetence, 
and the urge toward competence with-the-cognitive sppere 
of life. 2 He denies that shame relates to moral violation, 
but this is because h~ narrows morality to guilt-related 
situations only. We are following Fromm's lead in identify-
ing morality with the broad range of human value. 
We disagree, then, when Prichard identifies with 
a Butlerian view of moral· cognition as a separate function. 
B. Intuition a Creative Insight. 
Our analysis would indicate that an intuition is 
a creative insight. We might liken it to the appreciation 
1c£. Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory" .•. , p. 251. 
2cf. Robert White, "Competence· ••• ", pp. 111 and· 127. 
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of the essence,· or artistic pattern of an experiential 
Gestalt, following subconscious evaluation of a dramatur~ 
gic type. It is the enjoyment of-the apex, the decisive 
moment in a movement of thought, which defines the unique 
meaning of the entire movement. 
When Prichard says obligation is nabsolutely underi-
vative and immediate" he tends to fals:l.~y this process. 
The complexity of subconscious evaluations underlying any 
experience which comes to us with a sense of immediacy is 
amply demonstrated by psychotherapists. To say that obliga-
tion is an intuition would not make it self-evident in any 
analytic sense, then. Its meaning-must be explicated in 
terms of the evaluative processes which precede it. Prichard 
bore testimony to this when he abandoned Moore's perceptual 
model and spoke of "unreflective thinking." 
If an intuition is a creative insight, it remains at 
the mercy of the perceptual opportunities, the imaginative 
capacities, and the rational maturity of the person who is 
making the evaluation. Prichard would be hard pressed to 
explain why the matl;lrity of the moral being would make a 
difference if moral intuition is self-explanatory. We can 
.. 
explain this fact if we see, as Adler and Fromm concluded, 
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that all cognition varies in predictable ways with a person's 
total history and orientation. Cognition reflects character.l 
C. Obligation Relates to Goodness. 
We have seen that an intuition is not its own 
explanation. Further, when we seek an-explanation of an ex-
perience of obligation we will find it indissolubly bound up 
with evaluation, and evaluation presupposes a value-system. 
Prichard says no reason ca~ be given for an obligation, 
and np purpose assigned to it.· We can agree that no reasons 
not intrinsic to the obligating situation and the "unreflec-
tive moral thinking" which accompanies it can be given for 
an experience of-obligation. This does not mean, however, 
that obligationhas nothing to do with goodness, nor'that: 
the assigning of goodness to an object presupposes an 
obligation to produce it, as Prichard says. We should rather 
say that one feels obligated in a situation because he has 
assessed its complex meaning with reference to its value-
producing or value-threatening possibilities. A sense of 
obligation may be the only motive for a moral act, as 
Prichard says, but the obligation involves a value-judgment. 
We do anticipate guilt- and shame-anxiety, and hence 
1cf. Fromm's concept of "productive thin~ing", on 
p. 161 above. 
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experience signal-anxiety, when we observe that a course of 
action will threaten the personal or interpersonal coher-
ence wnich is our ve.ry existence. Similarly, we invest 
interest in an object in relation to its assessed signifi-
cance for the enrichment of our way of life. Obligation is 
the drive to integrate a significant (either in terms of 
value or disvalue) uwild fact" into the cognitive require-
ments of the value-system which defines our life, and the 
anxious concern for that value-system. 
This would lead us to both a positive and negative 
statement about Prichard's view: 
i. He does well.to stress the prime importance of 
obligation in morality. It is plain that the sense. of 
binding urgency which accompanies a duty is not adequately 
·explained by the ideal utilitarians. There is more involved 
here than the weighing of consequences to discover which 
course of action offers nthe greatest good for the greatest 
number." There is rather the eduction of·a fabric of 
relationships which carry an imperative quality, an inherent 
logic which is binding. in nature. One's very identity as 
a person is at stake. This is clearly illustrated in the 
moral crises psychotherapists so often face with their ~ ·:· ""'" · : ,; 
patients, where anxiety is so great as to demand a complete 
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disowning of the internal imagery of a situation, and yet 
the organismic involvement with that dissociated image is 
so intense as to reach hypnotic proportions. 
ii. The immediate, imperative quality of an obliga-
tion does not require us to divorce it from goodness, as 
the deontologists indicate. We do not see this separation 
of right from value as e~plicitly stated in the work of 
Prichard as we do in the~ work of David Ross. Ross de-
fined the directions of deontology by emphasizing the self-
evident nature of an experience of obligation. While Pri-
chard held a similar view, he qualified it by making 
obligation dependent upon the imaginative capacities of a 
qualified moral being, which opens the door to value-
considerations. Ross went so far as to state that there 
is no intrinsic worth in keeping an obligation, nor is 
there an increase in ttthe intrinsic goodness of a community 
merely because promises are kept in it. 111 We are further 
told that even if the keeping of an obligation made the 
world worse than before.in all ways, it is still our duty 
to keep i:t. 
1
navid Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Ttie~ 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 143. 
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We have indicated that obligation may be analyti-
cally described as an anxiety-interest complex. We have 
further indicated that guilt-anxiety is aroused when one 
threatens the fabric of law and trust which defines inter-
personal relationships, and shame-anxiety attends the 
judgment.;of personal incompetence when such relationships 
are threatened. Beyond this we have affirmed that interest 
is invested in a situation and attentiion given to it as 
some action is needed to integrate it constructively into 
one's life. We have concluded that these anxiety and 
interest gradients are systemically coordinated with evalua-
tion, and that an intuition is a creative insight. This 
would indicate that the right d~pends upon 'the good; that 
an experience of obligation carries a judgment, of value. In 
fact, a judgment of right ties directly to the value-system 
which defines the distinctive organization which is one's 
life. Furthermore, the keeping of a promise would have 
intrinsic value, as an example of the competent evaluation 
and resolution of a situation. 
II. Comments on the Emotivist Theory. 
A. Feeling Follows Significance. 
A.C. Garnett criticizes Stevenson in terms of a 
criterion of "broad agreementu. The great ethical religions 
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of the. world, he says, have gradually discovered thatr. there 
'is an objective, un?i:versal, and factual factor in moral 
iife. Morality does not.root in "anything so subjective 
and variable as mere emotion. irl In the light of our view 
of obligation as an anxiety-interest complex systemically 
correlated with evaluation, our own criticism of Stevenson 
would have to take the opposite tack. We would agree with 
Stevenson that ethical terms are distinguished by their 
emotive meanings, but deny the implication that emotive 
meanings are arbitrary and insubstantial. 
Freud showed us that emotion varies with signifi-
cance. Irrational feeling is feeling which has a rational 
meaning in the context of some covert intrapsychic pattern. 
It makes sense in terms of the total task a person is facing, 
once we know all ·the hidden dimensions of that task. Kurt 
Goldstein expresses the same conviction: . 
If the patient does not seem to react in a 
satisfactory way, it is in situations in 
which he also fails to comprehend the 
essentials to which a definite feeling 
attaches •••• His reaction seems inappropriate 
to us because we regard the ~hole situation 
and not merely a part of it. 
1A.C. Garnett, The MOral Nature of Man (New York: The 
Ronald Press Co., 1952), p. 63. 
2Kurt Goldstein, Human Nature ••• , p • 23 • 
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Maslow adds an additional dimension to this when he points 
out that some behavior is relatively "purposeless", or 
"unmotivated."! Much emotion is expressive, not of an 
inner problem or task, but of one's aesthetic appreciation, 
or his unique style of life, or simply relaxed play. Whether 
emotion is a concomitant of problem-solving, or of express-· 
ive behavior, it is reason~ble within the context of a given 
psyc;:hic system and its history. 
Stevet1son says "this is wrong" means "I disapprove", 
expressed in emotionally-toned language to manipulate the 
hearer's interest in the direction of conformity. Such a 
statement is not a factual, but a prescriptive statement, 
Stevenson says. Can we not reply that it is a prescriptive 
statement because it is also a statement of fact or belief, 
and that a prescriptive statement always expresses a judg-
ment? We would wish to agree with Stevenson that many 
ethical statemertts express varying degrees of interest, as 
their prescriptive form reveals. We would also wish to say 
that interest presupposes evaluation, and that:\every ethical 
statement which is prescriptive is therefore cognitive as 
well. A prescriptive statement means to indicate a person's 
1A.H. Maslow,: Motivation ••• , pp. 291-ff. 
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conviction that a complex pattern of experience is such that 
this prescription is justified. An expression of moral 
.attitude means to express a m~ral belief. 
We have observed .that.one.becomes "organismically 
involved" in a situation to the extent that it has some 
significance to the pattern of his life. The greater the 
significance; the more intense the interest, reaching hypno-
tic proportions in situations of massive threat. The total 
meaning of moral terms, which it is Stevenson's intent to 
reveal, will be discovered. only in th~iX' functional setting 
within the hierarchy of value which defines the inner logic 
of a person's life. 
It appears that two admissions by Stevenson con-
stitute chinks in the armor of emotivism: 
a) Stevenson admitted that."! like X" expresses a 
different kind of intex-est from that .expressed in "I dis-
. . 1 
approve of x·." Garnett points out that this admission 
opens the door to "the assertion of some difference in 
judgments about X which underlie and determine the difference 
2 in feeling-tone." · We ha:ve seen that the qualitative 
1cf. C.L. Stevenson, ·~!The Emotive Meaning .•• ", p. 425. 
2 ' • 
A.C. Garnett, Ethl.cs ••• , p. 308. 
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differences in feeling-tone experienced between, for in-
stance, guilt and shame, are 'symptomatic of two different 
judgments, expressed roughly by such sentences as "I have 
transgressed", as distinguished from nr am incompetent." 
b) Second, Stevenson admitted that some differences 
in attitude may be cogently defended by calling attention 
to the considerations which support the underlying.beliefs. 
The attitude will be presumably more acceptable to the 
listener if the beliefs are defensible. 1 Persons with the 
same beliefs will often differ in attitude, Stevenson says, 
calling for the use of emotionally-toned words to add addi-
tional force to one's argument. We would feel that a differ-
ence in attitude is alw~s indicative of a difference in 
belief. The nphen6tl1enal fieldn of one person who favors a 
moral statement is different from that of another who opposes 
it. The more objective aspects of the situation may be 
agreed upon by both parties, but its symbolic meaning is not 
the same to both. The use of feeling-tone language in moral 
argument may be effective·strategy, not because people wish 
to be "commanded", as Stevenson says, but because such lan-
guage changes the phenomenal field more readily than the 
cold language of logic. We have observed that evaluation 
1 Cf. C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language ••• , p. 29. 
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is mainly dramaturgic, with its decisive roots expending be-
low the surface of logico-verbal discourse. The language of 
persuasion changes attitude, not because people are irrational, 
as Stevenson implies, but because they are moved by the deeper 
rationality of dramaturgic evaluation. Such evaluation 
finds effective use of the value-charged imagery which emotion• 
ally-toned words convey. In fact, the deeper layers of 
evaluation have a greater "regard for representation" than 
the narrower logic of verbal discourse has. 1 
B. The Functional Meaning of Verbal Expressions. 
Stevenson shares the major weakness of the logical 
positivists. Positivists refuse to bless anything with the 
title "knowledge" unless it takes the form of snytactic 
statements describing an operation of the type found in 
the physical sciences. This means that by the arbitrary 
fiat of definition all expressions of the subtle shades of 
meaning found in prescriptive statements, or any other 
uniquely private psychic events, are termed noncognitive. 
People. may argue with rational cogency about the facts of 
1cf. in this connection Stevenson's chapter on Per-
suasion in Ethics and Language, and the concise criticism 
of this view of persuasion made by J.N. Garver, "On the 
Rationality of Persuading", Mind (April, 1960), Vol. LXIV, 
No. 274), p. 174. 
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a case,· but attitudes or interests can be influenced only 
by semi-hypnotic suggestion or subtle appeals to irrational 
authority. 
We can observe from our study of Freud and Sullivan 
that a verbal expression is a·decision, which bears the 
marks. of its birth in subconscious evaluation. We do not 
use a word unless we intend ·e·ither to express or disguise 
some significant truth about our total life situation or 
some part of it. We can say with Brand Blanshard that "words 
are used very much as checks are used, to transfer accumulated 
stores."1 
This is true not only of words used in a logical 
syntax, but as we saw above, of words which bear primary 
fruit in an emotive realm. Far more revolutd:onary from the 
positivist standpoint is the psychiatric assumption t~at 
nonverbal commur1ications such as gestures and facial ex-
p:ressions, as well as the mainly preverbal communications 
found in dreams, daydreams, insight, and artistic imagery, 
reveal the relatively predictable and .inherently rational 
. nature of subconscious processes. This may turn out to be 
1Brand Blanshard, ttThe Impasse in Ethics, and a Way 
Outn, in The Philosophical Forum (Vol. XVII, 1959-60), p. 18. 
' ' 
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the major epistemological contribution of the psychothera-
pists in our time. 
Edward S. Tauber and Maurice R. Green have done a 
constructive job of assimilating the insights of Freud, 
Sullivan, and others at this point. 1 They term unconscious 
evaluative processes "prelogical experiencen. The term 
"preverbal experience", which is also in current use, may 
be more adequate, since as Tauber and Green observe, these 
forms of experience are not extra-logical, but inherently 
logical, in a Uegelian or dramaturgic sense. Thus dreams 
employ absurdities, contradictions, and space-time trans-
positions, but they evidence a basic "regard for intelligi-
bility" in the way in which fragments of experience and 
memories of events are creatively arranged in intelligible 
h . 2 synt esJ.s. Myths and dreams have a logic of their own. 
Far from denying truth to emotionally-charged ex-
pression, the typical psychotherapist observes a more 
broadly significant truth underlying them. Creative hunches, 
then, though they arise outside the logico-verbal context: 
lgdward s. Tauber and Maurice R. Green, Prelogical 
Experience (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959:) 
2 Ibid., p. 13. 
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come to a person in a particular symbolic 
form pregnant with a sense of value, interest, 
and excitement. The strongly felt hunch puts 
one in touch with the deeper emotional content 
of the creative unconscious.l 
The purpose of logico-verbal syntax is to facil~tate, to 
communicate, or perhaps to disguise the depth evaluative 
processes. The preverbal modes of experience, then, 
i. have an internal logic which can be discovered by depth 
analysis, and ii. this deeper meaning can be explained, 
clarified, and communicated in syntactical form. In inter-
personal relationships,. with which ethics is primarily 
concerned, syntactical expressions lose validity to the 
extent that they become isolated from or distortive of the 
deeper truth of preverbal mod~s of experience. Dishonesty 
in feeling-tone expression, as i~lustrated, for instance, 
in the typical "Dale Carnegie" approach in interpersonal 
relationships comes under syspicion in this context. 
Stevenson assumes that anythingwhich is not asked 
in the form of discursive logic and answered by reference 
to a physical operation is not truth. Feeling, formless 
desires, interests, and immediate experience are outside 
the realm of truth. The whole weight of modern psycho-
therapy leads one to questionnthis positivistic bias. 
1rbid., p. 3. 
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<J. Ethics as External •. 
Precisely because Stevenson is committed to the 
denial of rational validity to preverbal evaluative pro-
cesses, he externaliz.es ethics. The model of ethical dis-
course he assumes limits ethics to the persuasive statements 
of a moral judge. He does not see that such statements 
presuppose the judge as moral thinker. Ethics is reduced 
to that of irrational authority, so decisively criticized 
by Fromm.in Man for Himself. 
This ·may be the fate of any ethic which denies the 
rationality of obligation. Stevenson can see nothing in 
obligation beyond the expression of personal taste other 
than the peculiar force of emotion which attends the former. 
He sees that taste .may relate to rational appraisal, but 
emotion is purely arbitrary. 
We would observe in this connection thatt: the ex-
perience of obligation roots in. an evaluation of an inter-
per·sonal situation as. it relates to the coherent structure 
of one's life. My imputing obligation to another carries 
the meaning that I judge his situation to be such that he 
will avoid a prescribed course of action~Jonly at the peril 
of guilt- or shame-anxiety or the various consequences of 
broken commitment. In commending moral behavior to a person 
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I pay him the compliment of supposing his own evaluative 
capacities to be intact. My evaluations may, of course, 
be marred by my excessive need to dominate the other 
party, or by my own compulsive rigidities, in which case 
I may employ Stevenson's ethical tactics. The relation-
ships which Stevenson considers normative for ethics would 
be regarded as pathological by psychotherapists, except 
for some of the orthodox psychoanalysts, who see sadistic 
overtones in all morality. 
III. Comments on Blanshard' s Thl!c.rx,. , 
It is the ·judgment of this author that the thought of 
Brand Blanshard rests generally upon solid psychological and 
ethical ground. We have concluded that obligation is a com-
plex anxiety-interest experience, growing out of an underly-
ing evaluative process, and·relating organismically to the 
tasks required for actualization of a coherent self within 
a social field. Blanshard:· leads ethical dialogue in a 
direction which would promise to make full use of a per-
spective of this type. 
A. Good Related to Satisfaction. 
The concept of "good" is rescued from the impasse 
in which G.E. Moore mired it. "Good11 is recognized, not as 
a simple, non-natural quality open to immediate experience, 
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but as a rich concept with varied connotations. Goodness is 
rooted once again in the human quest, and given meaning in 
terms of human interests and desires. The tendency of the 
traditional interest theories to equate the desired with the 
desirable is avoided by showing that desires undergo criti-
cal examination as experienc·e and maturity are gained. 1 The 
desirable grows out of experience with the desired, but 
"ought to be" is not limited to what uis". A.H. Maslow and 
others have insisted that certain "instinctoid needs" have 
an imperative ·quality in human nature, asserting themselves 
in distorted form under conditions.of deprivation, but never 
disappearing entirely.· This lends credence to Blanshard's 
view that goodness may be identified_ with. the r~alization 
of certain inherent impulses. ·The criterion of goodness is 
not limited to satisfying feeling alone, but to "satisfact-
oriness" or satisfaction in union with fulfillment. The 
steady, persistent pursuit of immanent human goals, enriched 
by moments of satisfaction, becomes. the source of goodness. 
B. Obligation Related to Good. 
The concept of "ought" and the experience of obli-
gation are once again seen as integral aspects of the 
~or a critical study of interest theories in ethics, 
see Thomas E. Hill," Contemporary Ethical Theories ••• , Chapter 
XIV. 
313 
human quest for good. The deontologists were led by their 
wish to salvage the imperative flavor of "ought" to insist 
that it had nothing to do with value. Blanshard answers 
their arguments effectively, and yet agrees that obligation 
is a categorical imperative •. 
As we have done in this paper, he explicates tha~ 
imperative in terms of the logic of human nature as it takes 
form within a J.social structure. The logical "oughtn is a 
form of the ethical "ought". While logical-ethical excell-
ence may be admired for its intrinsic worth, and may become 
a central goal of living in its own right, the true 
function of logic and ethical obligation is to order human 
experience so as to facilitate the achievement of value. 
C. Cognition and Conation Interrelate. 
Cognition and conation are seen as concomitants. 
Not only does reason legislate among desires, it is inherent 
in the very formation of desires. Impulses have their own 
implicit logic; rudimentary intelligence is at work at the 
very base of human striving. Imaginative anticipation and 
retrospective evaluation give eyes and understanding to 
desire. Reason for Blanshard always has a teleological cast 
suggestive of Freud's dramaturgtc. dream-work. While his 
language suggests the rationalisti~ identification of reasoning 
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with logical-verbal·discourse, unconscious mental processes 
are immanently rational. In a.ll knowing, understanding grows 
through a process in which the "germinal becomes the mature, 
the potential the actual; in which I become what I had it iri 
me to become. nl Immanent purpo~e is at work from the rudi-
mentary first steps.of perception. "This identical and con-
tinuous element has been working in darkness, freeing itself 
from irrelevancy, organizing its matter, enlarging its scope, 
until it is fully formed and ripe. 112 The immanent end of 
this subconscious dramaturgic reasoning is nto achieve a 
state of insight that will bring the theoretic impulse to 
rest.n3 . Until that state is reached, the cognitive impulse 
is restless under the obligation to complete:i.itstt:a~sk. J.:It~.is 
this immanent purpose, not only to know but to realize the 
goal of its being, which we have expanded to encompass the. 
entire self and identified with ethical obligation, apparent-
ly with the implied blessing of certain psychotherapists. 
Anxiety expresses the peculiar urgency of that task when the 
issue is in doubt. 
1Brand Blanshard, The Natlire of Thought ••• , Vol. I, 
pp. 482. 
2Ibid., p. 483. 3 . . Ibid.) p. 489. 
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D. . Concept o:f Self-actuali~_ation Required. 
While Blanshard sees goodness, obligation, and 
evaluation as they relate to the fulfillment of impulses, 
he apparently offers no conception of self-actuali~ation. 
He defines the summum~.bonum as "the most comprehensive ful-
fillment and satisfaction of impulse-desire."l His view of 
obligation would lead him to see the ethical end, not as the 
greatest possible fulfillment of impulse-desires, but of the 
coherent life as realized through fulfillment of impulse-
desires. His view of the final ideal, however, suggests 
atomistic impulse-satisfactions. 
Blanshard says that desires carry broad implications, 
and it is the work·of intelligence to apprehend these. Thus: 
The intelligence at work within desire, 
starting from the end of a single impulse, 
widens and modifies the prospect so that 
the final election is by the massed votes of 
many independent impulse-desires ••.• When 
election time comes, the impulses vote in 
blocks. 2 
This conceptual model suggests a democraey of atomistic 
impulse-desires, loosely ordered by_one among their number, 
the epistemic impulse. Several-questions can be raised about 
1Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness •.• , p. 311. 
2Ibid., p. 351. 
. ~ \., 
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this: i. Desires carry broad implications which reason 
apprehends. Implications for whom? Reason is a function 
i a person, defining the implications of all experiences for 1 
i 
the person, and judging among impulses in an organismic con-1 
I 
I 
text. Blanshard tends to hypostatize reason as Freud hypo- \ 
I 
statized the three elements of the tripartite self. ii. D4es 
not the logical nature of oblig~tion point .to one center by\ 
I 
which all value is defined? Blanshard often says that the 1 
immanent end of each impuise defines its goal. Thus the 
end of the epistemic impulse is to achieve understanding, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
the end of the aesthetic impulse to find beauty. I Goodness I 
and obligation are cOJnpletely relative to fulfillment of I 
these impulses and attendant satisfactions. Let us suppos.e ,I 
however, that these impulses belong to a highly intelligent \ 
I 
i 
and sensitive boy in an agricultural connnui:lity where intell-\ 
i 
ectual and aesthetic interests are identified with the feminr 
I 
I pain of hnmiliation. It becomes apparent that the impulse- I 
ine sex-role, and therefore must be carefully hidden under 
desires will take their meaning from the total context of a \ 
person's life. We do not seek satisfaction-fulfillment 
alone, but a Gestalt of experience which includes them in 
some unity satisfactory to the self as a whole. iii. Do 
impulse-desires "vote in clusters" or does a person vote for 
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or against the fulfillment of certain impulse-desires, per-
haps at the,expense of another, or even at the e:xpense of 
suffering the deprivation symptoms2 Blanshard often speaks 
of this sort of conflict, in which the person must care~ 
fully weigh his interests and talents, and vote to major in 
one thing and minor in another. He does not fully see that 
one's total life may take on the nature of an impulse, defined 
in complex self-role imagery. Adler's "use" psychology 
speaks to the manner in which all aspects of experience be-
come assimilated, selected, and ordered as though,·:they were 
in the hire of the person to which they belong. Similarly, 
Goldstein, Maslow and others have demonstrated beyond 
question the organismie character of the self, which takes 
shape as much by the process. of exclusion of impulsive aims 
as inclusion of them. The important point is that the logic 
inherent in each impulse does not define obligation; rather 
the logic inherent in the impulse for self-actualization so 
defines it. As satisfaction bows before fulfillment in 
BiLanshard;~s system, so fulfillment must bow before the highe.r 
court of self~actualization. Fulfillment of any impulse is 
in some sense fulfillment of a self, or it is no fulfillment 
at all. 
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E. The Self is Defined Within a Social Field. 
Blanshard affirms that duties relate to the re-
quirements necessary to maintain the social order. The 
imperative quality of obligation is a reflection of the 
imperative need to maintain society. Why must society be 
maintained? It is necessary to sustain human life, Blan-
shard m~ght reply. Why is society necessary to sustain 
human life? Because a ·:dependable social order is required 
for the achievement of impulse-desires. Does this explain 
the intensity ofguilt, shame, and obl,igation? 
We must see that the coherent structure of the 
self is defined in relation to an interpersonal field. A 
person's entire cognitive set is oriented in terms of "schema 
of apperception" (Adler)~. "frames of orientation and devo-
tion" (Fromm), which relate more or less veridically to the 
actual molar structure of social and cosmic·reality. A per-
son becomes a person .and knows who and where he is as he 
formulates his role, or his identity with reference to his 
place in a world of persons and keil.atiohs.c .. Erotn:,this·:'!we.::~can 
see that the threat of guilt-anxiety strikes at the very 
heart of personal existence; that it is further complicated 
by the deeper threat of lost confidence in one's capacity to 
define his life at all. Add to thisi:picture the danger of 
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the serious surgery which may be inflicted upon the soul 
with the alienation.of loved ones, and we can understand 
why the imperative of obligation becomes categorical in a 
way Kant barely dreamed. Now the rules of interpersonal 
.. relations take on a mien, not of a game, as Blanshard pic-
. tures it, but a drama of life or death. Perhaps the imperial 
nature of obligation is never fully appreciated until we 
place it beside the black pit of Sullivan's anxiety. 
The ideal person in Blanshard's thought is the 
·serene rationalist, moving sagely through the world, achiev-
ing satisfying fulfillment of his rational and aesthetic 
impulse-desires. Why, in this view, is it not always more 
rational to satisfy my impulse-desires, and advance my well-
being, though at the expense of my neighbor? I dare not 
violate the logic of community, Blanshard might reply. But 
what is the ground of that communal structure? Aaler, Fromm, 
and Sullivan, and Freud in spite of himself, would affirm 
that the inner logic of personal fulfillment commits us to 
the correlative logic of communal order. Social interest 
(Adler), productive love (Fromm), intimacyneeds (Sullivan), 
belongingness and.iove needs (Maslow), are not optionals in 
human living. Self;...fulfillment is fullness of love. It is 
the investment of one's powers creatively and constructively 
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in the world of persons.· It is, further, the imaginative 
projection of all. that such a world ought to be to sustain 
the lives of those who live and move within it. 
F. Evil Roots in Goodness.· 
Goodness and obligation are integral to human 
nature, and defined by that nature, Blanshard says. The 
question then becomes, which human nature? Hatred and indi-
gence are common enough to human beings, and may be said to 
constitute human nature. Freud, as we noted, postulated 
the ndeath wish" as a vital aspect of human nature, and thus 
often sppke of guilt, the death wish turned back upon self, 
as the tragic mark of our huma.n·fate, stemming not from our 
inherent good, but rather from oUr inherent evil. Why 
should we not·say,.with Kluckhohn, that every society is 
characterized by "free-floating aggression", an impulse-
desire which must find an outlet?1 Blanshard's rational 
impulse may as legitimately be employed for hostile as for 
benevolent purposes, then. His aesthetic impulse may find 
legitimate appreciation in the objects of sadistic desires, 
as the "beast of Buchenwald" admired lamp-shades made of 
human skin. 
1 . Cf. Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice ••• , 
p. 358 •. 
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Blanshard defines evil as· failure of impulse-desire, 
either to reach fulfillment, or·to achieve satisfaction, or 
both. Such failure is attributed to weakness, ignorance, or 
some other incapacity. He further defines evil as the eut~~ 
ttim,g off of good, through "disproportion between inner power 
and outer circumstance."l Presumably, then, it would be 
evil for free-floating aggression to remain unful-filled or 
frustrated. 
It becomes apparent that if goodness and obligation 
are to be grounded in human nature, we must find some good 
reason for evil impulse. That is, we must demonstrate that 
evil impulse would be good if it could. There is ample 
clinical evidence that such is the case. Hostility is not 
an impulse, but the distortion of an impulse. 2 Thus, Maslow 
says that we. know 
p. 359. 
nasty aggression is reactive rather than basic, 
effect rather than cause, because as a nasty 
person gets healthier in psychotherapy, he 
gets less v;i.cious; and as a healthier person 
gets more sick, he changes in the direction of 3 ~ hostility, more venom, and more viciousness. 
l . . 
Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness ••• , p. 338. 
2cf. Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice ••• , 
3A.H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 346. 
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Similarly, Adler's "striving on the commonly useless side", 
Fromm's "nonproductive orientation", and Sullivan's "malevo-
lent transformation" afford ample clinical evidence that evil 
impulse is the tragic distortion of an inherent goodness. 
G. Constructive Identification With Moral Struggle. 
Blanshard defines the ideal in its end-terms. 1 In 
Blanshard's chapter on "The Rational Temper" we see a picture 
of the serene intellectual, who, among other characteristics, 
would be "clever in the manipulation of logico-mathema.tical 
2 
symbols." One wonders whether the classic charge against 
Spinoza's ethics might also be leveled at Blanshard--only a 
philosopher can be virtuous. 
Do we not need a view of rationality which allows 
room for the average person? Cannot we admire the reason-
ableness of a plumber's life, or that of the typical house-
wife? Even more important is the insight coming from psycho-
therapy that a neurotic or psychotic person may in his own 
handicapped way evidence amazing courage and insight, and 
even more startling, that his emotional disturbances may be 
1 Cf. A.H. Maslow, MOtivation and Personality ••• , 
Chapters 12 and 13, for a psychological parallel. 
2Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness ••• , p. 412. 
' ~ • \ ~ .,•· I • -~,;. t 
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tragic testimony to the tenacious persistence of all that is 
good in human life. 
One wonders whether a major task of ethics might not 
always remain that of constructive identification with per-
sons who are involved in the struggle for the achievement of 
value, always in some degree under conditions of deprivation. 
If reason is dramaturgic in nature, there would be added 
power to an ethic which meshes into the unfinished drama of 
human living. The nature of guilt-shame cycles indicates 
that unless it is characterized by a therapeutic dimension 
the facile verbalization of the ideal may increase despair 
and· thus be of· negative moral value. In this sense, we see 
more positive ~oral value in the methodology of the psycho-
therapist and the social psychologist than we do in Blan-
shard's counsels of ,Perfection. 
To moralize is not necessarily to be rele-
vant, effective, or even moral. Understand-
ing a situation existentially is important 
to being ethically perceptive about it.l 
These considerations offer some evidence that the 
task-orientation of philosophical ethics might undergo a 
1cameron Hall, "The Church and Whose World?", in The 
International Journal of Religious Education, and available 
as a reprint from the National Council of Churches, New York. 
324 
major shift. We can only hint at the directions such a 
movement might well take. Surely ethics must speak to the 
meaning of guilt, anxiety, and despair, even as it speaks 
of 11 self-actualizing persons" and ttthe rational temper". 
This is supported by the plain clinical fact that escape 
from the myriad guilt and anxiety traps into which one may 
become enmeshed is possible only as the victim is enabled 
first to understand and accept himself. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation has involved a study of the ex-
perience of obligation, "oughting", or conscience. It has 
sought an answer to the question: to what extent and in 
what sense may conscience be said to be cognitive? On the 
preliminary assumption that conscience is related to guilt 
and shame, a search was made through the writings of certain 
psychotherapists to see what empirical data could be discovered 
about these experiences. The cognitive function was investi~ 
gated, in_ t_he broad sense in which the cognitive psychologists 
use the term to refer to the conscious and unconscious refer-
ential processes by which experience is selectively ordered 
and schematized into meaningful patterns. The writings of 
psychotherapists were found to be a fertile source of stimu-
lating· suggestion on this subject. 
It is important to note here that the criterion em-
ployed in arriving at the conclusions in thts chapter is not 
conformity to psychiatric theory. A critique of psychiatric 
theory itself is offered from time to time. The criterion 
is rather that of empirical coherence. The problem is to 
arrive at a view of obligation which is coherent with the 
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actual experience of obligation. The observations and re-
flections of psychotherapists are searched for light they 
may shed on the:matura~tofi .~7hhi1s C!bri:i.p lex·:~iexpeni:ence. 
Where the nature of obligation is concerned it is 
the judgment of this writer that the testimony of psycho-
therapists is ofunique evidential value, for the following 
reasons: 1). The most abundant. data on the anxieties and 
feelings which arise from the struggle of persons to create 
value in their lives is found in the psychiatric literature. 
By and large, theologia~s and psychother~pists have dominated 
discussions of guilt and shame in the;1past few dec~des. Many 
of the theologians,. such as Albert Outler and Paul Tillich, 
for instance, have been strongly influenced by theppsychiatric 
viewpoint. 2). The data from psychotherapy have been amass-
ed after untold hours of the most rigorous kind of intro-
spection, engaged in by countless numbers of persons under-
going therapy. 3). Psychiatric observations based upon thts 
introspection ·have been subject' to the scrutiny of numerous 
consultations among professional persons who have been ex-
tensively trained in the fine art of grasping subtle·shades 
of meaning in verbal communication, and in detecting behind 
the words people use the hidden truth conveyed in visceral 
react~ons, symbolic acts, and tone of voice. 4). The 
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situation in therapy is unique in that it encourages the 
utmost attention to the patient's total situation in pro-
visional isolation from conventional commitments, even in-
cluding logical commitments no philosophical or theological 
ideologies. In therapy rationalizations may be exposed, 
defenses lose their coping value, distortion of reality by 
repression or projection may be mitigated, and deep insight 
achieved. 
This is not to imply, however, that a neatly coherent 
view of obligation is to be found in psychiatric theory. 
Certain common elements appeared to emerge as the study moved 
from Freud to Adler, Fromm, and Sullivan, however. It is 
instructive that so many explicit conclusions made by Adler, 
Fromm, and Sullivan were assumed by Freud in spite of his 
theoretical commitments. Th±s may give evidence of the steady, 
stubborn emergence of a coherent view which :is prefigured in 
the data t~emselves. 
The first nour in the series of conclusions which 
follow represent elements in a view of obligation which 
seemed indicated by the psychological study. The fifth con~ 
elusion is a summary statement of the major thesis of the 
dissertation. The remaining conclusions represent a critique. 
of the ethical positions of Prichard, Sullivan, and Blanshard. 
328 
1. Obligation is a complex experience with a 
negative pole:of anxiety and a positive pole of interest, 
or organismic involvement with an uncompleted task. 
Freud identified guilt with anxiety; in fact, in 
Freud's writings anxiety is invariably the threat arising 
from guilty· desires. Freud perceived that guilt includes 
a component of self-directed hostility, and that this hosti-
lity attacks the ego, giving rise to deeper layers of anxiety. 
Piers, Adler, Fromm, and Sullivan identify this deeper anxiety 
as threat which grows out of the need for self-esteem and 
self-realization. These two levels of anxiety, which we have 
termed guilt and shame, must be carefully distinguished. Guilt 
is anxiety arising from actual or desired transgression of a 
moral norm; shame is anxiety springing from a threat to the 
inner coherence and competence of the self. That they are 
distinct ~henomena is born out by the.guilt-shame cycles 
described by Piers and Fromm, in which guilt and shame are 
reciprocally reinforced in a self-perpetuating syndrome. A 
sense of obligation includes anticipation of guilt- or shame-
anxiety or a combination of the two, and may be identified 
with mtld twinges of signal-anxiety. 
In addition to anxiety, however, we concluded that 
obligation includes a component of interest. Peter A. Bertocci 
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points to the qualitative difference between feelings of 
anxiety and feelings of guilt, and to the presence of an 
obligatory or impelling component to guilt. It may be 
suggested that a sense of obligation always points to the 
imperative to complete a functional system. Tunning to 
Freud's work, we discover the concept of interest, or 
"psychic value" which is.invested in ideas according to their 
significance to the self. He saw that guilt"anxiety is 
aroused when a segmental interest threatens to overwhelm 
one's total range of interests. Sullivan discussed the "fas-
cination11·which·surrounds a dissociated psychic system, and 
Robert White utilized the term "inculi>ation" to express the 
way in which compulsive engrossment in a repressed experience 
may intensify as time:· ensues. Theodore Sarbin reveals that 
this pathological interest ison a continutnn with more benign 
interests. He points to degrees of "organismic involvement" 
attending the enacting of a role, which may range from a mild 
playfulness to a hysterically-induced death. Since a role is, 
from the subjective standpoint, a complex, coherent system of 
images referent to the self and its integration with the inter-
personal environment, we can see that interest expresses a 
restless search for completion of a life pattern. 
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2. The anxiety-interest complex described as 
obligation is organismically coherent with creative eval-
uation, which is in large measure preverbal in character 
and dramaturgic in form. 
Freud thought of guilt as a primitive "given" which 
distorts evaluation; we demonstrated, however, that even 
this "irrational" gui).t.presupposes extensive preconscious 
evaluation. Freud's therapeutic goal was to reveal the 
intrapsychic system within which guilt is invariably reason-
able. Freud revealed that the preconscious evaluative 
activity of dream-work is dramaturgic in form, similar to 
the creative work·of a p~et or an artist. In fact, the term 
"dramaturgic'~', \:Whii.eh comes from Phillip Rieff, suggests the 
task of creating a drama. Freud saw that guilt-anxiety 
stimulates this depth evaluation, which while its immediate 
· purpose is to avoid guilt, its ultimate purpose is value-
achievement. 
Adler and Sullivan saw shame-anxiety as relating 
closely to depth evaluation. The self-system is constructed 
by unconscious evaluative activity, and once constructed 
continues to function as the central core in terms of which 
all experience is ordered. Gradient anxiety is an intimate 
component of this evaluative activity, both prodding it to 
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function and sh~plieDqing .it into one mode or another. 
Anxiety is described as "gradient" to express the manner in 
which mild intensities stimulate depth evaluation as we anti-
cipate its rising trend, or initiate psychic defense if it 
becomes too threatening. 
Similarly, interest fluctuates with the assessed 
value of a situation. Freud always assumed that the feeling-
tone and level of preoccupation a~companying an experience is 
reasonably correlated with a hidden value-system which defines 
its meaning. Adler and Fromm described the way in which 
immanent values associated with self-realization are served 
by the cognitive ordering of all experience. Sullivan showed 
that attention varies with significance. 
We conclude that the-experience of obligation, or even 
the presence of ego-defenses which reveal a hidden guilt, are 
adequate evidence that creative, in-process judgments are being 
made through a complex process of subconscious evaluation. 
Even pathological or chronic guilt reveals penetrating insight 
into one's actual situation, either as it is defined by un-
fortunate interper-sonal relations or by the inappropriate 
retention of a childhood role in the inte):'ests of security. 
Similarly, the pathological interest.associated with obsessive-
compulsive behavior indicates a rea:};;istic.:·.crisis~cin." abl:L.gation • 
.. . • ~ 
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This organismic relationship between the experience 
of obligation and depth evaluation appears to justify our 
thesis that conscience is functionally cognitive, in the 
broader integrative sense of the term. A sense of obligation 
is always reasonable within some coherent context, although 
it may require a depth analysis to discover what that con-
text might be. 
3. The evaluative processes which interact with the 
. . 
anxiety and interest gradients·are a functional tool of a 
self in its struggle for actualization and expansion. 
Freud took the position that guilt is irrational, 
that primary process !thinking is distortive of reality, and 
that the self is tripartite.· in nature. In his work on dreams, 
however, Freud assumed that evaluation; gutlt~anxiety, and 
interest are coordinated functions of a coherent self, as it 
faces not only the unreasonable tasks posed by a neurotic 
trend, but the contemporary tasks of normal life as well. 
Adler helped us to.see that shame-anxiety is the 
negative side of a positive teleology of self-actualization. 
He was the first theorist to observe clearly that the unifded 
self is a cognitive construct, and that the ego-ideal which 
guides self-evaluation is itself an imagmnative projection of 
creative thought, even though that thought is largely pre-
'· ,, ' 
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conscious. Fromm, tqo, saw conscltence as a concomitant of 
the imperious urging of. our hidden potentiality. Sullivan, 
similarly, saw the self as a product of npersonification", 
which is an unconscious process of creative evaluation, 
guided in part by the fluctuating intensity of shame-anxiety. 
Our investigation appears to lead toward a view of 
self-actualization. .These characteristics must be affirmed 
of the self; 1) It is an organismic unity formed by a pro-
cess of dramaturgic evaluation. 2) A positive growth prin-
ciple, or the actualization and expansion of an inherent 
self-ideal, must supplement the closed biological systems 
of Freud, Adler, and Goldstein. 3) The vacuous self of 
Fromm and Sullivan must be supplemented by some conception 
of inherent structure and need, such as we see in Maslow and 
the Gestaltists. 4) The defensive self of Freud and Sullivan 
must be seen as presupposing a more positive conception of the 
self such as may be illustrated by Maslow's "self-actualizing 
personn or Robert White's. "effectance motivation". Tlii.e,~de­
fensive self presupposes the self which is defended, and the 
self which plots the defense. 
4. The self is actualized in dynamic interaction with 
a social field, with other persons, but also with the molar 
structures which define the social field. 
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Freud assumed in his treatment of dreams that we 
experience guilt because of our depth understanding that we 
are tempted to threaten the social fabric which affords our 
love objects and defines our life. All three of the social 
psychiatrists developed some conception of love as an 
immanent goal of all striving. Adler saw ttsocial feeling" 
as the "only salvation" from chronic shame-anxiety. Fromm's 
"productive orientation", which is the hidden standard 
implicit irt conscience, is best characterized as mature love. 
Sullivan termed anxiety the "need for interpersonal security", 
which prov:ldes for "tenderness needs". The experience of obli-
gation, then, in-so-far as it is anticipation of guilt or 
shame, points to the requirements of self-fulfillmertt in love. 
. There is more involved in obligation than the need 
for rewarding interpersonal relationships, however. Adler 
and Fromm saw that personality is shaped along the lines of 
some cognitive map or orienting schema, which corresponds 
ideally to a perceptive eduction of the molar characteristics 
of the interpersonal and cosmic environment. When anxiety 
prevents one from interacting openly and freely with his 
environment, "private schema" are formulated. The role 
psychologists see that one's personal identity is of one 
fabric with one's working conception of the interpersonal 
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environment. Personal identity, then, is defined in terms 
of the molar structure which characterizes the social organi-
zation necessary to sustain human life. Guilt- and shame-
anxiety signal some threat to this structure and hence to one's 
personal identity. Organismic involvement (attention, inter-
est) relates to the tasks required to sustain the Gestalt of 
one's role, or personal identity as it is defined in an inter-
personal and cosmic environm.ent. Obligation, then, has an 
imperious quality precisely because it roots deeply in the 
primal conditions of psychie life. 
5. Conscience is rational, in the sense that it is 
empirically coherent with the most inolusive human need, 
that of realizing and expariding self in community, and em-
pirically coherent with the unconscious inferential processes 
which accompany that quest. 
Conscience is often identified with conscious guilt. 
This identification is no doubt responsible for much of the 
discrediting of conscience as a moral index. There are many 
reasons why a person may choose to disguise his guilt as 
gr~ef, hostility, or something else. The ingenious ration-
alizations, projections, and transpositions by which persons 
discredit their own guilty conscience were well known even in 
ancient times. In this dissertation guilt. has not been 
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limited to the subjective experience qualified by the feel-
ing we ordinarily term guilt. It has been expanded, follow-
ing the psychoanalytic lead, to encompass the anxieties which· 
arise from the violation of a norm or law or the wish for 
such a violation. The presence of defensive devices against 
anxiety, if they reaate to forbidden wishes, are taken as 
evidence of guilt, whether guilt is subjectively felt or not. 
One's understanding of obligation changes drastically 
when one expands the meaning of guilt to its use in psychiatric 
theory. If one is\·:willing to concede that the term "con-
science" is roughly synonymous with a sense of obligation, 
the expansion of the latter term puts a different light upon 
. the rationality of conscience. Conscience has so often been 
discredited as a reliable moral index largely because it has 
been associated exclusively with conscious guilt, and hence 
deemed unreliable because of its vulnerability to distortion · 
by arbitrary motives and affects. 
When one sees conscience as a sense of obligation ex-
pressing a very complex organismic state, the picture changes. 
A guilty person's conscience maythen·be revealed indirectly 
through anxiety defenses. Even fuether, we have said it may 
be revealedthrough a sense.of·bumiliation, or grief, or a 
chronic depression. We have said, too, that an investment of 
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interest in a task is evidence that one is, literally, 
obligated by it, or obliged to deal with it in some way. 
Looking at the psychic context of such complex 
phenomena, we seem to see a coherent pattern. We observe 
that at the heart of obligation is the deep need for per-
sons .to become fully themselves. The inner demand to live, 
to realize one's capabilities, to fulfill one '.s instinctoid 
needs, to expand one's horizons, and above all to order one's 
life into a harmonious and somewhat stable unity is expressed 
positively in organismic involvements, and negatively in 
fears of defeat and failure. 
This would seem to leave us with nothing in hand but 
·an ethic of enlightened self-interest, until we begin to take 
sermously the work of ih~erpersonal psychiatrists and the 
field theorists. A growing body of researchpy these men has 
tended to dramatize the internal relationship between the 
organization of personality and the 'interpersonal environment. 
Self-realization and self-expansion demand predictable, 
creative, and fruitful interaction between oneself and signi-
ficant others, within a de~ndably ordered pattern of social 
expectat~ons. The peculiar force of obligations which relat.e 
to the essential structure of community is mute testimony of 
this. The int.uitionists and others who have striven against 
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the utilitarians in ethics have been attempting to explicate 
the tenacious and even self-defeating way in which one may 
hold to such an obligation in ~pite of all utilitarian indi-
cations. In psychiatry Sullivan reveals the painful conse-
quences of secret, devious, and subjectively arbitrary acts 
and intentions. They represent serious personal threat be-
. cause of our deep perceptruan that they threaten the psycholo-
gical tendrils by which we hold to a meaningful place in 
society, and the fabric of trust within which :we are esteemed 
and thus can esteem ourselves. Such a pattern of trust tends 
to be clarified and specified as needed by a complex network 
of spoken and unspoken norms, expectations, and laws. 
To the extent that human needs are universal, as 
Maslow and others have argt}ed, they tend to define a universal 
ethic. Though it may be po~rly verbali~ed and even widely 
violated this immanent ethic makes· its presence known through 
the sufferings and triumphs of men. 
There is a type of rationality which is expre,ssed in 
conscience, · then, which may be deeper and more pervasive than 
the logic we use to explain conscience away. It is the immanent 
logic of the type expressed in the te&eology of .all living 
things, the organismic ordering of discrete elements into 
complex unities defined by the needs and nature of the parti~·<.~ .. -
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cular organism. Dramaturgic representation, or referential 
processes closely related to organic functions, accompany 
and guide the integration of life among men. Conventional 
systems of symbolic and verbal logic have evolved to facili-
tate this dramaturgic representation by sharply defining and 
relating objects and events, and by refining the art of inter-
personal communication. 
The contribution which logico-verbal systems have 
made to human life is of indescribable immensity. They have 
freed man from confinement to the narrow bounds of hig awn 
private world, and enabled him to transcend time and place 
by dreaming himself into the experience of myriad others of 
many generations. Such formal systems of logic are not with-
out their handicaps, however, as Freud revealed. ·While our 
explicit logical inferences are ideally coherent with the un-
conscious evaluations they purport to clarify, such may not 
be the case in actual practice. Thus an exaggerated need for 
autonomy, arising from a threatening situation or one's attrac-
tion to unintegrated and forbidden·wishes, may lead one to 
-employ the ingenuities of logic no distort and disguise one's 
deeper reasonings; even from oneself. In addition, intensive 
absorption in theoretical tasks can render a person a stranger 
to his own inner self. Alienation by verbalization, if the 
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truth were known, might be found .to be an escape from 
reality far more prevalent than alcoholiSm. 
Now, ethical reasoning may be the loyal servant of 
.the referential processes of depth, or it may abandon its 
servitude and set off on its own private quest. It may 
occupy itself only with the logical problems left over from 
our philosophical heritage, in which case it runs the risk 
of diverting attention to cognitive tasks which are peripheral 
in relation to more pressing moral problems. Or, if its goal 
becomes that of strict logical consistency or preci6e defini-
tion of terms, it may tend to block imaginative moral.insight. 
Wol,:'se, its closely structured logic may tend to falsify the 
moral processes it might have illuminated. Value-achievement 
is not logically neat; it is filled with subtle vaguaries, 
dramatic supptises, false starts and agonizing reappraisals. 
One primary task of ethical thinking, if it is to 
assist moral valuation, would seem to be that of clarifying 
and expediting the evaluative processes. It might turn to the 
history of ethics for the sharp delineation of recurrent pro-
blems, for immersion in a rich source of moral insight, and 
for the expansion of one's usable store of ethical concepts. 
It might turn to psychology for a deeper understanding of 
motivation, of universal human needs, of guilt and anxiety, 
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and of the emotional forces which may distort evaluation 
or restrict freedom. It might find in the social sciences 
the technical data required for wise decisions. To simplify 
.its complex task, it might center upon the major contemporary 
dilemmas with which men struggle, bringing all its resources 
to beat upon these problems. 
6. The thought of H.A. Prichard appears to be sound 
when he points to the unique experience of obligation as of 
central importance to ethics·, and when he says that obliga-
tion is "appreciated" fol~owing thoughtful consideration of 
a situation in "unreflective consciousness." These qualifica-
tions are indicated: 
1). "Unreflective consciousness" or "moral thinking" 
shouln ·not be seen as a separate ,cognitive function, as 
Prichard assumes, but rather as the evaluative function which 
we employ in every aspect of life. 
2). Prichard's view of obligation as "absolutely 
underivative and immediate" falsifies the complex subconscious 
evaluation which precedes any intuitive experience. An 
intuition is a creative ihstght. 
3). While a sense of obligation may be the only 
motivation for an act, Prichard says, yet obligati.on cannot 
be divorced from the good as the ethical deontologists generally 
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attempt to do. An experience of obligation is a value-
judgment, in that it is an expression of interest and an 
anticipation of anxiety in reference to the coherent value-
system which defines.one's very existence as a person. 
7. The emotivism of C.L. Stevenson is justified 
in its assertion that ethical statements are not primarily 
statements of fact, but express interest and emotion and 
prescribe a course of action. This critique of Stevenson's 
thought i$ offered, however: 
1). Stevenson appears to be in error when he asserts 
that prescriptive statements are noncognitive, in that they 
express no fact or belief. Psychiatric theorists reveal 
that interest and emotion vary with the assessed signifi-
cance of an experience for one's total well-being. A state-
ment of interest is a value-judgment, and hence is a cognitive 
ordering of experience. A prescriptive statement influences 
conduct, not because it is a.form of irrational suggestion, 
as Stevenson says, but because dramaturgic evaluation is 
particularly sensitive to the complex imagery of value-charged 
terms. 
2). The positivistic limitation of truth to logico-
. verbal discourse validated by a physical operation, which 
Stevenson accepts, appears to be invalid in the light of 
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modern psychiatric theory. Thus Tauber and Green, review-
ing the field, conclude that creative hunches, dreams, myths,. 
and value-c~arged expressions, though preverbal in form, 
evidence art internal logic, and express a deep and rich truth 
which syntactical expressions may or may not communicate. 
Our study of the evaluative function indicates that feeling-
tone expressions may be a typical and a valid medium of ethi-
cal communication. From the time of Freud we have known that 
words and neatly consistent logical systems may conceal as 
much truth ~s they reveal, depending upon the needs and pur-
poses of those who employ them. 
3). Stevenson externalizes ethics, failing to see 
that when a person imputes obligation to another, he reveals 
hi'S own extensive acquaintance with the inner experience of 
obligation, he makes an imaginative assessment of another's 
situation as one in which an experience of obligation would 
be justified, and he assumes the other person will experience 
obligation if he sees that it is relevant .to do so. 
8. Of the philospphe~s whose work was studied, 
Brand Blanshard seems most fully to have expressed the type 
of ethical perspective indicated by the clinical observa-
tions and theoretical formulations of psychotherapists. 
1). The concept of "good" is rooted in the values 
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defined by immanent human goals, and given rich meaning in 
terms of man's interests and desires. 
2). The imperative nature of obligation is sal-
vaged, but obligation is seen as a concomitant of value-
seeking. In contradistinction to the theories of the 
intuitionists and noncognitivists, obligation is coherent 
with goodness. 
3). Cognition and conation are seen as intimately 
related; reason for Blanshard :ils largely subconscious and 
dramaturgic, and ia inherent in the very formation of 
desires. 
9. While Blanshard sees· goodne·ss, obligation, and 
evaluation as coherently related to each other and to the 
fulfillment of impulse-desires, his theoretical system 
appears to require supplementation in several respects: 
1). Blanshard.defines the summum bonum as the 
fulfillment of atomistic impulse-desires, together with 
the accompanying satisfaction. He does not see that. the. 
total realization of one's life has the character of an 
impulse-desire, and that the mean~ng of individual impulses 
is defined by the holistic goal of self-actualization. 
2). Blanshard does not adequately account for the 
organismic relatedness between personal fulfillment and the 
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social field. He relates obligation to the logic of commu-
nity, but does not see that the inner logic of self-
actualization is of one cloth with the outer logic of 
community. 
3). Blanshard roots goodness and obligation in 
human nature, but we must turn to the clinical insights of 
psychologists such as Adler, Fromm, Sullivan, and Maslow 
to find strong evidence that the malevolent traits in human 
nature are tragic, limping manifestations of the more basic 
benevolent impulses. 
4). Blanshard defines ethics in its end-terms, 
identifying the ethical ideal of personality with an image 
of the serene intellectual. The focus of ethical dialogue 
might well shift from such counsels of perfection in the 
direction of a constructive identification with those who 
are involved in moral struggle, the interpretation of guilt 
and anxiety, and the work of redemption. 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem of the dissertation is the relationship 
between conscience and cognition. The plan of the work is 
to study guilt, shame, and the evaluative function in 
psychiatric theory, to define a view of obligation, and to 
offer a critique of certain ethical theories. The term 
"evaluative function" refers to the processes by which ex-
perience is ordered into meaningful symbols and patterns. 
The distinction made by Gerhart Piers between shame and 
guilt is employed. 
The first part of the dissertation is a study of 
guilt and the evaluative function in Freudian psychoanaly-
sis. Freud defined Super-ego guilt as the introjection of 
the punitive aspects of the parental image. In his work 
on dreams and wit, ho'to1ever, Freud assumed that· guilt stimu-
lates unconscious evaluation to facilitate value-achievement. 
Similarly, Freud's therapeutic goals were based on the assump-
tion that even pathological guilt is intelligible within 
some intrapsychic context. 
The second part of the work is an investigation of 
the thought of Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack 
Sullivan. These socially oriented psychotherapists deal 
extensively with self-esteem anxieties. They see the self 
as a product of the selective ordering of experience by 
creative processes which extend below the level of awareness. 
They affirm an immanent teleology of self-fulfillment in 
community. The anxieties defined in the dissertation as shame 
are seen as a correlate of the need for self-fulfillment. 
Shame is coherently related to value-achievement; pathologi-
cal shame is an intelligible response to some self-esteem 
cris;i.s. 
In the third part of the work a view of obligation 
indicated by the psychological study is utilized to develop 
a critique of three divergent ethical positions, those of 
H. A. Prichard, a deontologist; C. L. Stevenson, a noncogni-
tivist; Brand Blanshard, a rationalist. 
The conclusions are: 1). Obligation is a complex 
experience of signal-anxiety and interest~ Interest is de-
fined as organismic involvement with an unfinished task. 
2). Obligation is coherently ordered with creative evalua-
tion, which arises on the preverbal level and is dramaturgic 
in form; obligation is thus functionally cognitive, in the 
broad, integrative sense. 3). The evaluative function is 
an integrative tool of a self struggling for actualization. 
4). The self is actualized in dynamic interaction with a 
social field. 5). Conscience, or the experience of obliga-
tion, is therefore rational, in that it is coherent with the 
immanent organismic logic of self-fulfillment in community. 
6). H. A. Prichard makes obligation a separate cognitive 
function. He overlooks the depth evaluation which leads to 
an intuition of obligation. He divorces obligation from 
goodness, failing to see that obligation implies a value-
judgment. 7). c. L. Stevenson fails·to see that an emotive 
statement of interest follows evaluation, and is therefore 
cognitive. His positivistic limitation of truth is ca~led 
into question by the insight that preverbal forms of express-
ion have meaning as well as logico-verbal expressions. His 
externalistic ethic of imputation presupposes an inner ethic 
of obligation. 8). Brand Blanshard most fully expresses the 
ethical perspective suggested by the dissertation, rooting 
goodness in human interests, showing that obligation is a con-
comitant of value-seeking, and relating conation to depth eval-
uation. 9). Blanshard does not f~lly develop an ethic of 
self-realization, nor does he adequately explicate the correl-
ative relationship between the logic of community and the 
logic of self-fulfillment. 
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